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The heavy snowfall which occurred in Canterbury and North 
Otago from 5 to 7 August 1973 caused widespread and costly 
damage to electric power and telephone lines and buildings 
and disrupted access. Snow, and the heavy rain which fell 
during the period led to the death of at least 133,000 sheep 
and 4,100 cattle. Rescue and relief operations were expensive. 
The State alone paid out $139,366 to farmers, helicopter and 
bulldozer operators, and cartage contractors for livestock 
rescue and the provision of emergency feed. 
A distinctive feature of the snow was that it was at its 
deepest along the foothills and on the adjoining plains. 
Depths up to 130 cm (51 in.) were reported, and over five 
times this in drifts. 
This publication consists of a meteorological statement 
on the event followed by reports from the many bodies concerned 
with repairing communications or rescuing stock and stranded 
motorists. It also contains within these reports, and the 
reports of several post-event meetings, many suggestions for 
reducing damage and improving rescue efficiency in future. 
This is the principal value the Institute sees in 
compiling this document. 
--- J.G. Hughes 
Management Officer, 
Tussock Grasslands and 
Mountain Lands Institute, 
Lincoln College. 
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Abstract 
Section 1: Meteorological Aspects 
Meteorological Aspects 
Snowpack Measurements 
METEOROLOGICAL ASPECTS 
The snowstorm which began in Canterbury and North Otago on 5 August 
1973 was very severe in many low lying areas of Central and South 
Canterbury. Though the snowline was down to 150 metres in some places, 
snow depths of over 130 cm were recorded at points only 390 metres above 
sea level, and one station at 680 metres reported drifts six metres deep. 
The storm was characterised by very large increases of snow depth over 
short lineal distances on comparatively flat country. 
The total precipitation in the storm was high, having a return period 
of about 50 years at a few places and over 20 years at many others. As 
with most heavy snowfalls in New Zealand temperatures were near or a little 
above freezing point. Favourable conditions for such a development 
occurred during this period when a depression crossing from Tasmania to the 
South Island interacted with a large mobile anticyclone to the south of 
New Zealand to produce a line of intense convergence over and to the east 
of Canterbury. This convergence line developed several small cyclonic 
eddies within it and the deep convective cloud mass of one of these eddies 
produced the heavy precipitation of the storm. 
Introduction 
Heavy snowfalls above the 1000 metre level are a regular feature of 
wintertime weather in Canterbury and Otago. From time to time these snow-
falls also affect the plains and lowland areas (Tomlinson 1970). The 
local and infrequent nature of these storms makes the forecasting of them 
rather difficult. They always result from an unusual combination of 
meteorological events, which can be difficult to predict individually and 
even more difficult in combination. 
The snowfall described here is of interest because of the unusually 
large amounts of precipitation recorded. Within two days some places 
received precipitation totals calculated to have an average interval 
between recurrences of over 50 years. Such unusually heavy snow naturally 
produced a great deal of damage'. The Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
received claims for 630 buildings damaged by the snow. These were mainly 
farm buildings. Stock losses were extremely heavy with about 100,000 
sheep and 3,000 cattle perishing in the snow. Damage to power and 
telephone wires was extensive throughout the whole area of the storm and 
normal services were not restored in some areas until after 14 August. 
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Description of the Snow 
The snow which began on 5 August 1973 was preceded by rain in most 
areas and in fact in all areas below the 800 metre contour. The rainfall 
moved over North Otago and Canterbury from the west and south. At 0600 
hours* the leading edge of the rain area lay from about 25 km north of 
Dunedin to Lake Pukaki and northwards to just west of Lake Coleridge and 
by 1800 hours the rain had spread over most of Canterbury except the 
Christchurch-Banks Peninsula area. 
Though the rain did spread uniformly over Canterbury and North Otago 
the snow did not. There were only fifteen meteorological reports of the 
time at which the snow started, and this was probably because the transi-
tion from rain to snow was gradual in many areas. At Alford Forest 
(390 m a.s.l.) the snow began at 1700 hours while at Double Hill (762 m 
a.s.l.) it began about 1900 hours. The rather erratic times of snow 
commencement indicate the delicate balance between rain and snowfall, for 
there was no clear relation between the height or position of a place and 
the time at which the snow began. 
The maximum snow depths produced by the storm are shown in figure 1. 
Many observers noted difficulty in measuring this item because of consider-
able drifting in some places and also because the snow was so deep. At 
Lilybank Lodge at the north of Lake Tekapo, drifts six metres deep were 
reported, while at Mount John at the southern end of the Lake, drifts of 
four metres were recorded. Glendale Station 25 km northwest of Palmerston 
repbrted drifts of four and a half metres around the homestead. Many 
other places did not experience much drifting since the surface winds 
varied considerably and were quite light in some places. 
Mr A.P. Ryan (Meteorologist in Charge, Christchurch Airport) flew 
from Christchurch to Queenstown on 9 August and observed the pattern of 
snow drifts. Over the Canterbury Plains from about the 300 m to the 600 m 
level he noted that drifting showed evidence of a constant southwest wind 
during the snowfall. Further south the mountainous nature of the country 
made wind direction estimates difficult but winds appeared to have been 
strong. In the Lindis Pass area the snowdrifts showed evidence of a strong 
north wind. 
Mr Ryan observed that the direction and speed of the wind-flow which 
prevailed, strongly influenced the distribution of the total amount of 
snow. Heaviest falls occurred on the eastern slopes of the foothills of 
the Southern Alps, while a large area of the Mackenzie Basin was sheltered 
and received no snow but was surrounded by snow in all directions, and the 
western slopes of the foothills and the Southern Alps themselves received 
only light or moderate snowfalls. 
Throughout the duration of the snow, a very strong southeasterly 
wind flowed on to the South Isiand south of Christchurch, the belt of 
strongest winds moving on to the coast of the South Canterbury Bight on the 
south side of the active convergence zone or front shown in map 1200 hours 
*All times are NZST 
5 August of figure 2. It appears that the airstream of very cold air was 
partly blocked from crossing the Southern Alps by lighter and contrary 
winds in upper levels of the atmosphere as well as the great mass of foot-
hills and ranges. The lower level winds therefore were diverted almost 
immediately on advancing inland across the coastline, one arm of the flow 
swinging northeast to give the observed southwest winds, while another 
turned south over the Lindis Pass. The main area of divergence of these 
two arms would most likely be the area of relatively light winds, that was 
observed at the time. 
Water equivalent measurements of the snow were sketchy. A snow 
survey party near Lake Tekapo took several samples of the snow and their 
results provided by Dr P.W. Anderton (Scientist, Hydrological Survey, 
Christchurch) showed snow densities of 0.08 to 0.10 gm cm- 3 at altitudes 
of 680 m in freshly fallen snow at an air temperature of -1.00C. Near 
Mount Somers a density of 0.18 gm cm- 3 was recorded at an altitude of 
300 m but this was a total snow melt measurement where the air temperature 
during the snowfall was OOC to 40C. The Chief Engineer of the South 
Canterbury Electric Power Board reported that densities appeared to have 
been similar to those measured in the November 1967 snowfall (Chinn 1968) 
which were typically 0.2 to 0.4 gm cm- 3 at altitudes below 300 m in fresh 
snow. 
The time at which the snow stopped falling showed even less pattern 
than the time at which it started on the 5th. There was a slight tendency 
for a clearance from the south. Several low lying stations reported little 
snow on the 6th and observed that the snow finally ceased on the night of 
the 6th. At higher levels the snow persisted longer in some places. Over 
most of the snow-affected area showers of rain and sleet followed the snow 
but these had generally cleared by the morning of the 8th. 
The total precipitation in the storm was very large (see fig. 3). 
Over the 48 and 72 hour periods beginning 0900 hours on 5 August 1973 
some places received total precipitations with return period greater than 
once in 50 years. For example at Winchmore (160 m a.s.l.) there was 170 mm 
in the 48 hours and 182 mm in the 72 hours. An analysis of the 24 years 
(1950-1973) of Winchmore records reveals that the 50 year return period 
precipitations are 152 mm and 173 mm respectively for the 48 and 72 hour 
durations. The region where the precipitation had a return period of 20 
years or more (fig. 3) lay partly in the area where no snow fell and 
extended well into the snow area. In the vicinity of Hororata there was 
about 35 cm of snow and the 72 hour precipitation return period was greater 
than 20 years. 
Design Value of Maximum Snow Depth 
The large snow depths described above and depicted in figure 1 are 
in some areas quite exceptional. To decide how often such very heavy falls 
should be expected, figure 4 has been included. This figure shows the 
estimated 50 year return period snow depth over the whole of New Zealand. 
For over 100 years snowstorms have been documented in New Zealand. 
Very often the reports have been qualitative and rather vague. This js 
~CQkjFront 
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Figure 1: Maximum Snow Depths in the August 1973 
Snowfall. {Values are at 25 cm (10 inch) intervals 
and the observations were adjusted to time of 
fall.) 
Figure 2: The Weather Pattern 3 to 6 August 1973. 
(Isobaric values in millibars. Subscripts have 
been put on the Hand L centres so that they can 
be traced through the four days.) 
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Figure 3: The total precipitation (mm) from 
9 a.m. on 5 August to 9 a.m. on 8 August. (Solid 
lines, values from 25 to 300 mm.) Also shown 
(dashed lines) are the return period values in 
years (2,10,20) for this precipitation and these 
lines, based on values computed at over 40 stat-
ions, indicate the average period between 
occurrences of precipitation of this intensity. 
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Figure 4: Maximum Snow Depths to be Expected 
Once in Fifty Years. (Based on data 1862 to 
1973 inclusive.) 
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not surprising since snow-depths and densities are so spatially and 
temporally variable. However, most of the largest falls have been quan-
titatively recorded to some extent though the records are quite scanty 
(Tomlinson 1970). 
Heavy snowfalls in New Zealand are usually quite local and rarely 
affect a very large area such as, for example, the whole of the Canterbury 
Province. This means that in drawing a map of the 50 year return period 
snowfall over New Zealand, a large number of extreme cases need to be 
considered. Some areas of the country, such as Fiordland and inland 
Westland, being thinly populated, are particularly difficult to deal with 
due to lack of information. In such areas the map is liable to large 
error. 
Since about 1939 the reports of snowfalls have improved quantita-
tively and it has become apparent that our heaviest snowfalls at lower 
levels have a large water content. The reports available reveal a complex 
situation but generally speaking the deepest snowfalls at low levels have 
a high specific gravity of about 0.3 while at levels above 1000 m the 
specific gravity is commonly 0.1 to 0.2. It must be emphasised that these 
figures are based on limited data. 
The measurement of maximum snow-depth and its density poses consider-
able practical problems (Chinn 1969). Because of this, the measurements 
are subject to appreciable error which must be reflected in the map. None-
the-less the map represents the best estimates available from all the data 
accumulated by the N.Z. Meteorological Service since the middle of the last 
century. 
The table below may be useful in converting the snow-depths on the 
map to loadings in pascals (newtons per square metre). 
Snow Loadings (pascals)* for Differing Snow Densities 
Snow Depth Specific Gravity of Snow 
(cm) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
25 245 490 735 980 
50 490 980 1470 1960 
75 735 1470 2205 2940 
100 980 1960 2940 3920 
150 1470 2940 4410 5880 
* 100 pascals 0.145 lb per square inch 
No attempt has been made to allow for snow drifts in the map. 
Clearly, in the strong wind conditions which often accompany our most 
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severe snowfalls, drifts will provide serious extra loading on buildings. 
Such effects could onJy be estimated when details of the buildings shape, 
size and position are known. 
Ice Loading on Power and Telephone Wires 
Reports from Electric Power Board, the N.Z. Electricity Department 
and the Post Office indicate that power and telephone transmission lines 
suffered a great deal of damage during the snowfall. 
The mechanism of ice accumulation on terrestrial objects is com-
plicated. Rime is sometimes deposited on power wires but this requires 
the presence of supercooled water droplets which freeze on impact to form 
the accumulating ice. This effect is common on mountain tops and was 
probably a contributory effect in this case. 
Mr H.H. Kingham (Meteorologist in Charge, RNZAF Base, Wigram) 
reported, 
"On Monday (6 August) at midday when the freezing level at 
Christchurch Airport was 1624 metres, helicopters attempted to fly into 
the Porters Pass area. Snow was on the ground 8 km west of Kirwee and 
there was light sleet at Darfield. West of Sheffield the cloud lowered 
to almost ground level and there was heavy snow. Apparently the onset of 
the heavy snow was sudden, and the flakes were large and wet. They stuck 
to the aircraft, but the worst ice accretion was due to flying in and out 
of very low cloud. This latter fact would agree with Electric Power Board 
repair men who found that the ice on the power lines seemed to be formed 
in high wind and low cloud areas. The aircraft reported large temperature 
differences between Darfield and Sheffield, in spite of 10 to 15 knot 
winds." 
There are two means of accumulating ice on transmission lines and 
both lead to largest accumulations when temperatures are either at 
freezing point or one or two degrees below. To get snow to 'stick' to 
lines it needs to be wet and accordingly not too cold for all the water 
to be frozen, and as the snow accumulates a wind will slide it around a 
wire to form an even cylinder of snow several centimetres thick (Bauer 
1973). To get rime formation it is necessary to have a constant supply of 
supercooled water droplets being blown against the lines. These droplets 
may occur in clouds (or fog) just below freezing point, and freeze on 
impact on the windward side of objects. It is possible for both of these 
processes to occur simultaneously as wet snow may fall through fog which 
is below freezing point. 
On 5 and 6 August, the very strong moist flow with the surface air 
temperatures just below freezing point where the snow was falling, pro-
vided conditions very conducive to rime formation. Conditions were also 
extremely favourable for snow accumulation where the snow was very wet at 
low altitudes, the temperatures were near freezing point and there was 
sufficient wind to ensure the snow would accumulate evenly on power and 
telephone wires to produce heavy snow loadings. 
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Weather Sequence 
Figure 2 shows the sequenc~ of the weather pattern from 3 to 6 
August 1973 inclusive, each map being the weather situation at 1200 hours 
NZST. 
As with any very extreme event~ the weather pattern leading up to 
this snowfall was very unusual. The depression L3 was moving eastwards 
just to the south of Tasmania on 3 August while at the same time the anti-
cyclone H2 was advancing across the region some 1200 km southwest of 
Adelaide. This anticyclone played a major role in the subsequent snowfall 
and it can be appreciated that since it carne from an area of very few 
weather reports its characteristics could not be determined at such an 
early stage. 
Over the 24 hour period 1200 hours 3 August to 1200 hours 4 August 
L3 moved very rapidly to lie about 300 km west of Fiordland. During the 
same time H2 progressed steadily southeastwards to a point south of 
Tasmania. At this stage it was considered that L3 would continue its path 
and move away to the east of New Zealand. This did not happen. It would 
appear that H2 had been moving somewhat faster than L3 and in fact cut L3 
off during the 4th, so that it reduced speed and turned northeastwards. 
H2 continued southeastwards at a steady 25 to 30 knots and by 1200 hours 
on the 5th lay southwest of the South Island causing the pressure to rise 
by about 20 millibars over a large area south of New Zealand. 
The southwest airstream in the eastern part of H2, well south of the 
South Island on the 4th, was very cold and if L3 had moved eastwards at its 
previous speed, the cold air mass would have been swept across the area 
east of New Zealand and across the Chatham Islands during the following 48 
hours. However, the slowing down of L3 induced this cold southwest air-
stream to turn as a southeasterly flow towards, and on to the southern half 
of the South Island, developing at the same time a strong convergence zone 
or front, which spread slowly northwards across Canterbury. The slowing 
down and the break-up of the main centre L3 into two or three separate 
circulations is evident from the maps of figure 2. A major factor contri-
buting to the production of widespread snow, after the initial onset of the 
rain, was the downward cooling of the air mass over the region by the 
falling rain, overall temperatures at the time being only a few degrees 
above freezing even at sea level. If the temperature and dewpoint of the 
air had been just 2 or 30 C higher, the precipitation would have remained in 
the form of rain, and been of flood-producing intensity. 
During the 7th and 8th, the low L3 moved away to the northeast and 
skies cleared on the morning of the 8th. Figure 5 is a picture taken from 
satellite ESSA 8 1400 km above the earth surface at 0950 hours on the 8th.~ 
Snow covers much of Otago, Canterbury and Marlborough and is only obliter-
ated by a little low cloud in coastal South Canterbury. Lakes Wakatipu, 
Wanaka, Hawea and an area of no snow near the southern end of Lake Pukaki, 
are visible. 
*Not suitable for reproduction-Ed. 
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Forecasting in detail the movements and developments of weather 
situations of this unusual nature is difficult, though the general patterns 
as shown by the maps presented do occur suffiGiently often for forecasters 
to have some experience in their development. However, the three dimen-
sional nature of the atmosphere adds to the general complexity, and 
sufficient upper level information over the region covered by the maps is 
not yet available to add the necessary refinements to area forecasts as 
are required for events as outlined in this paper. The integration of 
modern satellite information with present day forecasting techniques is a 
hopeful sign for the future. 
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SNOWPACK MEASUREMENTS 
At the time of the August 1973 snowfall, the Ministry of Works and 
Development hydrological field party at Lake Tekapo carried out a series 
of measurements of snow depth and density in the Mackenzie Basin. The 
field parties at Christchurch and Timaru were not equipped to carry out 
snow surveys, consequently no measurements were made on the Canterbury 
Plains. 
Snow depth and density data are presented in the accompanying table 
and sampling locations are shown on the accompanying map. Freshly fallen 
snow at Tekapo had a density of about 0.1 g/cm3 . Measurements throughout 
the Basin at altitudes ranging from 500 to 850 m, show that one to three 
days after the snowfall, mean snowpack density ranged from 0.15 to 0.20. 
These values are higher than the density of fresh snow because of compac-
tion and it seems probable that the density at the time of fall varied 
between 0.10 and 0.15. 
At lower altitudes (300 to 550 m) in the Opihi Basin, density values 
up to 0.37 were recorded in wet snow which had probably had an initial 
density of about 0.20. At Round Hill skifield, at an altitude of 1600 m, 
the snow from this snowfall was sampled a week later. Mean snow density 
was 0.22 on a south-facing slope and 0.23 on a west-facing slope. 
P.W. Anderton 
Water and Soil Division, 
Ministry of Works, 
Christchurch. 
MACKENZIE BASIN SNOWPACK MEASUREMENTS 
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F 7/8 
G 7/8 
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Z 9/8 
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ZIt (S) 13/8 
ZIt (W) 13/8 
AUGUST 5/6 SNOWFALL 1973 
SNOWPACK MEASUREMENTS IN MACKENZIE BASIN 
Time Snow Water Mean 
Depth Equivalent Density 
(mm) (mm) (g/ cm3) 
1000 0.08 
(Fresh snow) 
1150 670 98 0.15 
1000 600 92 0.15 
1300 650 90 0.14 
1330 750 120 0.16 
1400 710 109 0.15 
1430 290 101 0.35 
1500 290 89 0.31 
1530 380 106 0.28 
1710 450 60 0.13 
1730 300 43 0.14 
1800 70 10 0.14 
1815 155 23 0.15 
1830 90 14 0.16 
195 31 0.16 
1015 510 93 0.18 
1040 315 63 0.20 
445 71 0.16 
1115 350 60 0.17 
350 62 0.18 
1230 282 51 0.18 
1245 115 24 0.21 
180 34 0.19 
215 39 0.18 
1420 220 40 0.18 
1620 550 93 0.17 
1635 450 81 0.18 
1645 270 54 0.20 
1700 250 39 0.16 
840 186 0.22 
800 182 0.23 
19 
Range in 
Density 
(g/ cm3) 
0.13-0.17 
0.15-0.16 
0.11-0.16 
0.14-0.18 
0.13-0.23 
0.34-0.37 
0.29-0.34 
0.12-0.15 
0.14-0.15 
0.12-0.17 
0.15-0.16 
0.17-0.21 
0.15-0.17 
0.17-0.19 
0.20-0.21 
0.15-0.19 
0.20-0.21 
0.15-0.16 
0.15-0.26 
0.21-0.25 
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Section 2: Effect on Communications and Services 
ACCESS 
From Middlemarch in the south to nearly Waipara in the 
north, roads were blocked and access denied to residents, 
farms, and livestock. Access was also necessary for repairing 
electric power and telephone systems. On the Pigroot and 
Porters Pass motorists were trapped in their vehicles for up 
to 9 and 30 hours respectively before being rescued. 
Here follow reports from County Councils and the Ministry 
of Works. 
Malvern County Council 
Ashburton County Council 
Geraldine County Council 
Mackenzie County Council 
Waimate County Council 
Waitaki County Council 
Waihemo County Council 
Ministry of Works, Christchurch Residency 
Ministry of Works, Timaru 
MALVERN COUNTY COUNCIL 
Commencing on the night of Sunday 5th August 1973, a severe snowstorm 
hit the County and there was further snow on the night of Monday 6th. The 
results of the storm were that all roads were blocked, telephone lines were 
down, people were isolated and there were severe stock losses. 
The lower limits of the snow were generally inland of a line between 
Te Pirita, Darfield, Kirwee and Courtenay. Snow depth at Darfield was of 
the order of 6 in. while at Kowai Bush, Peak Hill, Homestead and Harper it 
was 18 in. and at Russells Flat and in the Malvern ffills about 24 in. The 
most severely hit areas were in the vicinity of Fi~hting Hill, Windwhistle, 
Glenroy, High Peak, Benmore and Castle Hill where depths of the order of 
3-4 ft were encountered. Fortunately there was very little snow on 
Coleridge Road between Snowdon and the Power Station. 
On the morning of Monday 6th all Council graders and loaders were 
called into Darfield, and by midday gangs were organised and a start had 
been made on the clearing. 
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A particular problem that day was the Darfield water supply. It 
appears that unknown to us the transformer fuse at the pump site had blown 
on Saturday 4th August with the result that by Monday morning the reser-
voir was empty and the power supply was not available due to storm damage. 
As only the water within the trunk main was available, the township valves 
were screwed down and an appeal to residents to conserve water was maue 
over the N.Z.B.C. Central Canterbury Electric Power Board gave priority 
to restoring power to the pumps and also brought up a portable generator 
in case it was needed. By 4 p.m. that day the power was restoreu to the 
pumps and by the Tuesday morning the Darfield water supply was back to 
normal. 
By Tuesday, 7th August, the seriousness of the situation was 
apparent to all and it was decided to calIon the assistance from Contrac-
tors and neighbouring Counties. Additional radiotelephones were obtained 
from the Fire Brigades and from the Selwyn Plantation Board. A control 
headquarters was set up in the Overseer's Office at the Depot. 
The over-all policy decided on was to clear the roads to give access 
throughout the County with priority being given to main roads, power and 
telephone requirements. Once all roads were opened, then assistance be 
given to clearing entrances and private drives together with further snow 
clearance to widen the one way tracks that had been formed. 
We were not concerned with access west of Springfield as it was felt 
that the Ministry of Works would attend to this in conjunction with its 
work on State Highway 73. 
By the afternoon of Wednesday 8th, general access had been restored 
to the Malvern Hills, Russells Flat and Kowai Bush areas and machinery was 
then being concentrated in the Whitecliffs area and west of Glenroy. By 
mid-afternoon on Thursday, the Coleridge Road had been opened and two routes 
were available to Windwhistle via State Highway 72 and Leeches Road. It was 
Friday afternoon before State Highway 72 had been opened through to the 
Rakaia and access had been obtained into High Peak. Machinery was also 
becoming available on the Friday to allow us to commence to give help to 
farmers in respect of opening properties, drives etc. On Saturday 11th, 
clearing was completed in the Harper and Algidus Roads and by nightfall the 
Pig Saddle Road was opened. 
On Sunday 12th August an inspection was made of the Craigieburn and 
Mount White Roads. Craigieburn Road was found to be negotiable to 
Westenra's. On the Mount White Road it was found that the Hawdon River had 
cut the road adjacent to the Mount White Bridge so a further inspection of 
the road was not made. Mr Brooks of the Agriculture and Fisheries Depart-
ment advised me that Mount White Station had received supplies by helicopter 
and that their stock position was satisfactory. In these circumstances and 
in view of the thaw in the .area which would make the road impassable it was 
decided to defer the sending of equipment into the area for snow clearing. 
On Monday 13th August information was received that the Ministry of 
Works would be clearing the Lake Lyndon Road. 
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On Thursday 9th August, there was no stock water in the eastern end 
of the County for the main races had been filled with snow and were icy. 
On Friday, water race staff was concentrated in an endeavour to open out 
the main race. On Saturday they were supplemented by additional staff and 
Marshall Voice's race cleaner was obtained to assist with the work. By 
Saturday afternoon the main race along State Highway 73 had been cleared 
and water was becoming available to the Greendale and Norwood areas. It 
was Sunday before the Tramway road race had been cleared and water avail-
able for the Kirwee/Aylesbury and Burnham areas. 
Like other snowbound areas in the County the Downs Road area was 
without power and so a generator was hired from British Pavements to run 
the Downs Water Supply as from Thursday 9th August. The line between the 
Reservoir and the new pump is a private line and the cost of repairs to 
this will have to be met by the water supply area. All wires were down, 
three stays broken, three new poles required and four poles needed 
straightening. 
On Wednesday 8th August the assistance of the police and traffic 
department was obtained to prevent non-essential traffic from entering the 
work area west of Glenroy on State Highway 72 and west of the Sleemans 
Road/Leeches Road intersection. This assistance was readily given and con-
tinued until the night of Sunday 12th August. 
On the morning of Friday 10th August I attended a meeting in 
Christchurch with representatives of the Ministry of Works, Police, Search 
and Rescue, Traffic Department, Automobile Association and skiing organisa-
tions. It was decided, in the interest of public safety, to prevent sight-
seeing traffic from entering the snowbound areas west of Springfield and 
west of Glenroy. Permits for genuine through traffic to be issued by the 
Police. 
Duri~g the emergency period, the County had many offers of assistance 
from contractors and private individuals. In particular the following 
assistance was used -
Ellesmere County 
Paparua County 
Ross Hutton 
D. Mulholland 
K . . Eaves 
R. Beatty 
M. Ballagh 
E. Gardner 
British Pavements 
Lti-me and Marble 
Hales 
Marshall Voice 
Selwyn Plantation Board 
Police & Transport Departments 
Press and Radio 
Central Canterbury Electric 
Power Board 
Fire Brigades 
Tait Electronics 
two graders and a loader 
grader and loader 
dozer 
dozer 
dozer 
dozer 
dozer 
dozer 
transporter, loader and generator 
loader 
dozer 
race cleaner 
Landrover and two radiotelephones 
generator 
radios 
radios 
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I must record the service and co-operation given by all the members 
of the Council staff who at times worked long hours and in atrocious con-
ditions. In particular, I would note the work of the County Overseer, 
Mr L.V. Matchett who directed and co-ordinated the equipment working for 
the County. 
At the time of wrltlng this report (Monday 13th August) the full 
extent of damage is not known. A general thaw appears to have set in and 
there is some flooding on the back country roads. On either Tuesday or 
Wednesday the Selwyn River cut the Bealey Road and the Waireka was also 
through to the Selwyn. By Saturday night the Hawkins River was beginning 
to cross the Greendale Road and by midday on Monday it was through as far 
as Rudds Road. 
Arrangements are in hand for the disposal of carcasses under the 
control of the Hydatids Officer, Mr T. Main. Coxs pit, Kimberley pit, 
Wairiri Valley pit and Grays pit being made available for this purpose. 
Looking back now over the week that has just past, one can see many 
refinements that could be made to improve and make more efficient the over-
all organisation. The Council's radiotelephone network proved invaluable 
during the period but even this can be improved in line with the comments 
made at the last Works Committee meeting. 
My major disappointment during the week would be the irresponsible 
report that appeared on the front page of the Christchurch. "Press" on the 
morning of Saturday, 11th August, which appeared to rubbish the arrange-
ments made in the interests of public safety to restrict the general 
public from the snowbound areas. A decision to do this was not one taken 
lightly but was based on experience which occurred on the 11th July 1968 
when serious traffic congestion occurred on the Po~ters Pass area during 
snow conditions which resulted in an influx of sightseers. The 
Christchurch "Press" in an editorial on the 19th July 1968 appeared to 
support any action taken to "restore sanity and safety on the roads" in 
respect to allowing the general public into snowbound areas. 
W.J. Bevis, 
County Engineer. 
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ASHBURTON COUNTY COUNCIL 
1. The Storm: Area Covered 
1.1 It is reported that snow commenced falling at 3.30 p.m. on Sunday 
5th August with the heaviest fall occurring that afternoon and the 
following night' .. Snowfalls continued throughout Monday 6th, and again on 
the Monday night when some eight to nine inches of additional snow fell. 
1.2 In the lower levels of the County exceptionally heavy rain fell 
during this period, the total fall being in the order of eight to ten 
inches. 
1.3 The lower limit of the snowfall approximated a line running just 
below Carew to between Hackthorne and Punawai, below Springfield, to Urral 
and to below Barrhill. In the Rangitata River valley floor, including the 
upper reaches at Mesopotamia, Potts and Erewhon, there was no residual snow 
and much the same condition existed in the bed of the Rakaia River. 
2. Effect of the Storm 
2.1 The heavy rainfall in the lower levels of the County caused much 
local flooding and the closure of a number of roads, it being reported 
that several miles of State Highway 77, above Ashburton, and the Maronan 
Road, were running streams, fence to fence, with water depths of nine to 
ten inches. When the rain stopped the water cleared fairly rapidly. With 
the exception of the lower reaches, i.e. below the railway line, the 
expected floods in the rivers did not occur because of the snowfall in the 
higher levels. Some degree of flooding did occur ten days later as the 
thaw set in. 
2.2 The snow fall effectively closed to traffic 480 miles of roading in 
the County - completely blocked the whole stock water race system within 
the area of snowfall - collapsed or otherwise damaged some 80 buildings, 
mainly implement sheds and haybarns - caused quite severe branch break to 
pinus and spruce shelter belts and plantations and very severe damage to 
the beech trees in the foothill scenic reserves and Forest Park lands -
widespread damage to the overhead lines of the power and telephone system 
as well as the isolation of stock within the area. 
3. Snow depths and weights 
3.1 From the edge of the snowline, snow depths increased rapidly. The 
greatest depth of snow in the County was in the area above Methven, in the 
vicinity of the Mt Hutt Station, but snow depths in excess of three feet 
occurred in the area from Staveley across to Methven and Highbank. Some 
snow depths recorded were - . 
Andersons Corner (S.H. 72) 
Montalto 
1 ft 0 in. 
2 ft 0 in. 
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Mayfield 1 ft 6 in. 
Mount Somers 2 ft 6 in. 
Lake Heron 3 ft 0 in. 
Staveley 4 ft 0 in. 
S.H. 72 - Mt Hutt Station 6 ft 0 in. 
Methven 2 ft 0 in. 
Junction Ashburton Forks and 
Ashburton Staveley Roads 1 ft 6 in. 
3.2 The snow was wet and heavy and packed down under its own weight 
fairly quickly. In a discussion with Dr Anderton (Ministry of Works, 
Hydrological Branch) he stated that the specific density of the snow that 
fell in the McKenzie basin was 0.15 and he gave it as his opinion that in 
the Ashburton County the specific density would be of the order of 0.25 
i.e. 15.5 lb/cu.ft. The effect of this was shown in the collapse of 
buildings of long girder span, which had been designed for a snow loading 
under County Building By-Laws of 2 ft 0 in. of snow with snow weight of 
6 lb/cu.ft. 
4. Snow Clearing 
4.1 Preliminary Organisation: The first advice of a snowfall in the 
County was received early on Monday 6th August and the County Overseer 
immediately sent out all available graders on snow clearing. By mid-
morning it was obvious that these machines could not cope with the depth 
and weight of snow on the roads. The following steps were then taken: 
4.1.1 A control room for snow clearing was set up in the County Office 
with both telephone and radio teiephone communication. 
4.1.2 The following organisations or persons were advised of this and 
that plant for rescue work for humane reasons would be provided: 
Senior Sergeant - Ashburton Police 
Ashburton Hospital 
Postmaster 
Ashburton Electric Power Board 
State Hydro Electricity Department 
Transport Department 
Ministry of Works. 
4.1.3 Self contained snow clearing teams consisting of one heavy item of 
equipment i.e. snowplough, heavy front-end loader or bulldozer for front 
clearing, with a follow up grader for ground clearing and with each team a 
vehicle, runabout or truck, equipped with radiotelephone. 
The advantages of this system were: 
(a) They were self contained and self rescuing in case of breakdown or 
becoming stuck, with a resultant greater efficiency. 
(b) They were under direct control from the control centre and could be, 
and were, re-directed as the contingencies of the exercise required. 
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(c) They were in the picture through the radiotelephone which helped 
maintain a high morale. 
(d) The method of operation minimised damage to road surfaces, parti-
cularly sealing. 
4.1.4 All local and some outside contractors having heavy equipment were 
contacted and all available bulldozers and loaders from Messrs Doug lIood 
Ltd, Messrs Burnett's Motors Ltd, and Barry Lloyd Ltd, were hired and set 
up in snow clearing teams on the same pattern as in (3) above. Some other 
locil heavy equipment was offered and employed also. 
4.1.5 Instructions were issued to all plant operators that any requests 
for assistance received were to be referred to the control room for approval 
and action or otherwise. 
4.2 Priorities: Priorities in snow clearing were set in the following 
order: 
(i) Access for rescue or evacuation where life or health were in danger. 
(ii) Access for restoration of communications and power. 
(iii) Access to the areas of greatest population density. 
(iv) Access to all inhabited properties. 
(v) Access from roads to dwellings. 
(vi) Stock rescue. 
4.3 Clearing Operations: The major effort on Monday 6th August was to 
open the roads up to Mayfield, Mt Somers, Springburn and Methven, and to 
bring out, for medical reasons, one woman from Cavendish and one woman from 
above Methven, and to give the State Hydro Electricity Department access to 
Barkers Road for power restoration; the Power Board and Telephone gangs 
access to restore lines to Springburn, and to open up roads to main centres 
of popUlation. 
Snow falling on Monday and Monday night re-closed the roads cleared. 
All machinery used on road clearing was brought out to below the snow-
line overnight to minimise the risk of being snowed in. 
From the Tuesday morning 7th August, the opening up of the road system 
continued at a steady pace at the rate of just over 100 miles per day. 
Access to all properties below the Ashburton and Rakaia Gorges was given b)' 
Friday night and to the high country stations by Saturday afternoon 11th. 
As previously mentioned most road clearance was carried out to a one 
way width, it being considered that access to all occupied homesteads was 
of more importance than catering for general traffic needs. However by 
Wednesday, stock rescue and other operations in the areas to which access 
was already open, forced the need to widen out cleared sections on the main 
routes and this was done largely by use of graders made available by the 
Ministry of Works Irrigation Section. 
Initially v~ry few passing bays were developed, but in the latter part 
of the clearing these were installed as part of the work. It would have 
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been better to have commenced this policy with the start of the work. 
In deep snow the windrows built up on either side of the initial 
clearance made widening slow and difficult. However it was found that 
the Ministry of Works graders, operating at relatively high speeds and 
with blades set as for borderdyke construction in irrigation borderdyke 
formation, could throw the snow to the road fence line. 
S. Stock Water Races 
As previously mentioned, in the snowfall area these became com-
pletely blocked, with the result that most of the water race system below 
the snowline, initially kept flowing by rainwater, dried out when the rain 
ceased. The demand for water did not arise till the second week after the 
snowstorm. A lot of work and machine time was required in the clearing of 
snow-choked mains and races to get the system in to operation again. 
6. Domestic Water 
A fairly substantial demand developed for the supply of potable water 
for household use. County trucks were set up with the road construction 
water tanks and were used on delivery work. 
7. Sightseers and Traffic Control 
With most of the road clearance being to a single lane, the need to 
keep traffic to a minimum was essential. Relatives and friends of people 
living in the snowfall area and sightseers became a serious hindrance to 
the rescue and clearance work in the area. Such County Staff as could be 
spared were placed on traffic control and the Transport Department were 
asked for assistance and'the co-ordination of traffic control. The Legion 
of Frontiersmen volunteered their services for this work and made a very 
valuable contribution to the effort. 
8. Stock Committee 
8.1 It was brought to my attention on Wednesday 8th August, that a Stock 
Rescue Committee of Ministry of Agriculture and Federated Farmers personnel 
had been set up in Methven, with a sub-committee in Mayfield. Contact was 
immediately made with the Methven Committee and it was arranged that to 
prevent any confusion or overlapping, all requests for assistance, clearing, 
use of County equipment etc., would be channelled through Mr Robertson of 
the Federated Farmers and the County Control Centre. This system worked 
well. 
8.2 By Friday the pressure on road clearance was falling away and as they 
could be released, heavy machines were made available to the Stock Rescue 
Committee for stock rescue. 
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9. General Comments 
9.1 With the completion of the opening of the roads the main emphasis 
of the e~ergency passed to stock rescue a~d the County's role diminished. 
The County's heavy plant was transferred to stock rescue and the remainder, 
was employed, where possible, on road fane widening clearing access from 
road to farm buildings, water race cleaning and general maintenance. 
9.2 Despite the care taken, a considerable amount of damage was caused to 
roads in the County, the total cost for snow clearing and subsequent road 
repairs being 
state Highways 
County Roads 
Total 
11,151 
46,064 
$57,216 
Road clearing was carried out from daybreak till about two hours after 
dark but not through the night. It was better to have the crews on snow 
clearing rested and fresh each day, that better progress would be made this 
way. The numbers for replacement ~rews with adequate skills and the 
necessary knowledge of the area were not available for a second shift in 
any case, and the damage caused to roading at night would not justify the 
work done. This latter consideration was supported in that in clearing 
some five miles of the Ashburton Forks Road and State Highway 72 on the 
Tuesday night, to get a father and daughter to their home where it was under-
stood two children were isolated, some $6,000 worth of damage was done to the 
road seal surface, the greatest amount of damage done to roading at anyone 
time during the emergency. 
10. Conclusions 
In retrospect the following points are noted: 
(i) The basic organisation for road clearing etc., with the control room 
at the County Office was sound. 
(ii) The organisation of the self-contained clearing teams was sound and 
also functioned well. 
(iii) Radiotelephone was invaluable for communicatioi1 and control, saved 
confusion and speeded up the work immeasurably. 
(iv) Saving time by clearing one-way lanes in the deep snow I consider 
basically sound, but the lack of development of passing bays, which was over-
looked in the early stages, was an error that must be kept in mind. 
(v) The control of sightseeing requires early implementation to prevent 
interference and delay in clearing and subsequent rescue work. 
(vi) Appreciation of the extent of the emergency was slow in developing. 
In notifying various organisations and departments of the emergency (see 
4.1.2) the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Federated Farmers 
were not included; closer liaison is needed. As Civil Defence does not 
cover stock rescue this closer liaison is important and requires early 
implementation. 
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(Vii) The "snow loading" requirements of the N.Z. Standard Building Codes 
require reconsideration in' the iight of the knowledge gained in this snow-
storm. 
(viii) Greater use of the news media, in particular the Broadcasting 
Corporation, should have been made, particularly in the early stages, to 
advise people who were snowbound of what steps were being taken and pro-
gress being made in bringing them assistance. 
D.G. Thomson, 
County Engineer. 
GERALDINE COUNTY COUNCIL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This snowstorm occurred on 5 and 6 August 1973 and roughly the area 
in the Geraldine County covered by snow was northwest of State Highway 72 
from Arundel to Geraldine including Peel Forest, Rangitata Gorge, Tripp 
Settlement, Woodbury, Four Peaks and Te Moana. South of Geraldine the 
Hilton, Kakahu, Waitohi Hill, Gapes Valley and Beautiful Valley areas were 
covered. The depth of snowfall varied from place to place, there being no 
snow on the flats at Mesopotamia and at Mt Peel Station, yet heavy falls 
were experienced in the Peel Forest and Beautiful Valley areas, with the 
depths generally increasing to the northwest. Fortunately in the remainder 
of the County the very heavy rain did not cause any damage except for some 
surface flooding. 
The snow closed many miles of roads, damaged telephone and power lines, 
affected water supply schemes, damaged buildings and caused a high loss of 
livestock. As far as the Council staff were concerned, the major effort 
went into opening roads as soon as possible, both to provide access to homes, 
and to allow early repair of power and telephone lines. 
The remainder of this report takes the forms of notes for use in any 
future snowfall of this magnitude. 
B. ROAD CLEARING OPERATIONS 
(i) Organisation - County Engineer in overall control. Overseer in 
control of outside staff and plant. Assistant County Engineer in control 
of Drawing office, to co-ordinate information and to deputise for County 
30 
Engineer in his absence. 
(ii) Information - Regular feedback by radiotelephone, telephone, and word 
of mouth from staff in field and farmers, travellers, etc, used to show on 
a master plan the current situation. This information to be recorded with 
time, date and source. This is recorded by drawing office on the map with 
pins to show plant and staff location and colours to indicate roads cleared. 
The drawing office having radiotelephone and telephone is ideal for this 
purpose. This map enables co-ordination and deployment of forces, plus 
easy assessment of the current situation. Detailed and long range weather 
forecasts from the meteorological office will also assist in planning 
operations. 
Information released to news media and general public to originate 
from drawing office. Progress reports on ice clearing to be radio broad-
cast at regular intervals to ensure that those persons still snowed in are 
aware of current situation by way of transistor radios, etc. 
(iii) Communications - Loss of telephone communication in snow covered 
areas was fairly gen"eral. For satisfactory communication between the 
office and staff in field, radiotelephone is essential, reporting on pro-
gress at regular intervals throughout the day. To avoid future problems 
in the event of a repeater station being put out of commission, dual 
channel radiotelephone sets will be fitted as replacements are required. 
Early aerial inspection of any isolated areas is essential to enable 
proper planning of the clearing operation. Helicopters are more suitable 
than fixed-wing aircraft enabling personal contact with isolated settlers 
to determine if any emergency situation exists. 
(iv) Road Clearing - Priorities for road clearing are: 
(a) Arterial roads and State Highways with one way track and clearance to 
gate only_ 
(b) Roads on which persons are known to be living - one way. Arterials 
and State Highways to two way. 
(c) All other roads one way access. 
(d) Further widening to two ways if required and release of equipment for 
clearing from gateways to residences if required. 
(e) Release of equipment for stock rescue if required. 
Any medical emergency or Post Office and Power Board priorities can 
also be treated accordingly. 
On one way clearing, passing bays must be provided at reasonably 
frequent intervals. 
An early start on clearing is essential as it is very much easier to 
shift shallow fresh snow than consolidated and frozen snow. Graders should 
start clearing as soon as snow starts to fall. 
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Snow covered cars at the Tekapo hotel 
-Bremford Studios 
Front-end loader operating on the Darfield/Springfield 
highway. 
-Christchurch Press 
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Example of telephone lines broken and stretched. 
- N.Z. Post Office~ Timaru. 
Sheep harbouring on a bulldozed track~ Sherwood Downs. 
- T.R. Donaldson. 
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When it is realised a major clearing problem exists, plant should be 
worked 'in teams consisting -of two heavy plant ,items plus a truck or utility 
with'·a radiotelephone set. eRrequent reporting of progress is essential.) 
In shallow loose Snow (up to 12:in.) one 'grader can do the clearing. Speed 
will throw the snow and prevent formation of a windrow. In snow 12-24 in. 
deep, a bulldozer or loader and heavy grader or two graders work well 
together. In snow 18 in. or more deep, a bulldozer is extremely useful 
working ahead of one or two other heavy plant items. In average conditions, 
up to about 18 in. of snow, each team can clear about 12 miles of road per 
day. 
If it is still snowing it is essential that plant be withdrawn below 
the snow line overnight. 
The operation of tracked machines on sealed roads must be in such 
a manner that minimum damage is caused to the seal surface. Bulldozers 
should leave about 6 inches of snow under the tracks at all times on sealed 
roads and on metal roads care should be taken not to sweep the metal off as 
well as snow. 
The last road opened to traffic on this occasion was the Rangitata 
Gorge road on Friday 10 August. 
(v) Plant - In a major snowfall, the location of all County and contrac-
tors major plant items in the area should be established as early as poss-
ible. 
Chains are essential for heavy rubber-tyred plant working in deeper 
snow. Where possible the radio vehicle should also be fitted with chains. 
Four-wheel-drive vehicles are very useful and additional units should be 
hired if necessary. 
Snowploughs were not available for this clearing operation, however 
I consider that it would be good insurance to have one snowplough available 
for fitting to a loader bucket for future clearing. A snowplough can be 
extremely useful for fast clearing. 
(vi) Staff - To work long hours. If an emergency arises two shifts can 
be worked although night work under these conditions is not satisfactory. 
Suitable :protective clothing must be ,available and sunglasses must be 
issued to all staff working in the snow. All staff worked well and with 
high morale under difficult conditions, however regular radio and personal 
contact during the day is important. It is essential that Council staff 
and hired plant operators only take instructions from Council officers 
supervising the work. 
If sightseeing problems are experienced, staff or traffic officers 
should be placed at strategic points to let only essential traffic through. 
(vii) Repair Work - In this instance a Flood Damage Restoration claim of 
$8,000 was made, which primarily co'nsisted of the snow clearing costs. 
Some seal patching' and replacement of r.oad metal was required, and a founda-
tion failure was repaired on the Waikari Hill. Fortunately, there was very 
little bulldozer or grader damag~ to sealed roads. 
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Arrangements were made with the South Canterbury Electric Power Board 
for the Council to pick up all the broken concrete power poles on roadsides. 
These broken poles proved very useful for protection works, etc. 
C. WATER SUPPLIES 
The headworks of the Te Moana - Downs Scheme required clearing of 
snow. The power to the Gapes Valley pump house was disrupted for several 
days; fortunately the consumers concerned had sufficient storage on their 
properties. 
The water race schemes with intakes and races above the edge of the 
snowfall were choked and blocked with snow and ice. Clearing was limited 
to control structures, etc. 
D. BUILDINGS 
Several buildings failed in the Beautiful Valley area due to the 
weight of snow. These were of the prefabricated barn type, and had been 
erected shortly after the 1967 snowfall. Several other older sheds also 
collapsed. The question of a higher snow loading in the Canterbury area 
is under investigation by the staff of Lincoln College and it is expected 
that recommendations will be made shortly. 
E. RESERVES 
Many trees in several Council reserves were knocked over by the snow. 
These trees which were about five years old, were stood back up and tied. 
Only time will show whether permanent damage was incurred. 
F. STOCK 
Stock rescue was controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries with a base in the County Office for the Geraldine County area. 
Use was made of both County and Catchment Board radio frequencies by M.A.F. 
staff using the County base set. 
An offer was made by the Council to assist with stock burial, however 
there were in fact no requests for such assistance. 
G. SUMMARY 
The road clearing operation progressed reasonably smoothly with access 
being provided to all residences within a reasonable length of time. 
Generally those properties which gained access last were those furthest back, 
often in higher snow risk areas.where they could expect to be snowed in 
occasionally. Taking into account the frequency of such snowstorms, I con-
sider that with the addition of a snowplough, the Council is sufficiently 
well equipped with plant to handle any similar snowfall in the future. 
L.J.S. Baker, 
County Engineer. 
MACKENZIE COUNTY COUNCIL 
Report of a Meeting held in the Mackenzie 
County Council Chambers, Fairlie, on Wednesday 
19th September 1973 at 7.30 p.m. 
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PURPOSE: To clarify responsibilities and facilitate discussion between 
those parties essentially involved during and after the snow storm of 
August 5/6th 1973. 
ARISING FROM DISCUSSION: 
(1) That Council-owned snow-clearing equipment had been inadequate to 
cope with the situation that arose both as regards the number of units 
available and related efficiency. In making this point however it was 
acknowledge that no local authority could be expected to gear itself com-
pletely to cope with a storm of the magnitude of 5/6th August. 
(2) That as in the past, lack of communication and information from the 
worst affected areas had been a major problem. The establishment of a 
communication network to operate solely in emergency situations was not 
however considered to be practical or reliable. 
(3) That as regards Ministry of Works Project equipment, priorities had 
and would continue to be as follows: 
(a) State Highways 
(b) Local Authority Roading 
(c) On-farm assistance. 
In addition, the restoration of essential services, including access 
within Twizel could well be needed on such an occasion in future. 
(4) That as part of snow ~learing operations, widening at the entrances 
to side roads, should be provided,where practicable. 
(5), That in the event of a repetition, an early meeting of all available 
parties would be preferable to the ilTIplementation of a previously conceived 
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disaster plan at a predetermined stage. 
(6) That the function of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 
such a situation is confined solely to the rescue of stock. 
(7) That lack of financial authority in the initial stages of the 
disaster had seriously hampered the Ministry's work. 
In this regard the issue by farmers of prior authority to the 
Ministry was being investigated. 
(8) That because of the difficulties in obtaining helicopters, fixed-
wing aircraft would be used in future for reconnaissance purposes. 
(9) That Council should consider delegating authority to farmers to open 
roads for essential movements in future instances. 
(10) That farmers themselves should also assess, and improve on if 
necessary, the capabilities of their own equipment for use in such a disas-
ter. 
(11) That in certain cases a lack of initiative had been displayed by some 
farmers while in others a lack of appreciation as to what in fact was 
required had been obvious. 
(12) That better use could have been made of the local broadcasting station 
in order to keep residents better informed via transistor radios. In the 
event of a recurrence it was felt that the County Chairman should immediately 
make a radio broadcast outlining the extent of the disaster and the recti-
fying measures proposed. This to be followed at regular intervals by further 
reports regarding progress made to that stage. The initial and subsequent 
reports to include a firm request for non-essential traffic to refrain from 
endeavouring to enter the area. 
(13) That to ensure authenticity, the radio station would prefer the follow-
up reports to be channelled through the Police Department. 
B.J. Dwyer, 
County Clerk. 
WAIMATE COUNTY COUNCIL 
No written report on the event was supplied by the Engineer to the 
County. Snow clearing east of the Hunters Hills was carried out by plant 
from Waimate. The task was mor~ difficult in the Hakataramea Valley where 
two graders and two bulldozers were needed to open the roads. It was not 
until Friday 10th that they reached Round Hill Station at the head of the 
valley although a tractor had got through before this. 
With the Mt Studholme repeater station out from midday on Monday, 
communication between plant and base was difficult. 
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The County has now instituted an early warning system whereby strate-
gically placed farmers will warn it when snow starts building up. 
WAITAKI COUNTY COUNCIL 
A snowstorm, considered the severest since 1945, swept almost the 
entire County and most higher-altitude areas in the South Island on August 
5th, 6th and 7th, covering many miles of roads with varying depths of snow 
up to five foot drifts in Dansey's Pass, the clearance involving most 
Council plant ~ei~forced by Ministry of Works and contractors' equipment) 
in a major effort over several days following the storm, by which time 
access to all ratepayers had been restored. 
Also as a result of the storm Council's plant assisted in the dis-
posal of many hundreds of prelamb-shorn carcasses at selected sites, in 
particular at the large gravel pit in Mr C.R. Dick's property adjacent to 
McEneaney's Road. 
1. Ahuriri Riding 
Snow clearing as necessary including assistance to Ministry of Works 
on the Ahuriri Saddle section of State Highway No. 83. 
2. Otekaike Riding 
Snow clearance including Kurow township streets and State Highway 
No. 83 
3. Awamoko Riding 
Snow clearance in particular on Dansey's Pass Road. 
A.R. Budd, 
County Clerk. 
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WAIHEMO COUNTY COUNCIL 
Snow clearing is a regular winter activity of the Council. The first 
priority of the Councli was its responsibility to keep open the Pigroot-
State Highway 85 from Palmerston to Ranfurly. Deep sn~w kept 60 motorists 
trapped here for up to 9 hours until five graders cleared the road. Atten-
tion was then turned to opening the road to Macraes, Moonlight, and 
Nenthorn. At one stage Council staff worked through a 24-hour period to 
do this. Graders, front-end loaders, and where necessary, bulldozers were 
used. Two graders became snowbound in 5ft deep drifts. High-speed grading 
for snow clearing was not possible on the hill country of the County. 
Council plant was clearing snow for about 4 days. 
Gangs were equipped not only with vehicle-to-vehicle radiotelephone 
but also with personal sets. 
The Council also arranged snowraking gangs for a number of settlers. 
MINISTRY OF WORKS, 
CHRISTCHURCH RESIDENCY 
Snow was reported to be falling on Sunday evening with 6 in. at 
Castle Hill and 10 in. at Lake Lyndon. Mr George Barnes, the Manager of 
Castle Hill Station, contact~d Overseer George Johnson, Waddington, at 
8.00 p.m. advising of this situation. 
Shortly after, a party from Waddington with a runabout, grader and 
loader left Waddington and arrived at Castle Hill Station at 11.00 p.m. 
On their return they met four cars at Porter River. Three of these cars 
followed, but one elected to remain behind. Other cars were collected at 
Porter Heights turnoff and the grader and six cars continued to the top of 
the pass. One car elected to remain and five cars followed to Red Hut at 
the foot of the pass. These cars continued towards Christchurch. The 
grader then returned to the top of the pass to collect the remaining cars 
at 3.30 a.m. One car was driven down and the grader towing the runabout 
proceeded towards Springfield. The loader was parked at Red Hut for use 
later. 
The grader caught up to the five cars at Kowhai No.2 (R.M. 46.5) 
at 4.15 a.m. all unable to proceed. The grader continued, but was caught 
in a deep snow drift in Joynes Cutting (R.M. 46.0), but it managed to get 
clear by 6.00 a.m. They then proceeded to get help for the trapped cars, 
but were stopped by fallen power lines at Kowhai No.1 (R.M. 42.0). They 
arrived at Springfield on foot at 10.00 a.m. to find all communications 
cut. 
39 
Meanwhile, from the Christchurch end Overseer Banks had met with 
heavy snow at Racecourse Hill (R.M. 29.0) at 7.00 a.m. and turned back to 
Darfield to advise Christchurch office which sent two extra graders. By 
11.00 a.m. he had continued in his vehicle to meet with the Waddington 
party at Springfield. 
Overseer Mcqueen from Cass was returning home in the early hours of 
Monday morning when he was stuck at Racecourse Hill. He continued with 
Overseer Banks to Springfield and travelled by railcar to Cass arriving by 
evening. The remaining Cass party with runabout and grader had been 
clearing snow all night, returning to Cass at 4.00 a.m., but leaving again 
by 6.00 a.m. They cleared the road as far as Porter River (R.M. 56.0) but 
became trapped in a snow drift at noon on Monday. 
Heavy snow was falling in the area all day Monday and Tuesday. 
Conditions were bad and visibility poor. 
The main concern of everyone was how to rescue the people trapped in 
cars at Kowhai No. 2 River. Two large front-end loaders were sent and 
the loaders and graders proceeded westward. No trouble was experienced in 
reaching Kowhai No.1, but very slow progress was made along Brooksdale 
Straight (R. M. 43.45). 
Concern was mounting for the safety of the people trapped in cars. 
Search and Rescue had been advised by the Waddington party. An Air Force 
helicopter standing by left at 1.00 p.m. to locate the vehicles and to 
check the road. However, conditions were so bad that it was forced to turn 
back. 
By now, at 4.00 p.m., a full scale Search and Rescue operation was 
mounted under the direction of Inspector Perring. The Army were called in 
with their tracked vehicles. On the first attempt they were turned back 
by broken wires, but made another attempt and finally reached and freed 
the stranded party by 10.30 p.m. They continued on but were stopped short 
of the top of Porters Pass by large snow drifts and avalanche dangers. 
By 10.00 p.m. on Monday the Ministry of Works' team with loaders and 
U.S. Navy D8 bulldozer had reached the end of Brooksdale Straight in very 
difficult conditions. This party continued and was able to clear to the 
foot of Porters Pass by Tuesday evening. At the same time, the bulldozer 
had reached the top of the pass. 
Overseer Banks had worked all night with the forward party until they 
reached the top of Porters Pass. He was relieved by Overseer Radburnd 
after having worked continuously for 30 hours. He was back next morning, 
however, to press on. Overseer Hawtin was on duty at Springfield main-
taining radio watch from noon Monday till early Tuesday morning when he was 
relieved by Jack Kennedy. The radio room was manned continuously until 
Wednesday evening. 
On Tuesday, a further Bight people were rescued from beyond Porters 
Pass and a party of 14 from Castle Hill Station by the Army. The emergency 
was then considered to be over, but it was still necessary to open the 
road. By Wednesday afternoon a clear road to the top of Porters Pass had 
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been formed. By Wednesday evening bulldozers were working around Lake 
Lyndon and a clear road was to below the Pass. After having worked con-
tinuously for Monday and Tuesday evenings only a small force of two graders 
was kept on on Wednesday night to keep the road open. 
On Tuesday it was obvious that help from Greymouth was needed, so a 
party of two graders and two loaders was despatched. By Tuesday evening 
this party had reached the bottom of Flock Hill (R.M. 66.7), but took all 
next day to reach the top of Craigieburn Cutting (R.M. 65) where snow 
drifts were very deep. 
By Wednesday the Cass party had managed to free the grader and con-
tinued clearing the Castle Hill straight (R.M. 56.5-58.0). 
Fine weather on Wednesday had made conditions much easier and the 
snow had begun to melt. 
The situation on Thursday improved rapidly with contact being made 
by the Christchurch and Greymouth parties by 11.30 a.m. at Broken River 
(R.M. 60.2), but the track was rough. With two loaders, one dozer clearing 
the deeper snow and four graders following, a clear road was soon obtained 
and by about 3.00 p.m. all that remained was one icy path out of the Porter 
River. 
This was soon cleared and a track clear of snow had been established 
by 4.00 p.m. 
On Friday, the loaders were released and the graders continued until 
noon when they had achieved a clear two way road. 
In all the emergency, close contact was kept by radio of field opera-
tions and also with Police operating the Search and Rescue. It was found 
to be much more satisfactory to control the whole operation from the radio 
room. 
During the emergency all concerned worked long hours without complaint 
in order to rescue the trapped people and also to open the road. The situa-
tion had been confused on Monday morning because nobody had realised the 
full impact of the storm and communications had been lost. However, by noon 
on Monday contact had been made with all parties and the situation began to 
clarify. 
The process of clearing snow was for the bulldozer to clear the worst 
of the drifts working on a' layer of compact snow. This was followed by 
front end loaders which cleared a track down to the seal. The graders 
following quickly widened this to a two way road. 
Graders could not be used to make the initial clearance because the 
snow was too deep. The front wheels tended to get choked by the snow being 
pushed forward. Had these graders been equipped with snowploughs attached 
to the front they could, in many·places, have cleared the road without the 
help of other machines. 
Starvation Gully Porters Pass on 8th August, 1973. 
- Ministry of Works. 
Brought to a halt. 
- Christchurch Press. 
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Smothered 3 isolatid. 
- N.Z. Electricity Department. 
Fairlie. 
- Bremford Studios. 
43 
44 
Urgent stoakfeed awaiting a alea 
High speed grading. 
- N.Z. Post Officc~ 
45 
It is recommended that a snowplough be available at both Cass and 
Waddington depots for such occasions. This should be able to be attached 
to any grader or even the front-end loader. It is also essential that all 
graders have chains carried on the machine. 
Perhaps it should also be the established routine that Christchurch 
be advised whenever a team leaves its depot on weekend emergency for snow 
clearing. Radio communication could then be established and extra help 
sent earlier if this became necessary. 
J.M. Rhodes 
MINISTRY OF WORKS, TIMARU 
I will confine my comments to the effect of the storm on State High-
ways No. 8 and 80. 
The first snow commenced falling in the Tekapo and Mount Cook areas 
during the evening of 5 August and this department arranged for snowploughs 
mounted on trucks to commence snow clearing. Four such snowploughs were 
used; one at Fairlie, one at Tekapo on State Highway No. 8 and two at the 
Rest Depot on State Highway No. 80. 
They concentrated on sections of the highest snowfall and continued 
throughout the night. Graders proceeded to the various steep inclines on 
these highways and proved invaluable in towing stranded vehicles out of the 
way of the snowploughs. 
Arrangements were made for personnel to work 12 hours in rotational 
shifts and this seemed not too onerous. 
Two drivers were allocated to each vehicle and this proved good for 
their morale and it proved essential to have at least one person familiar 
with the highway because the depth of snow experienced blotted out most of 
the marker posts, fences and other features that demarcated the highway 
boundaries. Knowledge of turning places for return journeys was most 
essential. 
The continuous operation of the snowploughs throughout the storm 
enabled the highway to be kept clear as long as possible and when sections 
became blocked graders were used to reduce the depth of snow to what could 
be cleared by the snowploughs·. The snowploughs operated at a relatively 
high speed and were able to spread the snow away from the highway without 
leaving a windrow of snow. Where deep windrows had to be left, graders 
again were used to clear these. 
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Front-end loaders were of little use in the major work of clearing 
the highways but were most useful in clearing entrances to county roads, 
depots, farms and ends of bridges. 
Communication between operators and base stations is essential for 
proper co-ordinating of activities. The V.H.F. station at Studholme failed 
early in the snowstorm and it was necessary to arrange for trucks with 
medium wave frequency transmitting sets to go into the area to provide the 
essential communication with operators working at each extremity of the 
section of snow-blocked highway. 
The Hermitage, Mt Cook, because of its situation and concentration of 
visitors presented a problem of providing ingress and egress each day. 
Priority was given to clearing the State Highway to ensure the 
changeover of visitors and afterwards work was carried out on clearing of 
access ways, airstrip etc. The Ball Hut Road was given lowest priority in 
clearing as there was no one at the Ball Hut at that time. 
It was found that staff responded admirably to the tasks allotted to 
them and were most willing to carry out arduous and sometimes dangerous 
tasks to ensure the safety of the travelling public. 
It was essential to prohibit access to critical sections, partic-
ularly at snow bound inclines, until these were completely cleared. Petrol 
tankers, because they are not allowed to be fitted with chains, were most 
likely to get stuck on hills. Transporters, even when fitted with chains, 
are likely to jacknife if they slip on inclines and are most difficult to 
extricate. 
One is ever conscious of the need for emergency transport to hospitals 
and this was highlighted by a request from the doctor at Twizel for an 
emergency route to either Timaru or Oamaru hospitals on the night of 
6 August and the need was made evident by an emergency ambulance trip 
(maternity case) at about midday on 7 August from Twizel to Timaru. 
There is need for all depots to be fully equipped and to hold emer-
gency equipment such as lighting sets, welding appliances and many other 
necessary items to ensure that immediate essential work can be carried out 
without the delay of equipment having to be brought in under adverse con-
ditions. 
E.R.L. O'Toole, 
Resident Engineer. 
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Section 2: Effect on Communications and Services 
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 
Damage in this storm was more widespread and more severe 
than that of the November 1967 snow. This time it was to be 
four weeks before all consumers were reconnected. Great damage 
was done to concrete poles especially when breaking conductors 
or when snow falling from them caused torsional shock loading 
on pole heads. Hardwood poles stood up very much better to 
stress. 
The following are reports from the New Zealand Electricity 
Department, and Power Boards throughout the Canterbury/North 
Otago area. 
New Zealand Electricity Department 
North Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Central Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Ashburton Electric Power Board 
South Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Waitaki Electric Power Board 
NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT 
Introduction 
This report deals with the severe snowstorm that hit North Otago, 
South and Mid Canterbury on Sth, 6th and 7th August 1973, and the damage 
it caused to N.Z. Electricity Department transmission and telephone lines 
in the Christchurch district. 
General 
The first snow fell in the afternoon of Sunday S August 1973 hitting 
Omarama and the Waitaki Valley. 
Snow began falling at Highbank Power Station at S.30 p.m. on the Sth 
and continued until the 7th. The average depth of snow at the station was 
14 inches but drifts on some· roads were estimated at 4-6ft deep. 
At Tekapo Power Station the snow was 3ft deep and by the 7th August 
snow lay at depths of 4-Sft with drifts 10-12ft deep through to the Mid 
Canterbury region. 
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Heavy falls were experienced over an area 20 miles wide from Omarama 
to Oxford and light falls were experienced near the coast. 
An interesting feature was that the worst damage was done at the 
eastern and western edges of the 20 mile wide path whereas there was com-
paratively little damage in the centre where the snow was just as heavy. 
This clearly indicates "wet snow" (which adheres to overhead wires and 
causes ice building) at the edges of the areas affected. 
As well as damage to N~Z.E.D. lines, supply authorities and the Post 
Office lost many miles of lines and poles. Many towns were without power -
Methven and Springfield being hit the worst. Farms and outlying homes were 
without power for one to three weeks. Also twenty-two people were trapped 
in their cars on Porters Pass for two nights until finally rescued. The 
Department's Snowtrac was involved in this operation. 
Transmission Lines 
Islington-Twizel 220kV line 
On Monday 6th August at 11.26 hrs the line tripped and closed on auto 
reclose. A subsequent patrol found collapsed earth peaks on tower 271 near 
Fairlie. 
Christchurch-Twizel 220kV line (under construction) 
Following a report from a farmer that this line was touching a 
telephone line, two men went out to investigate on 6th August while it was 
still snowing. At span 145-146 they found the line 6 inches above the 
telephone line and approximately 11ft above ground. The conductor had an 
estimated 5-6 inches diameter build up of snow and ice. There was also evi-
dence on the ground of snow unloading at the spacers. 
It was later discovered that the lower conductor had one broken strand 
in a position which suggested that it was caused by rubbing on the telephone 
line. Also the two upper conductors had moved through the clamps off the 
armour rods and stripped the aluminium down to the steel core. 
Islington-Kikiwa 220 kV line 
This line tripped out on fault at 07.54 hrs on 6th August and reclo-
sures were initially unsuccessful. An aerial patrol revealed severe icing 
on the conductors in the Duncans Camp, Fowlers and Balcairn area. The 
line was returned to service at 11.54 hrs and a ground patrol the next week 
failed to reveal any definite signs of a flashover. The cause and location 
of the fault is still unknown although it is thought that ice caused the 
conductor to sag sufficiently close to the ground to cause a flashover. 
Tekapo-Timaru 110kV line 
On ,Monday 6th August at 10~37-hrs .th~s line tripped on fault. The 
fault was identified as being in the Albury~Timaru section of the line and 
at 1t'.20 hrs the Tekapd-Albury section of the line was restored to service 
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after the Albury-Timaru section had been isolated. 
A farmer who heard the line break and saw that something was wrong 
telephoned the N.Z.E.D .. and informed us where the fault was. This saved a 
considerable amount of time as the line could not be patrolled owing to 4ft 
of snow and near blizzard conditions. At span 351-352 in the Limestone 
Valley, Y0 conductor Was broken and hanging down a gully. There was 2-3 
inches of ice still on the conductors and during the day R0 broke in the 
same span. It was snowing all through the day and in the evening R0 conduc-
tor broke in span 354-355. 
On Tuesday; 7th, the Timaru maintenance linemen were joined by 8 line-
men from the Temuka construction depot and their D4 dozer. The weather was 
windy and cold but considerably improved over the previous day and this 
section of the line was paralleled to the system at 15.21 hrs. 
Highbank-Methven 66kV line 
This line tripped out on fault at 03.58 hrs on Monday, 6th August. 
Much of the load on this line had however been lost earlier because of 
extensive damage to the Power Board lines. B0 conductor was broken between 
the Highbank structure and tower 1 and Y0 was broken between towers 1 and 
2. Although these were visible from the station they could not be repaired. 
for over 24 hours because heavy snowfalls and the steep tree-covered slopes 
prevented access to the broken conductors. 
Y0 conductor was also broken in span 132-133 and span 137-138. 
After a total of 58 hours out of service the line was closed in again 
at 14.13 hrs on 8th August. A D8 dozer was hired to clear access to one 
section and finally a helicopter was used to string new conductor. 
Coleridge-Hororata 66kV lines 
These three lines sustained the most serious damage. At the edge of 
the storm the lines were effectively wrecked whilst in the centre very 
little damage was done. 
No. 1 line 
This tripped at 05.00 hrs on Monday, 6th August. Damage was done 
between poles 90 and 110 - the last five being severely damaged. From pole 
100 - pole 110, most crossarms had to be replaced and about half the 
insulators were damaged. The conductors were broken at several places, 
viz. all 3 phases in spans 101-102, 104-105, and 106-107. R0 and B0 in 
span 107-108, R0 in span 110-111. 
Pole 108 - an A type strain structure was broken and the top half with 
the double crossarm was demolished. The line was resagged from pole 98 to 
pole 110. 
There was also severe damage between poles 408-413. All conductors 
plus two main crossarms were broken. All the poles were pulled back and 
twisted and the strain pole guys pulled through the dogs. 
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At both these sites, snow on the ground caused great difficulty when 
moving repair equipment around the area. Without the use of helicopters 
and Snowtrac vehicles it would not have been possible to effect repairs 
until the snow had thawed to some degree. Deep gullies and steep bluffs 
plus the Selwyn River in flood contributed to the difficulties the linemen 
experienced in getting new conductor across to effect repairs. 
The No.1 line was returned to service on Friday 10th August at 19.14 
hrs after being out of service for 110 hours. 
No. 2 and 3 lines 
The No.2 line tripped at 23.3.4 hrs on Sunday 5th August and the No. 3 
line at 05.46 hrs on Monday 6th August. 
The tower section of these lines was severely damaged from towers 
276-302. The conductors parted in most spans on this section where these 
were the old type of copper sleeve known as the 'Gun Barrel'. The conduc-
tors pulled through these sleeves with the weight of snow. Four tower 
cyossarms were damaged and one of these had to be completely replaced 
before further repairs could be made. Construction line staff repaired 
this section under very cold conditions. 
The pole section of the No. 2 line was badly damaged from pole 249 
to pole 276. This section is along the road and hence access was much 
easier with County Council staff clearing the snow off the sealed road. 
B0 and R0 conductors were broken and several crossarms and insulators also 
required replacement. The conductors had travelled back through the 
binders and the line had to be resagged from pole 249 to pole 276. 
The pole section of the No. 3 line was badly damaged from pole 103-
pole 108. All conductors were broken in this section and four crossarms 
were also broken. 
In all replacements of crossarms the associated hardware was also 
replaced. 
These two lines, after 155 hrs out of service, were paralleled to the 
system at 16.40 hrs on Sunday 12th August. 
Telephone Lines 
The Coleridge-Hororata phone lines were also- badly affected by the 
storm. Four poles, 24 crossarms and 40 insulators were replaced in the 
Snowdon-Bayfields area and the line was resagged for 24 spans. 
In the Brackendale-Hororata section one pole and 35 crossarms were 
replaced. About 2 miles of conductor required repairs in this section and 
the line was resagged for 50 spans. 
The Coleridge-Otira line required repairs and resagging in four 
spans. This was only possible using .Snowtrac vehicles. 
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The Tekapo-Timaru telep~oneline alsp ,came., down but did not require 
extensive repairs. 
At about 12.00 hrs on 6th August the P9wer line to Waitohi I-:lill v.h.f. 
site failed. Channel 32A, which is suppli,edthro.ugh batteries, ,was the only 
channel still operative and this proved invaluable under the circumstances. 
A TD9 dozer began clearing the road up 'to "the radio .. siteat 14.30 hrs on, the 
7th and this took until 15.00 hrs'the following day'to reach the top. The 
power was restored at about 18.00'hrs on 9th August. 
SUMMARY OF EVENTS 
Sunday, 5th ,August 1973 
18.30 
23.34 
Heavy snow reported at Highbank 
Coleridge-Hororata No. 2 line tripped 
Monday, 6th August 1973 
03.58 
05.00 
05.46 
07.54 
10.37 
11.20 
11.26 
11.54 
Highbank-Methven line tripped 
Coleridge-Hororata No. 1 line tripped 
Coleridge-Hororata No. 3 line tripped 
Islington-Kikiwa line tripped 
Tekapo-Timaru line tripped 
Tekapo-Timaru line split at Albury and Albury-Tekapo section 
returned to service 
Islington-Twizel line tripped and closed on auto reclose 
Islington-Kikiwa line returned to service 
Tuesday, 7th August 1973 
15.21 Albury-Timaru section line returned to service and paralleled 
to system 
Wednesday, 8th August 1973 
14.13 Highbank-Methven line returned to service 
Friday, 10th August 1973 
19.14 Coleridge-Hororata No. 1 line returned to service 
Sunday, 12th August 1973 
16.40 Coleridge-Hororata No.2 and 3 lines returned to service 
Conditions 
As has already beeri ihdicated, the conditions under which the linemen 
worked during this storm were atrocious. 
The Timaru linemen were working In near blizzard conditions to repair 
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the Tekapo-Timaru line as were the Islington linemen repairing the 
Coleridge-Hororata lines. 
Two linemen spent over 24 hrs stranded in a Snowtrac which had 
developed engine trouble and thrown a track. A second Snowtrac on its way 
to assist i~ remobilising the first vehicle also threw a track when nego-
tiating a drift. The occupants of this vehicle with a local farmer and 
his bulldozer spent about 6 hrs clearing the snow and replacing the track 
in appalling conditions. By this time it was realized that rescue of the 
linemen in the first Snowtrac by land vehicles was futile and they had to 
wait until about 13.00 hrs the following day for conditions to improve 
enough for a helicopter to take off and rescue them. 
By the Wednesday, snow had stopped falling and the days following 
were clear but very cold. Nevertheless with snow at an average depth of 
4-5ft, the linemen experienced great access difficulties. Some poles could 
be replaced only by using helicopters which generally contributed greatly 
to the restoration of the lines. 
Another vehicle which proved extremely useful after the storm was 
the Nodwell - a tracked vehicle returned from the Antarctic on loan to the 
Department. This vehicle was very useful in shifting large loads of 
equipment to the various sites and without it repairs would have taken 
considerably longer. 
Conclusion 
This snowstorm, although not the heaviest in Canterbury, caused the 
most damage to transmission and telephone lines in the province's history. 
The linement from the Temuka construction camp and line staff from 
Timaru and'Hanmer were called in to assist with repair work. It was only 
with this extra staff available and the co-operation of some local farmers 
that the lines were returned to service as soon as they were. 
The Snowtrac's, in spite of some shortcomings, together with the 
Nodwell were essential to gaining access and transporting equipment. Above 
all, the use of helicopters for patrols and access to the more difficult 
sites was invaluable. 
NORTH CANTERBURY ELECTRIC POWER BOARD 
Following the onset of so~th to southeast winds over Canterbury during 
the afternoon of Sunday the 5th August, a mass of very cold air descended 
late in the evening. This turned a heavy rain storm into a massive fall of 
wet snow, reaching down to sea level in the southern part of the district. 
The accompanying map shows the area in the Board's supply district where 
snowfalls caused damage to electric lines. The recording of temperatures 
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Above and below~ wires slaok~ broken and poles asceW. 
- Central Canterbury Eleotric 
Power Board. 
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at the office in Rangiora illustrates the remarkable fall in temperature 
which occurred at 1.00 p.m. on Sunday evening after the rainstorm started. 
The drop in temperature brought freezing conditions in the areas above 
500 ft, and precipitation of rain and snow of up to 80 mm in many places. 
Electric lines running approximately north and south in direction, 
under the freezing conditions soon had a large build-up of snow and ice. 
Wind directions were generally from a westerly quarter at ground level, 
with speeds ranging up to 25 knots. The unusually strong wind with the 
snow further aggravated the build-up of ice and snow on conductors. Much 
of the equipment was therefore stressed well beyond breaking points, but 
was not related to the depth of the snowfall. Snowfalls generally up to 
1 ft were experienced at altitudes above 1,000 ft, but in the Burnt Hill 
area much greater depths were observed. In Lees Valley conditions were 
similar, but at 2,000 ft falls as deep as 5ft were reported. 
By 7.00 a.m. on Monday the 6th August it became apparent that a major 
power supply break could be expected in the area to the west of Springbank, 
and in the Loburn-Okuku-Whiterock districts. The fault staff had struggled 
from midnight onwards in an endeavour to keep the supply available to 
Oxford, but had to give up in the small hours because of the increasing 
depth of snow. At 7.15 a.m. a review of the position was made, and 
shortly before 8.00 a.m. two parties set out, one for the Cust substation 
where all 11 kV lines were out of service, and the second for the Loburn 
area. It soon became very noticeable that all lines east and west were 
barely damaged, but north and south ones were in very poor shape. With a 
7 in. diameter build-up on the north-south lines, conductors were subject 
to tensions well beyond breaking points, and crossarms which normally 
carry loads of up to 100 lb were subjected to weights of 5,000-6,000 lb 
from a single conductor. Therefore considerable failures were experienced 
in conductors, arms, poles, and stays. By 9.00 a.m. supply was restored 
to Cust again, and progressively over the next two hours to the West 
Eyreton and Horrelville districts, which were not greatly affected. 
By removing all branch lines between Cust and Barracks Road, Oxford, 
the main 11 kV feeder to Oxford was again put into service. Fortunately 
the east-west lines along the Main Street of Oxford remained in good order, 
and it was possible to restore power as far as the West Oxford hotel by 
4.45 p.m. on the same day. All lines running north and south in Oxford 
township were largely wrecked. Only slow progress could be made in 
restoring the power to Loburn and Whiterock, as severe damage had taken 
place to the line just past the Loburn exchange. An assessment of the 
damage during Monday afternoon pin-pointed the two main trouble spots of 
Loburn-Whiterock, and generally the whole of the Oxford County. The storm 
had further reached across the Omihi Valley in the north, to cause some 
damage to Reece's Road. 
On Tuesday all available staff were concentrated in Oxford, and in 
the Loburn-Whiterock area, and lines were progressively restored from that 
time. Priority was given to restoration of water supplies to Cust and 
Oxford, and this was achieved by advancing the 11 kV supply to the west of 
Oxford on Tuesday, to the water pump just beyond The Terrace towards 
Coopers Creek, and putting one of our portable generators at Tippings 
Road just before the water supply to Cust failed. An effort was then made 
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to restore the areas which affected the greatest number of people, and to 
get supply back to the schools as quickly as possible. 
I would like to express appreciation to the staff, who have worked 
continuously since the snowstorm along with construction crews from the 
Municipal Electricity Department in Christchurch and the Kaiapoi Borough 
Council. They worked under very difficult conditions for long hours every 
day. Assistance from local residents has also been most helpful in the 
form of tractors and carrying shingle to help stand up poles in the very 
wet ground conditions. Also it should be recorded the assistance given by 
the public in the rest of the district, in not pressing for services in 
other directions while overhead lines were being repaired. 
The Mt Thomas radio repeater has provided continuous and excellent 
communications, and without it the progress of repair work, particularly 
in the Oxford district, would have been greatly hindered. It also allowed 
the residents of Lees Valley to have some form of communication, as one of 
our portable radiotelephones was sent in by helicopter on the Tuesday after 
the storm. 
The damage has necessitated the replacement of 140 broken poles, 
approximately 500 crossarms, and four transformers, and it is probable the 
final cost will reach at least $25,000. 
At the time of reporting two main areas will still be without elec-
tricity supplies. They will be the Lees Valley, and the line across the 
Ashley River to Rakahuri and Haylands at the foot of Mt Thomas. The lines 
in these areas are generally not badly damaged, but the heavy snow and wet 
conditions in the Ashley River gorge make it difficult to repair the two 
trouble spots. The river crossing over the Ashley River to Rakahuri is a 
problem, as it has been badly damaged, and the river has been at a high 
level for some time. Also the wires down in the river have broken off 
one of the poles from its pile structure. However, should weather con-
ditions remain favourable, it should be possible to have these two parts 
of the district restored in about a week's time at the latest. 
The new line in Lees Valley stood up to the snow conditions excep-
tionally well, and the whole main line the length of the valley from 
Harper's to Okuku Station is undamaged, except where the east-west branch 
lines have pulled over their tap-off poles. It is remarkable that the . 
lines at the top end of the valley at the Okuku Hills Station have not 
been damaged at all, as it is in this area that falls of up to 5ft have 
been reported by the local residents. 
The Board has had sufficient stocks of all materials in hand to meet 
the emergency, and further consignments of poles and hardwood timber 
arrived from Australia during this week. 
To assist people with deep· freezes, the Board made available five 
deep freeze units in Oxford for use by the residents of the district, and 
the County also made other arrangements. It was indeed fortunate that the 
elec~ric power was able to be supplied to the major part of the commercial 
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area of Oxford within sixteen hours of its failure, as I am sure that this 
greatly alleviated problems in the district. 
D.W. Harris, 
General Manager & Chief Engineer 
CENTRAL CANTERBURY ELECTRIC POWER BOARD 
Storm Damage 
During the night of Sunday 5th August a heavy snowstorm struck, 
amongst other areas, the western part of Malvern County. All supply from 
the Hororata Substation was interrupted at 1.30 a.m. 
Serious damage was sustained to the lines in Windwhistle, Lake 
Coleridge, Hororata, Glenroy Downs, Glentunnel, Whitecliffs, Russells Flat, 
along the whole of the West Coast Road including Waddington, Racecourse 
Hill, Sheffield, Annat, Springfield, Kowhai Bush and Coalgate and minor 
damage around Darfield and Greendale. The worst hit areas were Glenroy 
Downs, Whitecliffs, and the West Coast Road. 
The number of poles broken at that stage was estimated in the vicinity 
of 60. No estimate was made of the number of crossarms broken, but prac-
tically everyone was broken between Racecourse Hill and Springfield. A 
considerable amount of conductor had been damaged and during reconstruction 
most of it was replaced. Some of the conductor will be recoverable when 
cleaning up operations take place later. 
Power was restored to Darfield and Kirwee townships by midday on 
Monday 6th August, and Aylesbury, Greendale and Te Pirita were reconnected 
that afternoon. Also by the evening parts of Hororata and Coalgate town-
ship were back on. 
By Monday 13th August, power had been restored to the Windwhistle 
area as far as Snowdon, most of Glenroy Downs, and along the West Coast 
Road to just past Annat. The rate at which repairs had been carried out on 
the West Coast Road can only be described as fantastic. In one day through 
one section 13 poles were replaced and a mile of new conductor run. 
A very rough estimate of the cost of the damage was just under $100,000. 
Special account numbers were established for the allocation of costs involved 
in repairs and the true position should be known fairly accurately when the 
work is finished. 
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llkV Lines 
Naturally for the whole of August practically all lines staff were 
engaged on repairing storm" damage in the Darfield area. Also during 
September gangs from other areas were frequently sent to Darfield to assist 
with tidying up. 
The storm struck about 5.30 p.m. on Sunday 5th August. Attempts were 
made to restore supply damaged during the night but conditions became 
impossible and work ceased at about 1.30 a.m. Early in the morning staff 
again began to restore supply as far as possible. By about 9 a.m. on Monday 
6th August about 30 percent of the area supplied from Hororata substation 
had been restored. 
A survey as far as was possible that morning clearly indicated that 
the damage had been extensive. Access to much of the area at that stage 
was extremely difficult. The provision of tracked vehicles by the Army and 
the use of a helicopter from the R.N.Z.A.F. were very helpful for gaining 
information on areas that would have otherwise been inaccessible. It took 
three weeks to restore supply to the last consumer. It is however expected 
to take three months before the last remnants of damage have been repaired 
and the system finally restored to a safe condition. 
During the course of repairs the opportunity was taken to upgrade or 
re-route various lines for which this work had been previously planned. 
These included Russells Flat where the 'Dog' line through the Pig Saddle was 
completed, the Main West Road beyond Annat and a new line beyond the Lime-
works at the Kowai River crossing. 
As an indication of the extent of the damage the work done included 
the replacement of 380 poles, 62 miles of conductor and 7,500 lineal feet 
of crossarm timber. In all some 200 miles of line were worked on during 
the three week period. 
Most of the work in other areas since the storm, involved catching 
up with the small services and extensions for consumers' immediate require-
ments. 
S.E. Slatter, 
General Manager 
ASHBURTON ELECTRIC POWER BOARD 
1. Damage 
1.1 Snow which fell during the night of 5-6 August 1973 covered some 
400 square miles of the Board's ~tea. 
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Damage to the Board's electrical system occurred generally northwest 
of a line joining Carew, Hackthorne, Lyndhurst to the Rakaia River. 
Analysis shows that some 100 miles of aerial lines suffered substan-
tial damage. 
Some hundreds of conductor breaks occurred and 4,400 ft of crossarm 
timber was used in replacing damaged crossarms. 280 poles were damaged, 
requiring replacement. 
1.2 Generally.the lines which suffered the worst damage were those lying 
at right angles to the southwest storm although there were exceptions to 
this, particularly with short spur lines. 
1.3 Damage to lines caused by falling trees was minimal and confined 
mainly to aerials in farmers' yards. 
It is probable that the November 1967 snow felled those trees which 
were in a menacing position and of course the continued activities of the 
tree-cutting gang must have also helped to alleviate the "tree problem". 
1.4 While much of the line damage coincided with the snow falling, some 
lines suffered damage on the 7th of August after the snowfall had ceased. 
In this case damage was caused by the sudden unloading of snow from 
a conductor with resulting unbalanced shock loading. The subject is treated 
in greater detail later in the report, however as an example the new 33kV 
line from Lismore to Mt Somers is known to have been virtually intact on 
Monday but on Tuesday had suffered the following damage: 
Crossarms broken 
Insulators broken 
Insulator pins damaged 
Poles broken 
Braces damage<;l 
36 
60 
40 
8 
16 
There were four conductor failures at points of jointing. 
This line was built to a loading condition of at least tin. radial 
ice and 7 lb wind; in fact the line was sagged such that the design load 
with a factor of safety of 50 percent was 8.65 lb wind on t in. radial ice 
at oOF. 
It is worth noting however that damage occurred only on the 5 chain 
span 33kV section of the line. Where the line is 4 chain span with 33kV 
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and 11kV circuits there was no damage. 
1.5 In an effort to establish any pattern of behaviour which may exist, 
the number of miles of line damage to the various conductored lines on the 
various span langths were recorded for l1kV lines. 
These are summarised in the following table: 
TABLE 1 
MILES OF LINE DAMAGED 
Span 3~ch 4ch 4~ch Sch Skch 6ch 7ch Total Type of poles 
Conductor 
No. S galv. 1 1 I 10 3 I 29 Hardwood poles 3 I 1 6 I B.S. poles 
Bantam 1 1 H.W. B.S. 
Magpie 2 20 2 3 3 32 H.W. 2 B.S. 
Squirrel 0 H.W. B.S. 
Swan 1 2 3 H.W. B.S. 
Flounder 7 3 2 12 H.W. B.S. 
Pickerel 3 3 H.W. B.S. 
Fox 3 3 H.W. B.S. 
Ferret 0 H.W. B.S. 
Mink 3 3 H.W. B.S. 
Dog 0 H.W. B.S. 
No. 5 Cu W 1 2 H.W. 
I B.S. 
Wet snow and freezing temperatures caused heavy snow 
accumulation on power lines. 
- N.Z. Post Office~ Timaru. 
Twisted and crossed lines~ difficuZt to recover~ wasted. 
- Central Canterbury EZectric 
Power Board. 
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Much concrete pole failure, Transformer on the Geraldine-
Woodbury line. 
- South Canterbury Electric 
Power Board. 
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Span 3~ch 4ch 4~ch 5ch 5~ch 6ch 7ch Total Type of poles 
7/13 Cu 4 4 H.W. B.S. 
No.8 Cu 1 1 2 H.W. B.S. 
7/16 Cu 3 H.W. 3 B.S. 
3/10 Cu 3 H.W. 3 B.S. 
7/14 Cu 1 2 H.W. 1 B.S. 
1.6 There is little trend apparent from the table. 
Magpie and No.8 galvanised steel lines appear to have fared badly. 
This is not necessarily the case as these conductors have been used exten-
sively on the Board's system and particularly in the snow areas. 
2. Personnel 
2.1 The Board's area was divided into three sections and direct super-
vision of repair work in these areas was handled by the Assistant Engineer, 
Engineers' Assistant and Lines Overseer. This method of supervision worked 
very well. 
2.2 Extra personnel made available by the N.Z. Army, N.Z.E.D., and other 
supp y authorities were used to advantage. 
2.3 Office staff members who joined line gangs in the field also made a 
valuable contribution to the job in hand. 
It is likely that the usefulness of non line staff in the field is 
attributable to the fact that we are a relatively small authority with all 
staff members having an appreciation of the other man's job. In a large 
organisation this "team" attitude is lost and an "I am all right Jack" 
attitude frequently prevails. 
3. Communications 
3.1 Communications were generally good, however the loss of supply to the 
Gawler Downs radio repeater station meant that the standby radio equipment 
at Ashburton had to be used extensively. 
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It is a fact that nowadays absolutely reliable radio communication is 
a must and standards of performance which were once acceptable i.e. VHF 
transmission from Ashburton are no longer good enough. 
A standby diesel alternator set has been ordered for the Gawler Downs 
radio station and it is expected to have this equipment in service for the 
winter of 1974. 
3.2 Two 
to enable 
continued 
able sets 
portable VHF radio sets on the Board's frequency were purchased 
outside help to have communications. This equipment will have 
use as emergency communication in the future. Two further port-
were hired for the duration of the repair work. 
4. Vehicles and Plant 
4.1 The following vehicles and plant were used in addition to that owned 
by the Board. 
Hired locally: . 
From other Boards, 
N.Z.E.D. or Army: 
1 Landrover 
4 front-end loaders 
3 hole diggers 
3 line trucks 
4 heavy trucks 
4.2 The use of front-end loaders was vital in providing access to areas 
of line damage, particularly pole sites. The Landrover provided useful 
transport for one area supervisor. 
The heavy Army trucks enabled transport of men and equipment under 
difficult conditions. 
The remaining vehicles were basically the tools of the assisting 
lines staff. 
5. Line Design 
5.1 Since the Board's inception a number of different line design 
standards have been used. 
Modifications have been made in the light of experience of storm 
conditions and with the availability of different construction methods and 
materials. 
5.2 Since 1944 lines erected for snow loading have been erected to either 
8lb wind and ~ in. radial ice at 200 F or 11 lb wind and t in. radial ice at 
200 with F.O.S. 2. The latter design standard has been used mainly for 
major lines. 
5.3 In 1967 snow loadings were reassessed when the New Zealand Standard 
A.C.S.R. conductors were considered. 
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It was desired to run Mink conductor on 4·ch span 30ft poles. A 
loading factor of q = 10 was the highest loading factor which could be used 
in this case. This loading factor is :equivalent to ~ in. radial ice and 
7 Ib wind at OOF with a factbr of saiety of 2. 
This loading was adopted for heavy snow areas with 8 lb wind arid' in. 
radial ice (q = 7.1 for similar case) in less severe snow areas. 
5.4 Consequently in snow areas there are lines constructed to various 
of the above loading conditions. 
5.5 If progress is to be made, the experience of a snowstorm should be 
analysed so that better informed decisions may be made in the future. 
Unfortunately however much of the information which comes in after 
such a storm is opinion only. Factual information very often relates to 
lines which have been in service for many years and it is probable that some 
components, which failed under severe snow loading, had deteriorated in 
service and would have failed under less severe conditions in the foresee-
able future. 
5.6 One line which is of known condition (new), known design, and known 
subsequent damage is the 33kV line Lismore~Mt Somers. Further study of 
this line is warranted. 
5.7 It is known that this line suffered damage at some time after the 
snow had stopped falling. 
It is likely that failure was due to unbalanced loading caused either 
by conductor failure or sudden snow unloading of one conductor in a span. 
5.8 The most severe unbalanced loading condition will occur when a 
conductor breaks under snow loading. The unloading of snow off a conductor 
is unlikely to be quite as severe as the snow would not all falloff at the 
same instant and some balancing tension remains in the conductor. 
Calculations for the broken wire condition for a Dog 33kV line on 5 
chain spans when loaded for a design stress of 3,650 lb show that a stress 
of 12,000 Ib/in2 will exist in the crossarm. 
Allowance has been made for the fact that the crossarm will deflect 
under load and in doing so reduce the force applied to it. 
If the line is stressed to ultimate i.e. 2 x 3,650 lb then stresses 
of the order of 24,000 Ib/in2 will occur in the crossarm. 
The C.S.I.R.O. Timber Engineering Design Handbook lists a modulus 
of rupture of 12 percent moisture content tallowwood as 22,240 Ib/in2 . 
The crossarm can therefore be expected to fail at ultimate load or 
less depending on how good a sample of timber is used in the crossarm. 
5.9 If the line is re-poled at 4 chain spans, then under the above des-
cribed conditions stresses of 22,000 Ib/in2 may occur. This represents a 
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theoretical reduction in stress; however there is no guarantee that some 
crossarms will not break. 
5.10 An additional safeguard would be to include two-pole H structures in 
the line at half-mile intervals. These structures fully guyed would reduce 
the tendency for whole sections of line to whip in a torsional manner under 
broken-wire loads. 
6. Future Design 
6.1 Cost dictates the standard of service which any service organisation 
may offer to its consumers. 
As it is beyond the resources of the Board to completely rebuild all 
its lines in snow areas to withstand some inches of radial ice loading, some 
compromise must be made. 
6.2 In my opinion it must be accepted that if a sufficiently severe snow-
storm hits the Board's area then some aerial lines will fail. This will be 
the case for many years to come. 
6.3 The point at issue is which lines cause the least inconvenience when 
they fail and is there a particular component in the line which desirably 
should fail first? 
6.4 The order of preferred failure for the major line components is 
conductor, crossarm, pole. 
6.5 In general the smaller conductors which have been used on minor lines 
have a lower strength than the larger conductors. For this reason failure 
is usually the conductor which may be readily jointed. The exceptions to 
this are the 3-4 stranded A.C.S.R. conductors and an inspection of Table 1 
shows that 32 miles of Magpie line suffered substantial damage. In this 
case conductor breakages were few and the damage was frequently caused by 
guy failure. 
6.6 On the basis that the larger capacity lines serve a larger number 
of consumers and that they form a base from which progressive repairs to 
spur lines may be made a system of graded strength is proposed. 
6.7 In snow areas i.e. west of a line joining Ealing with Urral to Rakaia 
River; 
All lines Mink and larger t in. ice 11 lb wind at OOF design loading. 
This means Mink will no longer be suitable for 4 chain spans and 
30ft poles. 
Lines to be shackled off on H poles at least every mile and for 33kV 
lines every half mile. 
All new A.C.S.R. lines which lie approximately across the S.W. to be 
built to t in. ice 11 lb wind. 
All other lines in snow area to t in. ice 7 lb wind. 
Lines between the above described snow line and SH12to be built to 
8 lb wind ~ in. ice. 
Lines east of SRI Mink and i~ige~'; 8lb'wind ~ in. ice. Smaller than 
Mirik, i8 lb wind.' 
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6.8 Particular care is to be ~aid to' guying methods.' Further research into 
the sizes of guy used' will be made as failures occurred with all sizes in use 
at present i.e. ~ in., ~ in. and i in. 
Guys with only two bulldogs fitted failed by pulling through~ In 
future :thr~e bulldogS will 'be fitt~d in all cases. 
6.9 The failure of compression tension joints on the 33kV Dog Line Lismore-
Mt Somers is a matter for some concern. Examination of the joints which 
failed reveals that they were insufficiently compressed. It appears that the 
12 ton compressors have not been capable of fully compressing the aluminium 
strands onto the'steel core. In future the 100 ton compressor will 'be used 
for all tension compression joints. 
6.10 Past, present and proposed snow loading design figures are summarised 
in the following Table 2. 
Heavy snow 
areas at 
right angles 
to S.W. 
Heavy snow 
areas other 
directions 
Light snow 
area 
East of 
SH1 
Prior to 1967 
Main 
Lines 
tin. ice 
11 lb 
wind at 
OOF 
tin. ice 
11 lb 
wind at 
OOF 
Minor 
Lines 
tin. ice 
Illb 
wind at 
OOF to 
18 lb 
wind 
iin. ice 
8 lb wind 
to 18 lb 
wind 
!zin. ice 18 lb 
8 lb wind wind 
at OOF 
!zin. ice 18 lb 
8 lb wind wind 
at OOF 
TABLE 2 
1967 00 1973 
Main Minor 
Lines Lines 
3 • 41n. ice !zin. ice 
7 lb wind 8 lb· wind 
at OOF at OOF to 
18 lb 
wind 
3 • 41n. ice !zin. ice 
7 lb wirid 8 lb wind 
at OOF at OOF to 
18 lb 
wind 
!zin. ice !zin. ice 
8 lb wind 8 lb wind 
at OOF at OOF to 
18 lb 
wind 
Gener- 18 lb 
ally wind 
!zin. ice 
8 lb wind 
Proposed 
Main 
Lines 
3 • 41n. ice 
11 lb 
wind at 
OOF 
tin. ice 
11 lb 
wind at 
OOF 
Minor 
Lines 
ACSR lines 
3 • 41n. ice 
11 lbwind 
at OOF 
3 • • 41n. Ice 
7 lb wind 
at OOF 
!zin. ice !zin. ice 
8 lb wind 8 lb wind 
at OOF at OOF 
!zin. ice 18 lb 
8 lb wind wind 
at OOF 
6.12 Table 2 shows that the, pr()p6sed new snow loadings do not really 
represent a major change from those which have been used in the past. 
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What has been done is to tidy up the situation; to extend sno~ design 
to cover minor lines to a greater degre~ in both light and heavy show ar~as; 
and to discontinue the use of ~ in. ice 7 lb wind on main lines in heaVY 
snow areas in favour of ~ in. ice and 11 1 b wind. 
7. Rebuilding 
7.1 The Lismore-Mt Somers line is to be' rebuilt to the' new standarci. 
7.2 An estimated 30 miles of other 11kV line require complete rebuilding 
and many miles of line require maintenarice work. 
7.3 Methven and Mayfield townships require extensive maintenance and 
rebuilding and some repairs are required in Mt Somers township. 
7.4 This rebuilding is expected to take 80 gang weeks to complete." With 
the exception of the proposed extension to Lake Heron and Erewhon there is 
no major line construction job planned for the next'few years. For this 
reason and particularly if this extension may be deferred it is anticipated 
that the line reconstruction and repair work will be completed within two 
years. 
8. Cost 
8.1 Expenditure immediately after the snowstorm i.e. the initial repair 
work cost $62,000. 
8.2 The rebuilding and maintenance programme is estimated to cost as 
follows: 
30 miles of reconstructed 11kV line 
9 miles reconstructed 33kV line 
General maintenance i.e. sagging and the 
replacement of occasional poles and arms 
$75,000 
$14,895 
$33,650 
This work is to be done to an estimated 100 miles of line. 
8.3 Total expenditure on snow repairs over the next 
two years 
8.4- Total cost of repairs including amount spent 
9. Summary 
$123,545 
$185,545 
9.1 The snowstorm of August 5-6 1973 caused severe damage to the Board's 
overhead system west of a line joining Carew, Hackthorne, Lyndhurst to the 
Rakaia River. 
100 Miles of line suffere~ substantial damage including 280 poles, 
4,400 ft of crossarm timber and hundreds of conductor breaks. 
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9.2' Lines lying approximately at r*:g~t angles to, the southwest wind 
suffeTed the worst damage. 
9'.3 Considerable damage arose from shoc'k loading at the time of' snow 
falling off heavily ioaded spaNs. 
9.4 From a personnel point o"f view the> Board's staff coped very well with 
the difficult conditions. 
9.5 The: Board's vehicles.'and plant wiere also adequate in type'. The use 
of front-end: loaders was essential, how'everit is not recommended that the 
Board should own this type of equipment, hiring being the better al ternati ve. 
9.6 Communications were g()od and the provision cj:f a; standby alternator at 
Gawler Downs will make the radio netwoTk even more reliable., 
9.7 Lines of various design strength suffered damage howe'ver those lines 
designed to ~ in. ice 11 lb wind at OaF withstood the storm quite well. 
9.,8 It is considered that in future main lines should be built to this 
standard in the heavy snow area. ,It is also considered that the direction 
of a line in relation to the S.,W., and the size and importance of the line 
should he major factors in selecting the design strength level from the 
various alternatives available. 
9.,9 The snowstorm has already cost a further $123,545 over the next two 
years .' 
9.10 This work involves rebuilding some 39 miles of line and carrying out 
maintenance on a further 100 miles. 
9.,11 These figures do not take account of the loss o'f revenue during the 
storm. 
9.12' It must he expected that in spite of rebuilding programmes a future 
similar snowstorm will cause substantial damage to the Board's system. 
The be>st that can be expected is that lines'will fail in a Way that 
is easier to repair and major feeder lines, <'will remain intact. 
9:. 13 . Finally it should he recorded that the vehicles 'and men provided by 
other supply authorities, N.Z.E.D. and N.Z~ Army were of considerable assis-
tance in spe:eding up the restoration of supplyn) many of the Board's' con-
sumers. 
9.14 It is not possihle for any supply authority to carry sufficient men 
and machines on a daily hasis as it suddenly requires when confronted with 
an emergency of this type. 
Co-operation between interested parties must always be the solution 
to this problem. 
M.J. Walker, 
Chief Engineer. 
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SOUTH CANTERBURY ELECTRIC POWER BOARD 
1. Damage caused by the August.1973 snowstorm 
During the night of Sunday, 5th August, and particularly on Monday 
morning, 6th August, the ,Board's distribution system was extensively 
damaged in the storm when snow fell to a great depth along the foothills 
from Waihaorunga in the south to Peel Forest in .the north. Heavy snow . fell 
in the Mackenzie Basin, but very little damage wa~ done to the aerial dis-
tribution system in that area. 
Areas Affected 
Although it will be some time before a full assessment can be made 
of the extent of the damage, the following schedules have been prepared ·from 
the information that is currently available. 
District 
Tara Hill Road 
Tavendale's Road 
Meyers Pass Road 
Douthwaite's Road 
Kaiwarua Road 
Mt Studholme 
Totai 
WAlMATE COUNTY 
Length of line 
damaged 
miles 
Serious Minor 
0.5 3.0 
2.0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
1.25 
0.5 7.35 
Poles 
damaged 
12 
1 
4) 
2) 
1) 
20 
Consumers 
affected 
15 
12 
23 
Remarks 
Repairs commenced by 
PAC-Lysaght staff 
8.8.73 plus local 
service staff 
3 Repairs to commence 
17.8.73 
,53 (16.8.73) 
District 
Clelands Ext. 
Henricksen's ,Ext 
Nimrod Cannington 
Lamb, Maungati 
Mt Misery 
Guidex ext. 
Burnetts Road 
Cannington 
Giles & Steel 
extension 
Langley Downs 
Line over 
Brothers 
Total 
LEVELS,' COUNTY 
Length qf line 
damaged 
miles 
Serious Minor 
0.8 
0.8 
1.6 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.7 
0.35 
1.35 
Poles 
'damaged 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
15 
'Consumers 
affected 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
5 
16 
Remarks 
Repairs still to be 
effected 
Repairs (some 
temporary) effected 
by faul t staff, 
Timaru. Supply 
restored by 8.8.73 
Line not in use 
meantime 
(16.8.73) 
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GERALDI.NE: COUNTY 
District Length of line 
, damaged 
miles 
Serious Minor 
Arundel to Peel 6.5 
Forest & 
Blandswood 
Arundel to Inglis 2.5 
Road '. Si I verton 
Lysaght Road to 1.5 
Orari Gorge Stn 
and Tripp 
Settlement Road 
Woodbury Road & 4.0 
Township from 
consumer Cummings 
to Waihi Gorge 
Wooding Road to 2.0 
McKeown Road to 
Four Peaks 
Four Peaks Road 
to Painton Road 
Te Moana, Slacks 
Valley, Gapes 
Valley 
Rapuwai Corner 
Consumer Tovey 
Total 
1.0 
17.50 
3.5 
1.25 
3.5 
0.5 
0.25, 
1.0 
2.5 
0.25 
12.75 
poles. ' Consumers, ' 
damaged Glffected 
Remarks 
123 150 
53 10 
33 30 
92 30 
27 8 
15 20 
1 20 
2 1 
346 269 
" Repairs., commenced by 
Southland Electric 
,Supply 13.-8.' 73 
Repairs to commence? 
Repairs.commenced by 
Marlborough Electric 
Power Board9.8~73 
Being repaired by 
S.C.E.P.B. ,·staff 
from 7.8.73 
Repairs to 'commence 
15.8.73 
Repairs by T.C.C. 
from 8.8.73 
Temporary repairs 
effected by T.C.C. 
M.E.D. staff 
Temporary repairs by 
S.C.E.P.B. 
(16.8.73) 
District 
Wins combe from 
main line to 
consumer 
Gillingham 
Cricklewood Road 
Burkes Pass Ext 
from Fairlie 
Mt Michael Road 
Mona Vale Road 
Rocky Gully Road 
Tangawai River 
crossing 
School Road, 
Fairlie 
B.C. Bowker Ext 
Three Springs Road 
Trotter Ext 
L.T. in Fairlie 
4 single 
consumers 
Mt John, Tekapo 
Total 
MACKENZIE COUNTY 
Length of line 
damaged 
miles 
Poles 
damaged 
Serious Minor 
3.0 1.5 60 
0.7 10 
0.5 26 
0.4 5 
0.1 2 
L.T. only Nil 
0.2 Nil 
0.05 3 
0.7 2 
0.25 2 
0.25 4 
0.15 4 
0.5 10 
1 pole 1 
4.9 3.40 129 
Consumers 
affected 
13 
6 
63 
60 
7) 
5) 
Nil 
8 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
Nil 
173 
73 
Remarks 
Repairs commenced by 
S.C.E.P.B. & M.O.W. 
Twizel staff 
14.8.73 
Repairs by S.C.E.P.B. 
& M.O.W. 13.8.73 
Repairs by S.C.E.P.B. 
11.8.73 
Repairs by S.C.E.P.B. 
11.8.73 
Repairs by 
S.C.E.P.B. 
Alternative feeds 
available. Conductor 
only 
Repairs by S.C.E.P.B. 
9.8.73 
Repairs to commence? 
Repairs by M.O.W. 
Restored 15.8.73 
L.T. only 
Supply not inter-
rupted 
(16.8.73) 
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SUMMARY 
COUNTY TOTAL 
-------~---------
Waimate Levels G'dine Mack. 
Route miles of serious damage 0.5 1.6 17.5 .9 24.5 
Route miles minor damage 7.35 1.35 12.75 3.4 24.85 
Poles damaged 20 15 246 129 510 
Consumers affected initially 53 16 269 173 511 
Repair of Damage 
By Tuesday, 7th August, it became obvious that extensive damage had 
been caused to the distribution system, and that it was beyond the ~apacity 
of our staff to repair the damage if supply to consumers was to be restored 
organisations, who each supplied a line gang, t!ansport and other plCint: 
Timaru City Council Electricity Department 
Marlborough Electric Power Board - Blenheim 
Ministry of Works - Twizel 
Southland Electricity Supply - Invercargill 
Besides three of our own line gangs and fault ~t~ff, w~ were able to 
utilise PAC-Lysaght staff ln the Waihaorunga District for they had only_ 
that day, Monday 6th, moved from Twizel to Waihaorunga to complete a job 
there. On 16th August, there were still 72 persons engaged in the restora-
tion process. 
Cause of Damage 
Snow exceeding 4 in. in diamete-r was a common sight on many of the 
conductors and many spans of A.C.S.R. were seen resting close to the ground 
and on fences. The greatest damage appears to have been caused initially by 
snow and ice laden conductors breaking either at joint, in mid-span or at 
the end of an armour rod. In many cases, this broken wire condition caused 
high tortional forces to be set up on the pole head, such that in the case 
of concrete poles, the heads were ~crewed 6ff. The falling o£ic~ from one 
conductor likewise sets up unequal stresses on the pole head and could have 
been the cause of some failures. There was much evidence to show that once 
one concrete pole failed, it set up a chain reaction such that c.oncrete poles 
in adj acent spans also broke at ground level. 
Types of Poles Damaged 
By far the majority of poles that'were aa~ag~d in the Geraldine County 
were the reinforced concrete type, for these were used almost exclusively 
when this area was reconstructed 7 years ago. To effect quick repairs in 
the Geraldine County after the 1967 snowstorm, concrete poles were used in 
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places where concrete ones had been broken, and in many cases, these replace-
ment poles have again been broken in this most recent storm. 
It is very difficult to say to what extent the damage would have been 
reduced if exclusive use had been made of Australian Hardwood poles instead 
of the reinforced concrete types that are manufactured by the Board, for 
even where hardwood poles were used, some were broken. North of the 
Rangitata River, similar snow conditions were experienced, and the Ashburton 
Board, which makes extensive use of hardwood poles, found that in excess of 
250 supports were damaged in the storm. It is interesting to note, however, 
that in the parts of the Waihaorunga district shown in the previous schedule, 
the majority of poles are hardwood, having been erected during the 1956/7 
reticulation scheme. Of these, 4.5 percent were damaged. In the same area 
since that date, various extensions have been built, using concrete poles, 
and of all the concrete ones in the area 25 percent were damaged. 
Although the conductor tension due to ice loading imposed stresses 
on crossarms and supports in excess of those for which they were designed, 
the resilience of the wooden poles and their ability to accept higher tor-
tional loads at the head, showed that they are a more satisfactory type of 
support for conductors in the conditions encountered. Many concrete poles 
which were broken have been replaced with hardwoods in the expectation that 
they will prevent the cascade collapse of lines, should similar ice condi-
tions occur in future. 
To minimise further the damage that can be caused by a broken wire 
on an ice laden line, it may be necessary to provide a fully stayed wooden 
H pole structure at intervals along a line. This structure would be able to 
absorb the stresses set up when one wire broke and thus prevent the trans-
mission of dangerously high forces along the length of the line. When 
permanent repairs are being carried out later, it would be desirable to 
introduce this additional feature, especially on those lines which have been 
damaged twice under similar snow conditions. 
Comparison with 1967 Snowstorm 
The damage on this occasion is far more widespread, ranging through 
four Counties - Waimate, Levels, Geraldine and Mackenzie. 
Pole damage is greater - 510 against 405. 
Time of restoration of supply to all consumers will be greater -
probably 3-4 weeks against 14 days in 1967. 
Cost of restoration will be greater, probably in excess of $60,000 
against $43,000 in 1967. 
In November 1967, a thaw set in quite rapidly, and allowed all gangs 
to obtain access to damaged lines, but even now, 10 days after the snow fell, 
gangs have been unable to reach every damaged section. 
The extensive damage to lines running east-west and comparative minor 
damage to lines built in the north-south direction, has been noticeable in 
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the case of this snowstorm, which originated from the south. 
Conclusion 
This report indicates that extensive damage has been sustained by the 
distribution system. It is possible that it would have been less had hard-
wood poles been used, but the snow and ice was of such severity that damage 
would have occurred irrespective of the type of support or conductor used. 
F.C. Stevenson, 
Chief Engineer. 
2. Effect of snowstorms in South Canterbury: 
1967 and 1973 
Because the snowstorm followed closely upon the one which occurred in 
November 1967 when practically the same parts of the Board's area were 
affected in a similar manner, one is forced to the conclusion that the 
frequency of such storms may be closer than has been previously accepted. 
Had the two storms been further apart in memory, a frequency of 1 in 40 
could possibly be accepted, but it is now necessary to consider what steps 
the Board should take if this type of storm is to occur more frequently. 
This report analyses in part A the factors which are associated with 
line design, the loading of lines during the storm and the resultant damage 
to same, while in part B, an evaluation is made of methods that could be 
used to overcome the problems. 
PART A 
1. DESIGN PARAMETERS 
(a) As used by South Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Until now, it has been considered that apart from these two relatively 
recent snowstorms, the design of aerial lines has been adequate for the 
conditions experienced in South Canterbury. Apart from a few special cases 
mentioned below, no lines in the Board's area (including the Mackenzie 
Basin), have been designed specifically to withstand snow or ice loads. The 
exceptions are: 
1. llkV line to supply N.Z.B.C. installation on Mt Studholme. 
2. 33kV line Twizel to Pukaki. 
3. Waimate-Arno llkV line. 
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Each of these have been designed for 8 lb per sq. ft wind on a con-
ductor loaded with ~ in. radial thickness of ice. 
The basic parameters used on all other lines built to date have 
allowed for: 
1. A wind load of 18 lb per sq. ft of projected area of the conductor. 
(This would be equivalent to a wind of approximately 113 m.p.h~ on 
the conductor.) 
2. A temperature of 200 F (-6.70 C) at time of maximum wind. 
When the above conditions are reached, the Electrical Supply Regula-
tions require that a factor of safety of 2 should still exist, i.e. that 
the maximum working tension in the conductor should not exceed 50 percent 
of the breaking load of the conductor. 
The Board's Engineers in the past have been more conservative and 
have, in fact, built in factors of safety of 2.5 (40 percent of ultimate 
tensile strength) on most lines constructed during the reticulation pro-
gramme. In some cases, the factor of safety was increased to 3, i.e. the 
maximum tension under worst load conditions did not exceed 33t percent of 
the ultimate tensile strength of the conductor and since the 1967 snowstorm, 
this has been standard practice. 
(b) As is used by other Supply Authorities 
Most Supply Authorities base their designs on the conditions as set 
down in the Supply Regulations and this has been found quite satisfactory. 
Neighbouring boards have until 1967, used the 18 lb per sq. ft wind load 
as being the most severe conditions they are likely to encounter, but some 
revision in line design was made after that storm. It is rather signifi-
cant, however, that although some lines were designed for a slightly 
higher loading of ti in. ice and 7 lb per sq. ft wind, the factor of safety 
was, in general, maintained at 2, and this proved to be insufficient margin 
for the conditions experienced during the August snowstorm, with the result 
that many of the lines collapsed. 
By way of comparison, if the ti in. ice and 7 lb wind load was applied 
to the Gopher lines erected since 1967 in the Board's area, these lines 
would only just withstand the ice load, but would fail under the heavier 
snow load which, of course, was proved in practice. 
(c) As used by New Zealand Electricity Department 
There is possibly reason to wonder why the large transmission lines 
as erected by the Electricity Department did not fail in the same manner as 
did the Board's distribution system, even though their lines are designed 
using similar parameters to that used by Supply Authorities. 
One particular line which passes through areas adjacent to damaged 
Board lines is designed for ~ in. radial thickness of ice for elevations up 
to 2,000 ft above sea level, and at the same time, it is designed to sustain 
a wind load of 8 lb per sq. ft at a temperature of 20oF. This particular 
criteria is very similar to having the conductor loaded at 18 lb per sq. ft 
with wind alone, which is the basis used by the Board. 
The main reason they obtain greater security in their lines is 
because of the large conductors that are used, and the ability of the con-
ductor to withstand very high tensions. To appreciate the order of magni-
tude of the loads that are imposed on conductors commonly used by Supply 
Authorities and the Electricity Department, the following table No. 1 shows 
the weight per foot of wind, snow and ice respectively on the conductor, at 
the following rates or densities: . 
(a) Wind at rate of 18 lb per sq. ft on bare conductor. 
(b) Snow, 4 in. in diameter weighing 36.6 and 14.3 lb per cu. ft 
respectively in the Geraldine and Fairlie Districts (1967 values). 
(c) Ice ~ in. radial thickness at rate of 57 lb per cu. ft. 
For comparative purposes, a typical conductor that is used by the 
New Zealand Electricity Department on transmission line construction is 
given. 
TABLE 1 
Range of Ultimate Weight per Weight per foot of conductor with Remarks 
conductor breaking foot of wind, snow and/or ice loads 
sizes strength conductor - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 
Copper ~ 
A.C.S.R. 
Herring 
A.C.S.R. 
Gopher 
A.C.S.R. 
Dog 
lb 
2 
1,370 
2,400 
2,100 
7,300 
A.C.S.R. 40,400 
as used by 
N.Z.E.D. 
for trans-
mission 
lines 
lb 
3 
0.087 
0.061 
0.071 
0.265 
1.77 
Wind No wind 
lb 
4 
Fairlie G'dine 
snow 
lb 
5 
snow 
lb 
6 
0.301 1.474 3.588 
0.318 1.458 3.588 
0.425 1.513 3.711 
0.878 1.884 4.351 
2.88 3.997 7.383 
~in. ice 
8 Ib Wd 
7 
0.949 
0.949 
1. 018 
1.390 
3.458 
Commonly used 
conductors dam-
aged in the two 
recent snow-
storms 
Heavier type of 
conductor for 
main lines 
With 8 lb/sq.ft 
wind and ~ in. 
radial ice, 
loading per foot 
is 2.603 lb 
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2. LOAD CONDITIONS 
Table (col. 3) shows that the E.H.T. conductors commonly used on rural 
distribution lines, and which were also the ones that received more damage 
in the storms, weigh about 0.06 lb per ft, and that the lines are designed 
to withstand a resultant wind load of 0.3 lb per ft approximately. 
(a) Snow loads 
The additional weight imposed by the snow is shown in col. 5 and 6 
for the dry and wet snow encountered at Fairlie and Geraldine respectively. 
From this it is evident that loads would have been 5 times and 12 times 
greater than the maximum designed load in Fairlie and Geraldine respectively. 
Had the lines been loaded with ~ in. ice and been subjected to 8 lb per 
sq. ft wind, the conductors would have experienced approximately three times 
the maximum tension for which they were designed as shown in col. 7. 
It is interesting to compare the effect of these same loads on 
N.Z. Electricity Department transmission lines, which are designed to with-
stand ~ in. radial thickness of ice with an 8 lb per sq. ft wind blowing 
on the ice covered conductor, which is the design parameter used by N.Z. 
Electricity Department for inland sections of line up to 2,000 ft above 
sea level. This wind and ice results in a slightly lower loading of 2.603 
lb per ft run compared to the straight wind load used by the Board of 18 
lb per sq. ft on bare conductor, which results in a 2.88 lb per ft load. 
In Geraldine snow, the total weight of conductor and snow would be 
7.38 lb per ft or 2.85 times the normal maximum designed load, compared to 
the 12 times excess loads experienced by our conductors, and it could be 
expected that the factor of safety built into their lines could accommodate 
this excess load without the line failing, whereas the Board's lines were 
well beyond their designed limit. 
(b) Wind load 
There was in addition, in this more recent of the two storms, a wind 
which added further load to the conductors and although the strength of 
the wind was not recorded, its effects were evident in many places. This 
was especially so on lines which had snow-loaded conductors running in a 
south-east/north-west direction, i.e., at right angles to the south-west 
wind, for in these cases, many miles of the line were damaged, whilst other 
lines in the same vicinity running in the direction of the wind, had only 
minimum damage. 
The foregoing information indicates that excessive loads could have 
been imposed on distribution lines such that conductors would be stressed 
beyond their ultimate limit, such that failure could occur in mid-span 
joints, in terminations, or in straight-out conductor failure in tension, 
and there was ample evidence of all these events occurring on our lines, 
and of only minimum damage to N.Z. Electricity Department transmission 
lines. 
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(c) Load Release 
The sudden alteration in tension when snow falls from a snow-laden 
conductor was a further transient force encountered during the snowstorms, 
but it is difficult to establish to what extent it caused damage to o~her 
parts of the distribution lines, although much of the pole head'damage 
could have been due to this phenomenon. 
3. TYPES OF FAILURE 
To the public, the obvious result of the snowstorm' was that many 
poles were damaged and fell to the ground, and in the case of plain rein-
forced concrete poles, often in crumpled, useless heaps of concrete. This, 
however, was only a secondary effect, for the poles on their own would 
still be standing, but because of the crossarms attached to the poles and 
the conductors attached to the crossarms, these two items were the main 
cause of subsequent pole failure, and an analysis has been made of the 
primary failure of conductor, the intermediate failure of crossarrns and 
the secondary failure of supporting structures. 
(a) Primary Failure (Conductors) 
(i) tension brekas in one or more conductors within a strained-off sec-
tion of conductor. 
(ii) tension joint failure - often twisting sleeves'being improperly 
applied or compression fittings being poorly completed. 
(iii) termination fittings failing to stand up to the load in tension. 
(iv) anchors of inadequate size for the weight being held. 
It was noticeable that the steel preformed line accessories that were 
in use on Mt Studholme during this latter storm stood up to the extremely 
severe conditions, and no failures were reported in this respect, although 
there were breaks in the A.C.S.R. conductor used on the lower slopes of the 
mountain. 
Within 3(a)(i) above, further investigations have been made into th~ 
failures that occurred with conductors in relation to their str~ndings, 
materials used and size, for it became evident that damage was more pr~­
valent where copper conductors were in use, and that greater percentage 
damage was done to the lower strength conductors. Results of this invest-
igation are shown in Appendix A. 
(b) Intermediate Failure (Crossarms) 
This refers to failure of crossarms. In some cases damage was caused 
due to the sheer weight of the snow-loaded conductors in the half span on' 
either side. of the crossarm being so great that the crossatms fractured. 
In other cases, the cause of the breakage was an unbalanced longitudinal 
force acting at one end of the arm, possibly due to a conductor breaking, 
which in turn, caused the crossarm to break. 
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The number of crossarms broken in this manner was higher where 
Herring conductor was being used, but even so it was not excessive compared 
to the total damage, and it would appear that torsional failure of pole 
tops occurred before the crossarms failed, i.e. that the pole top's resis-
tance to torque was lower than the breaking load of the crossarm. . 
(c) Secondary Failure (Supporting Structures) 
Probably the most distressing evidence of both snowstorms was the 
extensive damage caused to poles and supporting structures. In Appendix B, 
damage caused to poles in the August snowstorm is shown for the same surveyed 
area as is covered in Appendix A, and in the analysis, it is shown that the 
relative damage to concrete and wooden poles is for every 1 hardwood damaged, 
4.3 concrete were rendered useless. 
Because pole failure was associated with the conductor being used, 
this latter factor is analysed also in Appendix B which shows that spaces 
between shackle-off points on Gopher line construction produced a lot of 
trouble. 
In~estigation into the type of failure that occurred on poles shows 
three particular phenomenon existed: 
(i) Torsional failure of pole top 
This was particularly evident with the concrete poles which, due to 
their rectangular cross section, are not particularly resistant to torque 
when the force is applied to the pole head as occurs under broken wire 
conditions. 
Some wooden poles were turned in the ground when the broken wire 
condition occurred, but there was no evidence of the rectangular concrete 
pole turning in this manner. 
(ii) Excessive horizontal load 
When concrete poles failed at or above groundline and then tended to 
fall at right angles to the axis of the line, the plane in which the 
concrete pole's strength is a maximum, there was usually evidence of wind 
or snow-laden-Iines tapping the poles, thus adding extra forces to the 
pole which it could not withstand. 
(iii) Excessive longitudinal load 
A wooden pole is as resistant to a force in this plane as it is to a 
laterial force, and hence there was not the same evidence of failure of 
wooden poles along the line as there was in the case of concrete ones, which 
only have a minimum resistance to bending and fracture along the axis of 
the line. 
There was much evidence of cascade collapse of 20 or more concrete 
poles along the axis of a line, due to the type of conductor failure already 
discussed. In most cases, these poles simply failed at groundline when the 
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weighted conductor pulled it over. 
The above information merely set out the mechanical details of how 
various inter-related parts of the distribution system failed, and recom-
mendations follow as to what should be done in future. 
PART B 
1. DESIGN OF FUTURE LINES 
(a) Loading 
The most critical decision that has to be made is the one that relates 
to the load that should be allowed for in the design of new lines in the 
future, and if the load is to be greater than that which has been allowed 
to date, whether the increased loadings should apply to every line built 
in future, knowing that in 1967 damage occurred from as low as 250 ft above 
sea level. If new criteria are to be established, at what rate should the 
existing 2,300 miles·of line be rebuilt to this higher standard, for not 
knowing which part of the Board's 4,000 square miles will be affected by 
the next snowstorm, it could well be that much more damage will occur before 
lines are rebuilt completely. 
Some Authorities consider that if lines are designed to withstand 
ti in. ice and 8 lb wind, sufficient allowance has been made for abnormal 
conditions, but if even these lines are unable to withstand a 1973 snow, the 
extra cost involved in this type of design is largely wasted, although the 
stronger line will be subject to less damage than one built to a lower 
standard. 
It would be possible to design an aerial line that would withstand the 
snow and wind load of the recent storm, but it would be a most uneconomic 
one. To withstand Geraldine snow and still maintain a factor of safety 
as required by the Supply Regulations, a Gopher conductor would be erected 
on 30 ft poles spaced 27 yd apart, with 13 lb tension in the conductor, 
whic~ of course, is a quite unrealistic situation. Under conditions such 
as that, it would possibly be more economic to install llkV lines under-
ground, and such an installation would be aesthetically more acceptable 
than the picket fence profile that would result if aerial lines were 
erected to such standards. 
Because the acceptance of any load, apart from what has already been 
experienced, would be but a token gesture towards constructing snow-
resistant lines, a completely different approach to the problem is being 
recommended, namely, that the line design should be such that in the event 
of abnormal snow and wind conditions, that line failure should be res-
tricted to a minimum amount of pole replacement. 
With this concept, lines would continue to be constructed for 18 lb 
per sq. ft wind at -70 C in most .locations, unless there is a high risk of 
snow or ice load with erection tensions such that under maximum design 
loads conductor tensions never exceed 30 percent of the conductor U.T.S. 
If this fundamental loading concept is accepted, there are then many other 
factors which have to be correlated so that the maximum strength can be 
obtained from all the components in the line before anyone starts to 
fail under abnormal load conditions. 
(b) Conductors 
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The ability of an overhead line to withstand loading greatly improves 
with increased strength of conductor, and for this reason it is suggested 
that current practice be continued whereby A.C.S.R. conductors be used for 
E.H.T. wherever practicable, rather than use ~ copper conductor. In 
places where trouble has been encountered with ~copper lines during the 
recent storm, it will be recommended that the copper conductors be 
replaced with A.C.S.R. conductor, and the line strengthened to suit the 
new conductor. This would apply in particular to lines in the vicinity of 
Eversley at Fairlie and in the Arundel-Peel Forest areas. 
Conductors with larger cross-sections will obviously be stronger than 
thin ones, and if heavier conductors are used, the supporting structures 
and staying arrangements are likewise built to withstand greater loads so 
that a stronger line results all round. Costs, however, start to rise 
rapidly when larger conductors are used, and a balance has to be struck in 
the strength/cost ratio if mechanical strength is to become the main factor 
in conductor selection. 
The use of Magpie conductor which has in excess of 56 percent of its 
cross-section composed of steel conductors, could be used more often in 
locations where a minimum current is being carried, otherwise the 6-stranded 
aluminium conductor, Gopher, which has one central steel core would be used. 
This A.C.S.R. conductor has a reasonable strength (in excess of 2,100 lb 
ultimate), and quite satisfactory current carrying capacity for most work. 
(c) Joints and Terminations 
Whichever conductor is used, it is preferable that any joints which 
have to be made in the span do not decrease the strength of the conductor, 
and likewise, when the conductor is terminated at a strain point, the 
terminations should not slip when load is applied. However, when abnormal 
loads of snow and wind occur and the conductor is loaded beyond its design 
limit, it would be the intention to have line fittings slightly stronger 
than the conductor so that the latter failed in tension in the span, thus 
one would know that the maximum benefit had been obtained from the conduc-
tor that was in use. Any premature failure of joints makes one suspect 
that had the joint been a little stronger, the whole line may have 
remained intact, whereas if the conductor breaks in tension, it is usually 
caused by excessive loads. 
Experience with pre-formed line fittings that were installed when the 
aerial line was reconductored on Mt Studholme last year, proved to be very 
satisfactory - no failures were reported even though very heavy loadings 
were reported. Until recently, preformed line tension-joints which would 
develop the full strength of the conductor, have not been available for 
6 x 1 strand A.C.S.R. conductors such as Gopher, but as a result of the 
snowstorm and this Board's request for a more satisfactory form of tension 
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joint, a two piece fitting suitable for use with Gopher is now available. 
It is intended to test these and a similar type of termination joint at 
Canterbury University to see if they 'come up to the maker's claim of 
being a fitting that develops the full strength of the conductor. 
It is confidently expected that these fittings will be satisfactory, 
and that there will be a move towards this type of fitting on all the 
smaller-sized conductors in future. 
Cd) Distance between terminations 
Appendix A shows that considerable damage was experienced in those 
sections of line ~hich had terminations separated by large distances, e.g. 
1.96, 2.18, and 0.83 miles as was quoted in the Appendix. Over a compara-
tively large distance of say two miles, the conductor would be supported 
by some 40 poles, and failure in one conductor or in one span could cause 
damage to all poles between the terminations. 
It is most important that in new work fully stayed terminations be 
introduced, preferably using H pole construction at much more frequent 
intervals. The average cost of such a structure, complete with anchors 
etc., would be about $300. It would be advisable to introduce this feature 
now in approximately 100 locations on lines that were damaged in the 
Geraldine and Fairlie area in an endeavour to contain similar trouble in 
future to the few spans between strain points when a conductor fails. 
Ce) Supports 
If it is accepted that broken wire conditions will occur again on 
some of the lighter conductored lines, then to minimise further trouble, 
a structure design which will have a high resistance to the forces that 
accompany broken wires should be sought. Two solutions which have been 
used effectively, especially on transmission lines, are armless pole and 
H pole construction. 
With the former method of construction, although difficulties are 
encountered in mounting distribution transformers due to the vertical con-
figuration of the conductors and even though taller poles are required 
to maintain the same ground clearance, the reduction of torque on the 
pole head under broken wire conditions is an advantage over the flat cross-
arm construction method. It is estimated that the cost of constructing an 
aerial line without crossarms, using this method, could be up to one and 
a half times the cost of standard flat construction. 
The use of two poles with a crossarm between them to form an H pole 
type structure, has already been recommended as a method of reducing the 
amount of pole damage under broken wire condition. In some cases where 
anchors are not able to be installed, the structure can be made self 
supporting if suitable sized hardwood poles are used. 
There are several types of pole that can be used as a line support, 
but from experience we know that wooden poles have withstood snowstorms 
better than reinforced concrete or lattice steel poles, and of softwood and 
hardwood poles, the latter have much greater strength for the same cross 
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sectional area. 
The type of concrete pole manufactured by the Board is a plain M.S. 
reinforced pole of rectangular cross-section, which is satisfactory for 
normal load conditions but which has proved to be most inadequate under 
excessive snow loadings. In an endeavour to produce a pole with a stronger 
top section, some poles have been manufactured recently with more stirrup 
steel and these will be tested shortly, but it is practically impossible 
to manufacture a pole with sufficient strength to withstand the torque pro-
duced under broken wire conditions when the reinforcing steel has to be 
contained within the present moulds. Greater strength can be obtained if 
the pole is of circular cross section and prices have been obtained for 
spun concrete poles which have a hollow core. 
ANNUAL USAGE 
Type of Pole and length eft) 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 Approx. 
Average 
Usage 
No. of Hardwood Poles used 571 520 418 503 
No. of Reinforced Concrete Poles used 800 537 801 713 
No. manufactured - 26 ft 31 28 
30 ft 237 128 196 190 
32 ft 222 150 225 220 
35 ft 415 365 363 380 
Total No. manufactured 905 681 784 790 
Of the above reinforced concrete poles, between 10 percent and 
30 percent have been used each year by the Lysaght gang on reconstruction 
of 11kV lines, and as this work is now virtually completed, the annual con-
sumption of reinforced concrete poles would normally reduce to about 
600 a year. 
APPROXIMATE COST OF POLES 
Pole Length eft) Australian Reinforced Spun 
Hardwood Concrete Concrete 
$ $ $ 
26 16 56 
28 59 
30 33 24 
32 40 27.50 64 
35 65 40.00 
40 85 
45 104 
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If last year the 784 poles that were manufactured in the pole factory 
had instead been mixed hardwood species imported from Australia, the extra 
cost to the Board would have been about $13,600 and if, over an average year 
in which a total of 1,216-poles of both sorts were used, only Australian 
hardwood poles had been used, costs would have increased by 20.7 percent -
from $49,000 to about $61,800. 
If it was known for certain that the expenditure of an additional 
$12,800 p.a. would indemnify the Board against any future damage to lines 
in snowstorms, it would possibly be a good form of insurance, but such a 
claim cannot be substantiated. More frequent use of hardwood poles rather 
than concrete would, however, limit the amount of damage -in similar snow-
storms, and this course of action is being recommended. 
If pole production from the factory is reduced too much, the cost per 
pole produced will rise, and it could be that the reinforced concrete type 
will cease to be competitive with the hardwood ones. It is proposed that 
this aspect will be reported upon at a later date. 
2. OTHER EFFECTS OF SNOWSTORM 
(a) Communications 
The value of the Board operating its own independent radiotelephone 
service was again evident, for when it did give trouble, we were able to 
direct our attention to repairing the fault with the greatest possible 
vigour. Several points are worth recording in relation to the failure of 
the radiotelephone system, namely: 
1. Wind driven snow entered the building through a pipe bend vent on 
the south east side and caused water damage to the UHF equipment. 
2. Two breaks occurred in the line supplying power to the site. 
3. It is suspected that power was lost from the site on the Sth of 
August, but this was not known definitely until the 7th when a heli-
copter survey of the line was made. 
4. With the battery charger being out of action, due to failure of the 
230 v supply, the battery voltage gradually reduced and eventually 
the transmitter failed to switch off, thus reducing the battery 
voltage even more rapidly. 
S. The present arrangement of supplying the site with L.T. directly from 
a transformer from the bottom of the hill is satisfactory for normal 
operations, but not when additional heating is required within the 
building. 
6. The standby capacity (approximately 120 AH) for the UHF equipment is 
inadequate, as it provides only 10-12 hours of operation. 
7. The use of a helicopter in restoring the power supply and for the 
transport of personnel was invaluable, and should be used without hesi-
tation if similar circumstances should arise again in future. 
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8. Neither the VHF or the UHF aerials -suffered anything but minor damage. 
Recommendations arising from these points are: 
1. The building should be replaced with an enlarged buil,9ing providing 
space for equipment, an enlarged standby battery, work benches and 
some staff facilities where practicable. The building needs to be 
purpose designed - £ully insulated, heated, ventilated, ,(the:latter 
is definitely required in the summer), and vermin pr00f ~'.' An amount 
was allowed for this in the 1973-74 estimates. 
2. A supply line providing greater security of supply and greater 
capacity is required. It is recommended that, this line be livened at 
11kV to provide greater capacity and strengthened where necessary to 
improve security of supply. 
3. To overcome a shortcoming in the design of ,the standby battery 
supply at Mt Misery, the following recommendation is made: 
Provide a basic standby voltage at Mt Misery of 36 v. D.C. by instal-
ling a further 2 x 12 volt batteries, each with a nominal capacity 
of 200 Ahr to give a total 600 Ahr supply. This would provide in 
an emergency approximately two days of standby operations on both 
systems with the VHF Radiotelephone being the last to ceaSe operating. 
A simple series regulator with zener diode protection would be used 
to provide 12 volts for the radiotelephone repeater, and 30 volts 
for the UHF link transmitters and receivers. A suitable constant 
voltage battery charger would also be required. 
4. While the damage to the VHF aerials was only minor and the operation 
of the repeater was not affected, it is recommended that consideration 
be given to replacing these with an equivalent commercial aerial at 
some time in the future. 
(b) Transport 
Transport in general proved adequate, although for some two or three 
days after the first falls of snow, Board's staff was, in common with all 
other repair gangs, confined to the cleared sections of road. The use of 
hired 4-wheel-drive Landrover type vehicles proved useful. It is doubtful 
whether a Snow Cat type of vehicle if owned by the Board, would have resul-
ted in anyone consumer having his supply restored more quickly. If one 
had been available for the Bdard's use, the greatest difficulty would have 
been to decide whether it should have been sent to Waihaorunga, Peel Forest 
or Allendale. 
An improvement could have been made in communications between base and 
the line repair vehicles in the fi~ld. ,The three main line trucks were 
operating independently in each area and at times, a second vehicle equipped 
with radiotelephone had to be sent to make contact with the line crew. It 
would have been a more satisfactory situation to have each of these line 
vehicles fitted with radiotelephone of " their owrt. The initial reports from 
the line crews were th~ most valuable type 6f information that we had, for 
these normally included a practical assessment of the extent of the damage. 
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It would be recommended that radiotelephone be fitted in the three main 
line vehicles. This facility in the new type of six-man cab would then pro-
vide the men with a first class unit for all conditions of work. 
3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is considered that it is not practicable or economic to design a 
line that will never fail under the type of load that has been experienced in 
recent years in South Canterbury, and as a result, the following recommenda-
tions have been made in this report. 
1. Basic design loads to continue to be 18 lb wind at -7oC, except 
in special locations. 
2. Maximum design tension not to exceed 30 percent of conductor U.T.S. 
3. Replace ~ E.H.T. copper in sections of line at Fairlie and Geraldine. 
4. Use Magpie conductor more frequently. 
5. Carry out tests at School of Engineering, Canterbury, to verify 
ultimate strength of two-piece preformed line splices. 
6. Introduce approximately 100 additional strain points in existing 
Gopher lines in the Fairlie and Geraldine districts. 
7. Use H pole type construction more frequently in future to minimise 
effect of broken wire condition. 
8. Reduce production of reinforced concrete poles and order more 
Australian hardwood poles. 
9. Provide more satisfactory housing of the valuable radio equipment 
on Mt Misery. 
10. Provide more adequate power supplies for this same equipment on 
Mt Misery. 
11. Provide three line vehicles with radiotelephones~ 
CONDUCTOR MATERIAL AND TYPE 
F.C. Stevenson, 
Chief Engineer. 
APPENDIX (A) 
An investigation has been made of the damage sustained to 78.73 miles 
of line in Waimate, Levels, Fairlie, and Geraldine areas. The analysis is 
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restricted to the most affectedpq:r,tidtfs,::of the lines in the four areas, 
although the 78.73 miles under investigation do include lines that received 
only minor damage in some case's,~',; . 
The materials used and their incidence is shown in Table II. The 
classification "lengths most seriously damaged" is an arbitrary one, but 
relates to 22 sections of line which were erected with long distances 
between strain or shackle points. This aspect of lin'e 'design has a "signi-
ficant bearing when pole breakage is considered. 
Conductor· 
material 
and type 
~ (mainly) 
Gopher 
6 x 1 
A.C.S.R. 
Herring 
S.B. 
A.C.S.R. 
Magpie 
4 x 3 
A.C.S.R. 
Flounder 
S. B., 
A.C.S.R. 
of her 
A,C,SJR. 
TOTAL 
Breaking 
load of 
conductor 
(lb) 
1370 
2110 
2400 
4175 
3685 
1460 
(Thrush) 
TABLE II 
Total length 
in survey 
(MIs) 
14.54 
29.26 
29.14 
1. 97 
1.80 
1. 66 
78.37 
5.43 
Length most 
seriously 
damaged 
MIs % of 
9.8 
13.0 
5.83 
2.6 
31.23 
total 
67.5 
44 
20 
48 
40 
No. of 
strain points 
in seriously 
damaged 
portion 
5 
6 
7 
4 
22 
Average 
distance 
between 
strain 
points 
(MIs) 
1. 96 
2.18 
0.83 
0.65 
1. 42 
Table II indicates that damage was more prevalent where copper con-
ductors were employed, 67.5 percent of the total amount used being affected. 
This is not unexpected in view of the small load that can be sustained by a 
copper conductor before it breiks; in fact, of the three main types of 
conductor used, ~ copper, A.C.S.R. Gopher and A.C.S.R. Herring, the strength 
of the conductor appears to have a relationship to percentage damaged sus-
ta~ned by each type of conductor. . 
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APPENDIX (B) 
SECONDARY FAILURE (SUPPORTING STRUCTURES) 
TABLE III 
Type of Length Poles in surveyed length No. of poles 
Conductor of line ------------- broken in surveyed 
being No. % H.W. % Conc. length 
analysed (% in brackets) 
(MIs) ----------
H.W. Conc. 
Copper ~ 14.54 277 17 83 11 107 
(mainly) (23.4) (46.6) 
Gopher 29.26 635 10 90 6 231 
A.C.S.R. (9.0) (40.6) 
Herring 29.14 462 85 15 31 28 
S.B. (7.9) (41.3) 
A.C.S.R. 
Other types 5.43 99 55 45 8 24 
A.C.S.R. (14.5) (54.6) 
TOTAL 78.37 1473 38.2 61.8 56 390 
(10) (43) 
(a) Ratio of poles in use 
Table III shows that of the 1,473 poles in the areas under considera-
tion, 563 (38.2%) were of the hardwood variety and that of these, 56 (10%) 
were damaged, whereas of the 910 concrete poles in the same area, 390 (43%) 
were broken in the storm. Two conclusions could be drawn from this analysis, 
firstly that the storm was of such severity that even hardwood poles were 
damaged and secondly, that the hardwood poles withstood the rigours of the 
storm better than the concrete, in that for every 1 hardwood pole that was 
damaged, 4.3 concrete ones were rendered useless. 
(b) Effect on supports of copper conductors 
The higher percentage of poles that were broken on copper lines (23.4% 
and 46.6% hardwood and concrete poles respectively), correlates with the 
higher percentage damage shown in Table II for copper conductor damage 
(67.5). 
With copper lines having a relatively low ultimate tensile strength, 
one could expect that failure would occur early in the snowstorm on these 
lines and that as the storm proceeded, further failures would occur. This 
is borne out by experience on lines on the outskirts of Fairlie and at 
Arundel, and as shown by the extent of the pole damage. 
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(c) Effect on supports of Herring con<i.l,lc1;:or 
Although the ratio of breakage,be.tween concrete ,and hardwood 'poles 
(7.9: 41. 3) on Herring lines is of the same oTder as found elsewhere, the 
actual number of poles damaged (59) is a very much 'lower proportion of the 
total poles involved than for Copper or Gopher lines. 
Type of Conductor Total poles Total' poles % broken 
in survey broken 
Copper 277 118 42.7 
Gopher 635 237 ,37.4 
Herring 462 59 12.8 
The low percentage breakage of supports on Herring lines (12.8%)~ is 
attributable to. the fact that most of these lines were built with wooden 
poles (85%) as shown on Table III. However, considerable lengths of Herring 
lines were damaged when crossarms broke, either as a direct result of snow 
load on the conductor or due to broken conductors. 
(d) Effect of supports of Gopher Conductor 
The greatest damage to supporting structures occurred on those lines 
which we~e constructed of A.C.S.R. conductor known as Gopher, when 237 
poles failed in the areas that were analysed. A further analysis indicates, 
however, that it was not necessarily the type of conductor used that caused 
the poles to fail, but rather the type of construction employed. 
Of the 237 poles that were damaged on Gopher lines, 203 (856.%) were 
broken in the six sections listed in Table II, which totalled 12.0 miles of 
line classified as "Length most seriously damaged".". This is attributed to 
the fact that considerable distances exis~ed between shackle points and 
that between these strain points, which were usually guyed structures, most 
of the ~oles collapsed, especially the concrete ones. 
WAITAKI ELECTRIC POWER BOARD 
First reports of snow came in withaa report that supply was off at 
Livingstone at 9.45 p.m. on Sunday 5th August. The Hakataramea Valley 
Feeder swi tcha t ~ake Wai taki Power Station first opened on "Faul til at 
4.12 a;m. on Monday 6th August b~t from later reports it appears that the 
top part'of the Vall~y~as w{thoutsupply from ~bout midnight. 
Snow continued to fall during all of Monday, causing further failure 
and making operations generally impossible. All available men were sent to 
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Kurow to get an early start on Tuesday morning. 
The areas affected were The Dasher, Livingston and Danseys Pass, 
Kurow, Hakataramea Valley, Station Peak and Elephant Hill districts. 
On Monday the snow so heavily weighted the N.2.E.D. 220kV lines that 
they sagged down and contacted the Board's 11kV Haka' feeder, at approxi-
mately 11.15 a.m. This caused a major outage at the N.Z.E.D. Substation 
which eventually necessitated changing the switchgear. A temporary supply 
was given to the Haka' feeder on Tuesday at approximately 4.00 p.m. and 
power was restored to lower Haka' Valley and the Station ?eak Line. 
During the next four days (Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) 
all men were concentrated in restoring power supply, however temporarily, 
so that by late Friday afternoon all supply was restored to the Mt Dasher 
and Livingstone districts, also the upper Hakataramea Valley. The only 
lines without supply at this stage were the lines to the T.V. and radio 
stations on Station Peak, and the lines to Elephant Hill where access was 
impossible. Access was the major problem hampering activity, and it was 
not until the two Co~nties (Waitaki and Waimate) concerned had managed to 
clear at least a one way path to the points of damage that we were able to 
complete the restoration. A helicopter was used on three occasions, to 
survey the damage, to place men and materials in an isolated and other-
wise inaccessible spot, and to change the batteries at the Station Peak 
radio repeater. 
The number of poles broken was 28, and the estimated cost of damage 
is $15,000. (This compares with the 1967 snowstorm, 3 poles and $5,000.) 
The work of making permanent repairs is proceeding. 
The Board is grateful for assistance given by the N.Z.E.D., Waitaki 
and Waimate Counties, and various farmers for the use of bulldozers and 
equipment, and the helicopter service. I ~m deeply appreciative of the 
excellent work undertaken by the Lines staff who willingly worked long 
hours under difficult conditions and who were boarded away from home at 
very short notice; also the engineering assistants and assistant engineer 
who similarly worked and whose teamwork and co-ordination were so vital in 
such an emergency. 
Detailed reports by R.F. Fletcher and S.J. Baker 
(1) Report by R.F. Fletcher - Hakataramea Valley area 
(2) Report by S.J. Baker - Mt Dasher-Livingstone area. 
Report by R.F. Fletcher 
Snow commenced falling late Sunday evening 5th August and fell 
steadily through the following day, the areas mostly affected being the 
Hakataramea Valley and Kurow district. Roads were impassable and the 
falling snow reduced visibility ~o less than 100 yards. 
The snow eased and eventually ceased Monday evening. No further snow 
of any consequence fell subsequent1y t'b'" ·thisarld ind'e~d atTI.l0spheric~ondi­
tions were perfect at all times whilst· repairs' were being undertaken. 
The Haka' feeder tripped at 4.12 a.m~ Monday 6th August and held.: 
A further tripping occurred· at 6·.22 a;m. followed by a reclosure at 6.29 
a.m. 
C. Vincent was called out at 6 a.m. and upon entering the valley he 
discovered that the Haka' Station Sectionaliser had operated. Upon reclo-
sure, the sectionaliser tripped again. Snow was falling steadily but· roads 
were still negotiable and further patrolling was undertaken with difficulty. 
Nothing amiss was found. 
At 10.04 'a.m. the Haka' Valley feeder was eventually open'ed upon 
request from C. Vincent when Cary discovered the waxwing line down near the 
valley entrance. At this point the three waxwing conductors were found 
(later) to have pulled out of the tubular dead ends on the load side of'the 
"H" structure thereby leaving the supply to this point in a healthy condi-
tion. 
I arrived in Kurowat approximately 10 a.m. and upon receiving a 
report of outages from C. Vincent decided upon a policy of restoring power 
supply temporarily with safety as a primary consideration. Further 
patrolling was then made in deteriorating conditions and work was under-
taken to isolate the Haka' line and so restore power to Hakataramea town-
ship and the Station Peak area. Upon journeying to the Lake Waitaki Power 
Station, C. Vincent discovered that the 220kV N.Z.E.D. line was in contact 
with the 11kV Haka' feeder and upon informing substation superintendent 
Tyrell, Mr Tyrell remarked that "This is why the Haka' Feeder OCB has 
blown up." 
We were therefore not able to restore power to the Station Peak area. 
The Kurow O.C.B. developed a fault at 4.00 p.m. approximately, and arrange-
ments were made to supply Kurow from Ngapara. 
Further men, trucks and materials were requested from Oamaru and 
J. Jones with his gang arrived Monday evening; poles were delivered to the 
Kurow Yard ready for employment on Tuesday. 
Tuesday 7th August Temporary repairs were made to the waxwing line 
at the entrance to the Valley and further patrols along the limited length 
of roads now cleared by the Waimate County Council revealed that several 
poles were broken in the vicinity of Taylors property at "Struan". 
At 4.00 p.m. the N.Z.E.D. were ready to energise the Haka' Feeder and 
upon reclosure power was restored into the Valley as far as "Maungatiro". 
H. Tonkin and gang arrived at 4.00 p.m. in time to help liven lines in the 
Station Peak area and after disconnecting the translator line the Sandhurst 
bridgerecloser held.l had received a report that snow in the Elephant 
Hill area was lighter than elsewhere, and was unaware that the Elephant Hill 
line had failed. 
94 
Wednesday 8th August Work commenced replacing four broken poles 
and repairing conductors which were severed in several places at three sites 
in the vicinity of Taylors Property at "Struan" and at the day's end, power 
was restored as far as Rocky Point. ABS 35 Cattle Creek had previously been 
opened but attempts to restore power to this point ended in failure. I sur-
mised that the Highland Farm spur, which was impossible to patrol, was 
faulty and this proved to be the case. 
At 3.00 p.m. I visited the head of the Valley by helicopter and during 
the short period I was airborne (the aircraft was short of fuel) I was 
able to patrol lines which would have taken days to patrol otherwise. 
Indeed one line section of Rocky Point was traversed in less than a minute -
two linesmen sent into this area Wednesday morning were ordered out after 
a few hours floundering about in the deep snow to no advantage. 
Liries and poles were found broken at Christian Hilly and a clamptop 
insulator was discovered floating above an isolated pole by a riverbed south 
of Round Hill. 
I was now in position to assess the damage in the Valley and readily 
acceded to the request that J. Jones and his gang be sent back to Oamaru. 
Joe and his gang had worked valiantly in deep snow a quarter mile 
from the road on Tuesday, erecting the heavy waxwing conductor at the 
entrance to the Valley. 
Incidently the dozer hired from the Normanvale Estate for this job 
was invaluable. Without it, work would have been virtually impossible. 
Thursday 9th August The faulty spur line to the Highland Farm was 
disconnected and power flowed as far as ABS 35 north of Cattle Creek and 
the Asheridge and Kinbrace lines were energised at approximately 10.00 a.m. 
The blocked roads made it impossible to patrol this section and it was not 
without trepidation that these lines were livened without first patrolling 
for I was ever mindful that somewhere an E.H.T. line may be close to the 
ground. G. Jones did manage to patrol a very small section of the line as 
far as Small's property at Dip Creek where he discovered a broken L.T. 
pole and a badly cracked pole supporting E.H.T. 
Graham was operating the 4-wheel-drive vehicle hired from G.T. 
Gillies. This was of limited use for patrol work as it had no radio. 
At approximately 2.00 p.m. linemen and trucks were able to arrive at 
Christian Hilly through the efforts of the Waimate County Council dozer and 
grader drivers who also cleared snow from the paddocks to enable line 
trucks to gain access for pole and conductor replacement. This job was 
carried into Friday 10th August. 
The distances to the work were now increasing and the men were there-
fore commencing work earlier. At 12.30 p.m. a helicopter arrived to convey 
Messrs Tonkin and Dawe to effect repairs to the clamp top insulator men-
tioned previously. After twenty minutes ($45) they returned their mission 
accomplished. Power was restored to the Christian Hilly and Round Hill 
areas at 2.00 p.m. 
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The last consumer Mr W. Brown on the Highland Farm E.H.T. spur had 
powe.r restored by 4.15 p.m. after the Waimate County Council grader had, by 
arrangement, cleared both road and paddock for acce~s by line trutk~. This 
consumer was without power for over 100 hours (112). 
The vehicles and gangs were employed in two ways; C. Vincent and 
R. Brennan did invaluable work both in vehicle 42 (vehicle 35 was under 
repair) and 35(after repairs were done) patrolling lines and undertaking 
smaller repairs. G. Jones played a similar role in the vehicle hired 
from Gillies. This was of limited use but was later used as a runabout 
when 42 was released .by C. Vincent to G. Jones. 
The main trucks were of course engaged in major repairs which were 
undertaken speedily, if temporarily. 
All linemen worked well in conditions which were difficult, no morning 
or afternoon tea break was taken and lunch was invariably eaten standing up 
and th~n back to work. Comparisons are odious but without doubt the men's 
efforts compared more than favourably with those of other local and govern-
ment bodies working in the area. We expect and receive loyalty and effort 
from the men but· this should never be taken for granted. 
Thanks are also due to Mr Laurie Bartlett of the Waimate County 
Council who co-operated wherever possible and co-ordinated his efforts 
with the Board clearing roads and paddocks ahead of the line vehicles. 
The Board were fortunate that the snowstorm was relatively confined 
and that lines are in good condition. However a few lessons may be 
learned. 
Lines failed due to the wet snow whith clung to lines. This snow 
built up in diameter, stressing conductors till they, or the terminations 
failed. The tensions released by failure imposed shock loading on 
supports which, if of concrete, invariably failed - normally in the head. 
From appearances, a combination of torsion and direct-in-line shock pro-
duced failure which created a chain reaction. At Christian Hilly for 
example, in the five poles considered, the flounder conductor pulled out 
of the compression dead ends and the shock broke two concrete poles, passed 
through a hardwood pole with little effect, and broke a further two con-
crete poles. 
At Taylor's "Struan" snow had built up to 8 in. diameter (major axis 
measured) on an E.H.T. line suspended 4ft above the ground. These conduc-
tors may require replacing as may others in the area. 
I make the following observations: 
(1) The inadequacy of concrete poles has again been demonstrated. In only 
two instances were hardwood poles found to be broken and in both cases 
the poles were discovered to be unsound. 
(2) Standard lists of materials and tools required for faults should be 
prepared. When trucks are to be despatched they can quickly be 
loaded. Additional materials to suit the conductor size may then be 
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added. The change of a vehicle arriving on site with few tools and 
materials is thereby minimised. 
(3) When line vehicles are replaced, assess the desirability of obtaining 
suitable 4-wheel-drive vehicles for working off roads. Two-wheel-
drive vehicles invariably have to be towed in and out of positions 
in these conditions. 
(4) Certain areas are more likely to receive snow than others. Designate 
those areas, and within these boundaries build lines to a higher 
construction standard - pay attention to grade of hardwood pole and 
crossarm timber; span length, type of conductors arid method of 
termination. Faults will still occur but fault frequency will be 
reduced. 
A further two weeks work by three line gangs was necessary to restore 
lines to the standard required by the Board and further work may be required 
to replace conductors weakened by excessive loading. 
Report by S.J. Baker 
At approximately 8.00 p.m. on Sunday 5th August, our faultmen were 
called to investigate a report of no power in the Hampden area. By 8.20 
p.m. it was evident (due to further reports) that the Hampden feeder had 
opened on fault and this was confirmed shortly afterwards when our fault-
men arrived at Maheno sub. The weather at the time was windy with showers. 
At this stage S. Baker was called out to assist, and after identify-
ing the fault as a phase to phase outage, efforts were made to restore 
supply to Hampden via the Herbert feeder. It was proposed to leave the 
actual fault finding on the Hampden line until daylight although Messrs 
Walker and Bootsma did patrol a section of the line near McLeans Road from 
where reports of a flash had been sighted. Nothing was found however. 
An attempt was made to reliven the Hampden feeder after arriving at Maheno 
but this tripped again after a short time. 
At about 9.45 p.m. just as Walker had completed restoration of power 
to the Hampden area and was preparing to attend to a previously reported 
fault at Claridge at Waianakarua, the 36-333 faultman reported that power 
was off at Livingstone and it was said to be snowing. 
By this time the fault-truck lighting was failing (i.e. the portable 
lights) and S. Baker returned to Oamaru to collect another spotlight and 
picked up H. Tonkin for further assistance before proceeding to Livingstone. 
Messrs Walker and Bootsma had carried on directly to the sectionaliser at 
McCone's corner Tokarahi from where further switching would be done. 
Owing to what subsequently turned out to be a faulty radio in truck 
42 which Messrs Baker and Tonkin used because it was fitted with 4-wheel 
drive, no contact was made with Messrs Walker and Bootsma until they met 
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at McCone's corner. The sectionaliser was found to be open, and it was 
decided to isolate the branches to Douglas and Smith at Livingstone and 
Danseys Pass and try "in" again. The time at this stage was about 
11.45 p.m. and by 12.30 a.m. on Monday 6th August supply had been restored 
as far as Livingstone~ It was snowing heavily at the time with about 6 
inches of snow on the road in Livingstone township. It was therefore 
decided to leave further patrolling until daylight. 
Early on Monday morning 6th August a report was received of no power 
at Teschemakers Convent. It was found that the outdoor cable box which 
supplied the Convent had exploded. J. Jones was dispatched to effect 
temporary repairs to this. 
In the meantime, snow fell heavily in the Island Cliff, Tokarahi, 
Livingstone and Maerewhenua areas. Initially few further faults were 
reported and the Oamaru faultmen were sent to repair the unattended faults 
at Claridge, Waianakarua and others at Kakanui. 
By about 9.00 a.m. on 6th August the power in the Island Cliff area 
was reported to have failed, and B. Peace's gang was sent out to investi-
gate. Access by this time was becoming difficult in all areas west of 
the Ngapara Hill due to snow, where by midday it was over 1 ft deep. 
S. Baker manned the Ngapara Substation whilst B. Peace's men proceeded 
to isolate major branches on the Island Cliff feeder. The Prydes Gully 
brnach was isolated first and the Island Cliff feeder held in after reclo-
sing. The Prydes Gully line was patrolled in deep snow conditions and 
they found four H.T. wire broken, and in several spans the wire sagging to 
within a few feet of the ground. 
A. Rusbatch was sent to investigate a no power fault at Kingan on the 
Maruakoa line to Mt Dasher but found he could not get within a mile or so 
of the line due to deep snow. He did not have a four wheel drive truck 
since all but vehicles No. 1 and 32 were sent to the Haka' Valley where 
reports of faults and heavy snow had also been received. ' 
Rusbatch was then re-directed to the Ngapara area to repair further 
isolated faults. 
Repairs were effected to the Prydes Gully line by midday on 7th August, 
the snow having stopped falling on the previous evening. 
By this time it was evident that damage was fairly widespread, and 
efforts were made to attend to all faults which were in any way accessible. 
The Danseys Pass, Livingstone (Douglas and Smith's branches) and Mt Dasher 
were still largely inaccessible, and in any case Lines Staff were fully 
occupied in restoring power to the following areas: 
(a) Mr Luck, Island Cliff (pole and wire broken) 
(b) Earthquakes Branch (wire down into trees) 
(c) Lory, Windsor 
(d) Adams branch Maerewhenua (patrolled but found o.k.). 
By late Tuesday afternoon the road to Mt Dasher had been opened with 
the aid of bulldozers owned by Messrs Wardell and Ruddenklau, and some men 
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from B. Peace's gang were dispatched to assess the damage. This line sub-
sequently turned out to be the worst affected by the storm. Nine poles were 
broken and several breaks had occurred in the H.T. conductors. S. Baker 
made arrangements for poles to be carted from'Oamaru to the Mt Dasher line 
on Wednesday so that J. Jones gang who had been sent from the Haka' Valley, 
could make an early start on Thursday morning. . 
B. Peace's gang made another attempt to carry out repairs to Smiths 
and Douglas line at Livingstone on Wednesday 8th and although successful on 
Smiths line, they were unable to make much headway through about 2 ft of 
snow on Douglas branch. The line to Dome Hills, Livingstone, was also 
known to be down but the men were mistakenly advised by Mr Johnston that 
the house was empty so this was left in the meantime. It later transpired 
that the Dome Hills house was in fact occupied by a married couple from 
Mr Little's farm. 
Messrs Baker and Norman assessed the damage on Douglas branch on 
Wednesday 8th and it was decided to request the County Council to assist 
by clearing the road of snow. 
The N.Z.E.D. also offered help on Wednesday 8th by way of men and 
equipment and although there was little they could do in the way of repairs, 
they were engaged to conduct a line patrol through the Danseys Pass. As a 
result of the N.Z.E.D. report which was encouraging in that they had only 
found one span or wire down and two poles broken, B. Peace's gang carried 
out repairs to the Danseys Pass line on Thursday morning while the County 
Council bulldozer cleared the road to Douglas. 
By midday Thursday, power had been restored to the whole of the Danseys 
Pass, and the afternoon was spent on repairs to the remaining damaged sec-
tions of the Douglas line. Power was restored to Douglas line at about 
6.30 p.m. on Thursday 9th. 
On Friday 10th B. Peace's gang went to Mt Dasher to assist J. Jones' 
men with repairs there. Power was finally restored to the Mt Dasher line 
at about 6.00 p.m. on Friday 10th. 
At this stage a report was received of no power at Dome Hills and 
B. Peace and his men attended to this before nightfall on Friday. 
Conclusions 
Access was by far the biggest problem in the early stages. All but 
two of our four-wheel-drive vehicles were committed to the Haka' Valley for 
much of the time. 
Radio communications proved to be invaluable, and whilst drawing 
comparisons with conditions in the 1967 storm (when we did not have radio) 
I think it would be fair to say that the total job may have been extended 
by several days without this facility. 
I would recommend that with the experience we now have, future lines 
whether new or being overhauled, should in snow country, be constructed 
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in short spans, entirely with wooden poles and high strength conductor. 
I think we should also procure more and better portable lighting for 
fault work. 
Repairing the GoZeridge-Hororata Zine. 
- Christchurch Press. 
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Section 2: Effect on Communications and Services 
TELEPHONE SERVICES 
Heavy damage was done to the telephone system. Conductors 
broke or stretched and hundreds of poles failed. Nearly 2,000 
subscribers lost service. Fortunately a few toll lines and 
exchanges had underground wiring. These were almost unaffected. 
Two reports from the New Zealand Post Office follow: the 
first for Canterbury north of the Rangitata River and the 
second, south of it. 
New Zealand Post Office, Christchurch 
New Zealand Post Office, Timaru 
NEW ZEALAND POST OFFICE, CHRISTCHURCH 
Introduction 
Weather reports broadcast on late Sunday 5 August predicted snow to 
very low levels in Canterbury. By dawn on the Monday morning snow lay to 
considerable depths in a long belt in the general eastern foothill area. 
Conditions were to remain very cold throughout the Monday and when reports 
eventually came through in the morning, most parts were advising that snow 
was still falling. By the afternoon some areas reported that conditions 
had deteriorated and that heavy snow was again falling in near blizzard 
conditions. 
The Weather 
This particular snowfall was unusual in that it came from a south-
easterly direction. 
Most snowstorms in Canterbury come from the south-west. They are 
caused by a depression i.e. a Low in the south and an anti-cyclone or High 
in the north. These produce a south-westerly airstream which gets trapped 
against the Southern Alps and is therefore forced to flow from a south-
west direction. Thus when snow,conditions exist, the whole of the alpine 
chain becomes covered in snow. 
101 
Where this particular snowfall differed, was that a Low was located 
north of a High. Normally this causes easterly rain but in this case the 
pressure and temperatures were conducive to generating snow. 
A storm which started with south to south-east winds and heavy rain 
on the Sunday afternoon over Canterbury changed to a heavy fall of wet snow 
overnight. 
Area Affected 
The Christchurch District of Engineering Branch of the Post Office 
extends generally from the Rangitata to the Clarence River. 
Within this district very heavy rain was experienced on Banks 
Peninsula and the belt of snow was generally confined to a band, starting 
some 15 miles inland, in the upper Plain area and covering the eastern 
foothills. It did not extend into the Main Divide region and in fact there 
was little snow in Lake Coleridge area and none fell in the Cass/Arthur's 
Pass area. (Snow was to fall in Arthur's Pass a couple of days later.) 
The belt ~overed by snow extended from below the Rangitata River in 
the south, to the Lees Valley - Loburn area in the north. A little snow 
did lie in the Amberley district. 
The areas that were affected by snow In this district are shown on 
the map, Fig. 1. 
This was a he(lvy fall being up to 5 feet in depth in places. The 
storm differed in two important respects from the general type of fall in 
these parts in that it was wet snow and was accompanied by unusually high 
winds. The effect on opne-wire lines running in a general north-south 
direction was devastating. 
Power and telephone lines were therefore badly hit. 
Roads were blocked and some were to remain impassable for many days. 
Apart from services lost by lines being brought down, other services to 
which normal power supplies had been cut and which were now operating on 
battery or standby engine alternators, were also in jeopardy. Continued 
operation of those services on battery, was clependent on getting mobile 
engine alternators through. Those on standby engine alternators could 
require fuel before powel lines were restorecl. 
Automatic exchanges at Glentunnel and Springfield were working on 
battery as were also the Methven manual exchange junctions to Ashburton. 
The microwave repeater station at Lowmount (part of the national toll 
link) and the V.H.F. mobile station at Mt Alford were two places with 
equipment functioning on standby alternator sets. 
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Restoration of Services. 
The hatching on Fig. 1 shows areas in which major and minor line 
damage was sustained. It also shows the area given service from new auto-
matic exchanges at Mt Somers and Springburn, :somewhatahead of the planned 
cutovers of these exchanges. 
With some 1380 subscribers without telephone service and with several 
toll lines damaged (some severely), together with the inaccessibility of 
many roads, service restoration was to be a mammoth task making great 
demands on material supplies and appreciable demands on plant and labour. 
Staff had to work in very cold and difficult conditions. 
The first subscribers to regain service were connected oh Monday 
6 August and restoration of the first toll line (Oxford - Rangiora),' Was, 
also achieved on that day, but the last subscriber was not reconnected-
until 24 August. The last to have service restored were in the Windwhistle 
area, where it is understood that farmers also suffered the heaviest stock 
I os'ses . 
The graphs of Fig. 2 depict progress made with restoration of 
sub'scriber service. 
Three separate areas are now treated in some detail. 
(1) Ashburton Area 
This is a general area between the Rangitata and Rakaia rivers. It 
coniained thiee manual exchanges, Mayfield, Springburn and Methven and a 
VHF radio siation (mobile service) at Mt Alford. Power supply to all of 
these places was lost and was to take up to a week to restore to all the 
exchanges and 18 days for restoration at Lowmount. 
Subscribers' line damage in these three exchange areas was very 
extensive. The open-wire toll lines to Mayfield and Springburn were also 
out of service. Junctions between Ashburton and Methven were entirely in 
underground cable and unaffected. 
A radio-equipped vehicle got through to Mayfield on the Monday and 
a break in the toll line was repaired. Fresh falls of snow later in the 
day brought the toll line down again and for some time after that 
communication to and from Mayfield was dependent on this radio link. Apart 
from the main road to Ashburton, it was to be a few days before access by 
road was obtained to all parts of the Mayfield area. This was generally 
achieved by clearing one-lane strips. 
Many of the long rural runs of line in Mayfield were of one and two 
pairs. Restoration was to be largely effected here by laying along the top 
of the ground (or snow) many miles of twin-twisted drop wire (0.45). 
In Springburn exchange area some 150 out of a total 158 subscribers 
were without telephone service. The toll line,to Ashburtonwas badly 
damaged over a 5 mile section, at the Springburn end. The main road into 
Springburn took longer to clear than those to Mayfield and Methven. 
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One auxiliary link junction between Mayfield and Springburn, entirely 
in cable, was unaffected, When the toll line was first restored to Mayfield 
this link was used to give instructions to the Postmaster, Springburn, which 
enabled him to set up a VHF radio in his Post Office. When the snowstorm 
struck, work was well advanced towards bringing in automatic exchanges at 
Mt Somers and Springburn. A VHF radio set had been in use at the Springburn 
UAX building. The Postmaster was able to bring this set to his Post Office 
and when the Mayfield toll line was again lost he was able to remain in 
contact with areas outside Springburn, by this means. 
At a meeting called by the Regional Engineer on Wednesday, 8 August, 
and attended by Engineers and Overseers (the latter from the three snow-
affected areas) it was decided to proceed forthwith to bring the new 
exchanges at Springburn and Mt Somers into service. It was estimated that 
it would take a month to reconnect all of these subscribers to their origi-
nal manual exchanges at Springburn and Mayfield. (Only a part of the 
Mayfield exchange area was being brought into the new Mt Somers exchange 
area.) On the other hand the new exchanges could be brought into service 
and the subscribers progressively connected to them over a matter of a few 
days. 
All of the underground cable network had been laid and jointed. 
Underground leads to subscribers had been laid and connected to automatic 
telephones in subscribers' premises. Work remaining to be done in the 
field consisted essentially of connecting the new underground leads to the 
cable network. 
The problems to be met in bringing the new exchanges into use, 
included: 
(1) Obtaining vehicles suitable for travelling over considerable depths 
of snow to permit connection of premises to the new cable network. 
Two R.L. Bedfords were obtained from the Army. 
(2) Obtaining and transport of engine alternator sets to the exchanges 
to provide power for the exchange batteries until normal power would 
be restored. Fuel would also have to be transported to these places 
for the alternators, as commercial pumps would not have power for 
their operation. 
(3) Restoration in difficult snow conditions, one pair of wires on the 
inner 5 mile section of Springburn-Ashburton toll line and inaugura-
tion of a rural carrier system over this bearer between Ashburton 
and Springburn to provide junctions to the exchanges at Springburn 
and Mt Somers. The junction link, between Springburn and Mt Somers 
for junctions to the latter exchange, would be in the unaffected 
underground cable. 
(4) A changed number (directory) service would have to be provided so that 
subscribers could communicate with each other on the new exchanges. 
Temporary "directory service" numbers (the same number at each 
exchange) were connected to telephones in the Post Office at Springburn. 
Publicity and instructions to subscribers were arranged through adver-
tisements in the Press and on local radio. 
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By late Thursday (9 August) some 50 percent of subscribers overall had 
been connected to the new exchanges which began operating with a limited 
number of generally satisfactory junctions to Ashburton. 
By late Friday (10 August) the proportion of subscrib~rs connected 
had been lifted to 90 percent. 
Local directories were in fact being delivered at this time by Rural 
Mail. These directories had been printed in Wellington (for the expected 
cutover late September) and had been dispatched from Wellington earlier in 
the week. Because of this timely delivery to most of the subscribers, the 
"changed-number" service operated from Springburn Post Office was 'never 
under much pressure, and was discontinued after a few days. 
It was to take about a week to connect all of the remaining subscri-
bers to the Springburn and Mt Somers exchanges. 
In the case of Springburn subscribers only one had to wai t this long'. 
His line ran across country for an appreciable distance and access could 
not be obtained earlier. 
Although a group of Mt Somers subscribers had to wait this long for 
connection to the exchange, the group was given a localised communication 
network having radio outlet. This group comprised the subscribers in 
the high country beyond Ashburton Gorge. Before the storm they had been 
connected by two lines from Erewhon and Lake Heron to the Springburn 
exchange by day and to the Mayfield exchange at night. The upper sections 
of their lines, of recent origin with 192 lb copper-clad steel conductor, 
were unaffected by the storm. 
A lower section between Hakatere and Mt Somers had the same conductor 
in an old pole line. Many poles failed in this section. This line was to 
be a subscribers' carrier bearer on the new Mt Somers exchange. The line 
would have to be rebuilt here (replacement with 0.45 or cable would not 
provide acceptable transmission quality for carrier use) and this would 
take Some time. An interim local communication network was provided by 
joining the two lines together at Hakatere. 
The uppermost stations on both lines were also on the Methven Radio 
(ZeI) link. Contact with the outside world was therefore available to 
these people also. 
In the Methven exchange area line damage occurred on three main fronts. 
These were: 
(1) In the township area and areas close to it where house connect~ons 
were generally by overhead drop-wire (0.45) and where service was 
lost through failure of these connections under snow loading. 
(2) In a sector of the exchange area (which can be roughly described 
as a quadrant of the whole service area) where service was provided 
by open-wire line. In the other three quadrants, open-wire lines 
had been devastated by earlier snowstorms (notably the 1967 one) 
and reticulation was largely by underground cable. 
(3) In the peripheral areas, where open-wire line was retained as cable 
was an unacceptable alternative for the formerly-envisaged, step 
automatic exchange for Methven. 
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In all, some 150 out of a total 520 subscribers on the Methven exchange 
were without service. 
Methven toll lines to Ashburton were entirely in underground cable, 
which was unaffected. As noted earlier, continued operation of these junc-
tions was dependent on getting electric power to feed the exchange junction 
battery. The Ashburton County got the road to Methven open on Tuesday 
(7 August) and this enabled the Post Office to get an engine alternator to 
the exchange. (A bulldozer had to be found to clear a way from the road to 
the exchange, so that the alternator could be set up-alongside the exchange.) 
Fuel for the alternator had to be brought in by road from Ashburton as power, 
to operate commercial pumps, was not available. The alternator was set up 
and working in Methven a little in advance of the time when the battery 
would have otherwise failed and the junctions to Ashburton lost. 
Very little progress was made with restoration of subscriber service 
in Methven throughout the first week (reference Fig. 2) for although gangs 
were able to get into Methven (from Ashburton) from Tuesday 7 August, snow 
levels beyond the cleared main road precluded their movement, even into 
much of the township area. 
(2) Darfield area 
This is a general area between the Rakaia and the Waimakariri Rivers. 
It contains four manual exchanges. Two of these, at Darfield and Lake 
Coleridge, on the eastern and western fringes of the snowstorm area, 
suffered relatively minor damage to subscriber service. 
The other two, at Hororata and Sheffield, suffered very heavy pole 
line damage and loss of service. 
The area also contains two automatic exchanges, at Glentunnel and-
Springfield. The exchange at Glentunnel was relatively new (having been 
brought into service the previous year). Consistent with recent practice 
nearly all of the outside plant including service leads to houses was by 
underground cable. Consequently nearly all of the Glentunnel subscribers 
suffered no interruption to their local service and even service out to 
Hororata where again junctions were underground cable. 
Service beyond Hororata was not available as the toll line to 
Darfield in opne-wire line was badly damaged. It will be noted that Fig. 2 
groups Hororata and Glentunnel subscribers together. The Postmaster's 
statistics on subscribers without service were compiled in this way but 
very few of this composite group of subscribers were in fact Glentunnel 
connections. Apart from their loss of toll service (that is, communication 
beyond Hororata) the Glentunnel telephone service was relatively unaffected 
by the snowstorm, but there was the threat that the local service would 
also be lost completely if the exchange battery were to go flat before an 
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engine alternator could be taken there. (Normal power to all exchanges 
in this general area was of course lost.) An alternator did get through in 
time to prevent interruption to Glentunnel exchange service. Whereas their 
electric power was lost and their roads impassable, the fact their tele-
phone service was intact ,throughout the Glentunnel area made quite an 
impression on these subscribers. 
At the Springfield automatic exchange, the situation was markedly 
different. This exchange had been converted to automatic some ten years 
earlier than Glentunnel. Consequently, the cable network at Springfield 
was very much more confined (as was customary with installations of that 
time) than that of Glentunnel. There were, therefore, many miles of pole 
line in this network and inevitably this suffered heavy damage. 
Here again, total loss of local service was a threat, should the 
battery fail before an alternator could get through. As is illustrated in 
Fig. 2 total loss of service did occur in this way, before road clearing 
allowed provision of an alternator. 
Toll line (junctions) from Springfield (through Sheffield) to Darfield 
were entirely in underground cable and were unaffected. 
One of Springfield's subscribers is the Canterbury Winter Sports Club 
at Mt Cheeseman (See Fig. 1). The line through the very heavy snowfall in 
Springfield area was generally in recently constructed open wire line with 
192 lb copper-clad steel conductor. This was unaffected initially and 
skiers on Mt Cheeseman for the weekend were able to telephone Christchurch 
on the Monday morning of 6 August. They lost their service later in the 
day when the line was broken, by a falling tree in one place and a falling 
power pole in another. The line suffered no other damage. 
Access to Springfield for restoration wdrk was obtained initially by 
two parties from Greymouth. These parties had brought an alternator with 
them and this was used to provide some lighting at the Springfield Hotel 
where they were accommodated. This to some extent eased the difficulties 
the hotel experienced (particularly in meal preparation by rather primitive 
means) in providing for its Post Office guests. (The power line from 
Darfield to Springfield had been brought down completely by the snow.) It 
is probable that if Post Office parties had not provided lighting at the 
hotel their request for accommodation would have been declined. 
Service restoration in the Springfield network was achieved in two 
ways. In some parts restoration of the open-wire pole line was adopted. 
(In some of these, interim restoration was achieved with twin-twisted 
drop wire.) In others, damaged pole lines were abandoned in favour of 
replacement with underground cable. (In some of these sections too, where 
cable was not then available, use of drop wire for temporary restoration 
was adopted.) 
Similar restoration methods were adopted in the Sheffield area. The 
Minister had recently authorised the provision of an automatic exchange 
for this area and a cable proposal plan was therefore available. This 
simplified the work involved in'selecting appropriate cables (pair size 
and conductor gauge), it being merely necessary to check that the cable so 
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provided would be acceptable on the manual (magneto) exchange in the mean-
time. Cable had now also to be provided in some sections, where the propo-
sal had envisaged retention of open wire line on the now invalidated 
assumption that the pole-line would be satisfactory for an appreciable number 
of years. 
In the Hororata-Glenroy area similar methods of restoration were 
employed. New automatic exchanges had been approved for both of these 
places. Whereas for Sheffield detailed proposals for cabling had still 
to be approved by Head Office, this approval had been obtained for Hororata 
and Glenroy and in fact most of the cable had just been received from the 
manufacturer. Much of this was therefore laid now, as soon as conditions 
were satisfactory for moleploughing. The remainder, which was not required 
for immediate pole-line replacement in Hororata and'Glenroy, was diverted to 
other places in the district where its need for this purpose was now criti-
cal. 
A pocket of subscribers in the Windwhistle area was connected to the 
Hororata exchange by a subscribers' rural carrier system using the Hororata 
to Lake Coleridge toll line as bearer. One break of 30 spans in this line 
occurred in a section where the line runs in paddocks at a distance of about 
a mile from the road. This road was not cleared for vehicle access until 
9 August. Two runs of 0.45 were laid out along the ground to fill the gaps 
in this line. Some difficulties were experienced in keeping this temporar-
ily repaired circuit in operation as a toll line. Further difficulties 
were encountered in getting the subscribers' carrier system to work satis-
factorily through the interruption cable. The system was working near to 
its transmission limit in normal circumstances and the rebuilding of this 
line was now required for restoration of satisfactory subscriber service. 
Three sections of toll line in this general Darfield area were badly 
affected. 
One of these was the Hororata-Lake Coleridge line referred to above. 
Another was the open wire line between Darfield and Hororata. This 
line was severely damaged in the generally north-south running sections 
between Homebush and Hororata. All wire was down and many poles broken in 
these sections. Fortunately an alternative means of restoration of this 
service was available. 
laid. 
that 
with 
A new Darfield-Hororata underground junction cable had recently been 
Some two-thirds of this cable had been jointed and it was fortunate 
jointing had started at the Hororata end as it was to be impracticable, 
the depth of snow, to work on that end of the cable for some days. 
Circuits could therefore be provided between Hororata and Darfield 
by completing the jointing of this junction cable at the Darfield end. 
However, the cable was an armoured lead-sheathed cable making underground 
joints in this, even at the Darfield end, would be difficult and slow until 
snow had cleared. A better alternative existed, however, as an interim 
measure. A subscribers' cable (plastic) had been laid with the junction 
cable throughout the sect~on at the Darfield end (in which the junction 
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cable was unjointed). Jointing in this cable would normally be by above~ 
ground joints. It was therefore practicable, although conditions were of 
course difficult, to partially make these above-ground joints (that is, 
connect a few pairs through) and at an appropriate point, connect pairs 
in this cable to pairs in the jointed junction cable. This approach was 
adopted and communication between Darfield and Hororata was established in 
this way, as early as Tuesday, 7 August. 
Prior to the storm, Hororata had a 3-channel and a I-channel carrier 
system working direct to Christchurch. With loss of the open-wire bearers, 
Hororata to Darfield, a rearrangement was necessary. As described above, 
following the storm, cable circuits were provided between Hororata and 
Darfield. As soon as road conditions allowed, the 3-channel terminal at 
Hororata was removed to Darfield and by Saturday, 11 August, the carrier 
system was working between Darfield and Christchurch. These channels were 
directly linked at Darfield to cable circuits on to Hororata, to again pro-
vide a direct Hororata-Christchurch toll link. 
The one-channel carrier system was not relocated but circuits between 
Christchurch and Darfield were augmented by providing a G.E.C. 5-channel 
V.H.F. radio system. The equipment for this system was brought from 
Wellington and was in service within a fortnight following the snowstorm. 
The other section of toll line affected in this area was the main line 
to the West Coast. Damage suffered here was devastating. From about a mile 
beyond the Darfield Post Office to Springfield (total distance 14.7 miles) 
all wires were down and some 45 poles broken. The Power Board and New 
Zealand Railways pole lines on this route were similarly affected. From 
Springfield to Avoca (16 miles) the Post Office toll line again sustained 
similar damage with some 55 poles broken. The immediate consequence of this 
damage was that all toll line communication between Christchurch and the 
West Coast by this Midland route was lost. Greymouth was not isolated by 
this loss as it had 15 toll circuits to Christchurch via Reef ton and 
Blenheim. The loss was drastic however, as pre-storm, Greymouth had 27 and 
Hokitika 3 circuits to Christchurch, all by the Midland route. 
Another consequence of this line damage was loss of service by sub-
scribers in the Arthur's Pass and Cass areas. While these lines 'were used 
as carrier bearers for toll circuits they were also used at voice frequen-
cies to connect some 20 subscribers in these areas to the Darfield exchange. 
The scope of the damage between Darfield and Springfield was apparent 
from the outset, that is, on Monday 6 August. (Communication existed 
Darfield to Sheffield to Springfield via underground junction cables.) When 
the line parties came through from Greymouth they were able to establish 
that the line to Avoca (from the west) was sound. From Avoca to Kowai Bush 
(12 miles), where road did not exist, it was not until a member of a Greymouth 
parth came through by railcar on Wednesday 8 August that the extent of 
damage here was finally known. 
Early restoration of a service to the Arthur's Pass, Cass area sub-
scribers was achieved (by Greymouth parties) by taking the three lines 
through to Otira (via pairs in .the tunnel cable) and from Otira to Greymouth 
via a 3-channel carrier system. In this way they were connected to Greymouth 
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instead of their former exchange at Darfield. 
While this was to be an interim measure, it would be some time before 
these subscribers could again be connected to Darfield. Whether this 
return was desirable and if so whether this should be achieved by mere 
reconstruction of felled lines was a matter that could not be considered in 
isolation from what should be done to restore toll circuits on this route. 
An eventual Arthur's Pass automatic exchange was envisaged in the objective 
plan for the Darfield Toll Group and the implications of providing this in 
the near future were therefore now considered. Some subscriber preference 
was expressed for the view that the interim solution should be allowed to 
remain for somewhat longer than it would take to restore the pre-storm 
set-up in order to achieve desirable improvement over that condition. It 
has been noted that mere restoration of pre-storm line conditions for 
Art~ur's Pass/Cass subscriber service would be a mammoth task and one for 
which alternatives should be considered. This view was just as applicable 
to toll circuit provision. 
Pre-storm, the toll circuits were provided by open-wire carrier 
systems on very long bearer circuits run in many places through difficult 
high-country terrain some of which was accessible only by rail. It was a 
system which had served well in an era which was now passing. It did not 
have capacity for the sort of growth in toll circuit demand that must be met 
within a few years. 
The solution that was being sought then, ought to be capable of pro-
viding at minimum cost an acceptable number of circuits for an interim 
period before provision of a modern system with adequate capacity for 
growth. 
Factors pertinent to choice of an interim solution included: 
(1) The Post Office line was intact from Greymouth to Cass (and Cass to 
Avoca). 
(2) The N.Z.E.D. had a communication line following the main highway from 
Cass to Lake Lyndon. (This was part of a circuit which runs from 
Dobson on the West Coast through Lake Lyndon, Lake Coleridge and 
Hororata to Christchurch.) 
(3) The Post Office subscribers' line from the Waimakariri Basin was 
intact from Lake Lyndon to Springfield. The Lyndon end was in 192 lb 
copper-clad steel conductor on pole line and the Springfield end in 
cable. 
(4) From Springfield to Darfield the Post Office open-wire line had been 
demolished but cable existed throughout this section. The cable at 
the Springfield end had oil-impregnated paper insulation and was not 
satisfactory for carrier working. However, a proposal for an overlay 
in polythene cable had been approved by Head Office for this section. 
Consideration could be given to changing this proposal to provide a 
paper insulated cable (suitable for carrier working) instead of the 
polythene. 
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(5) From Darfield to Christchurch the open-wire line was of course still 
available. Cable also existed throughout this section and except 
for a few miles of polythene cable in the Kirwee-Rolleston area, this 
cable was capable of carrier working. 
The problem was resolved in a two-stage plan. 
Stage I was concerned with obtaining some circuits immediately. This 
is now described. 
The decision was made to obtain a 24 circuit V.H.F. radio system 
(available in Wellington) and to install this between Christchurch and 
Springfield. Propagation to a point beyond Springfield was not practicable. 
The Christchurch terminal was located at Cashmere. Use of a suitable hill 
site at Springfield was negotiated. A building was transported from 
Christchurch to this site, masts and aerials erected and radio and open-wire 
carrier terminal equipment installed in the building. 
Negotiations with N.Z. Electricity Department resulted in their agree-
ment meantime to use of their communication line as a carrier bearer between 
Lake Lyndon and Casso New pole line had to be built down the hill from 
the radio building t9 meet up with the Springfield cable taking the Post 
Office circuit out on its way to Lake Lyndon. 
Carrier blocking networks and filters had to be installed to allow 
N.Z.E.D. continued use of their line at voice frequencies and as a one-
channel carrier bearer, and to permit continued use of the Post Office line 
beyond Lake Lyndon as a subscribers' line. 
The whole operation was carried out successfully with 12 circuits 
working Christchurch through to Greymouth within about a fortnight of the 
snow break. A second group of 12 circuits was added somewhat later (early 
October) to make full use of the 24 circuit radio system. This required 
building of some new pole line at the Springfield end of the Lyndon to 
Springfield circuit as there was too much cable in this section of the 
bearer for satisfactory operation of the high frequency open-wire carrier 
system. It is interesting to note that the Otira tunnel cable was able to 
carry the high frequency system satisfactorily. Had the cable been much 
longer, this would not have been practicable. 
This meant that 24 circuits to the Coast were now operating over the 
Midland route whereas there had been 30 prior the storm. However the 
number of circuits to the Coast via Blenheim had been increased in the mean-
time. At the time of the storm 15 were provided by this route and authority 
and the equipment were held for a Blenheim-Westport 12 channel system. This 
installation was accelerated and the Coast terminal located at Greymouth 
instead of Westport as an interim measure so that 27 circuits were provided 
by this route. 
Stage II of the plan is concerned with further circuit augmentation 
to meet growth in circuit requirements for the next two or three years. 
Actually these circuits are needed now as augmentation had not been keeping 
pace with growth in circuit demqnd prior to the snowstorm. Schemes have 
been proposed to Head Office. The preferred scheme would require little 
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cost and manpower effort to achieve but is dependent upon satisfactory 
negotiation for use of an existing New Zealand Railways' circuit as a 
carrier bearer and for use of their pole line to run a circuit on through 
the Springfield-Avoca section. The latter would also make it practicable 
to provide junctions to an Arthur's Pass automatic exchange. 
The New Zealand Railways' pole line between Darfield and Avoca has 
been restored to its pre-storm condition. 
(3) Rangiora Area 
The area considered here is all that affected by snow north of the 
Waimakariri River. 
Only light snow fell in the Amberley area. The area badly affected 
was served by two manual exchanges, at Cust and Oxford, and an automatic 
exchange at Loburn. 
Some 400 out of a total of 500 subscribers at Oxford lost service. 
Reference to Fig. 2 shows that this was the largest number on one exchange 
to have service disrupted. Two-fifths of those connected to Loburn and 
one-third of these on Cust lost service. 
The Oxford exchange area is a large one. Little cable had been laid 
here in recent years and reticulation was predominantly by heavily loaded 
pole line, with 150 lb/mile galvanised iron conductor. This plant suffered 
badly. 
An automatic exchange for Oxford had been approved recently by the 
Minister and detailed cable proposals were in Head Office for their appro-
val. Planning for this area was therefore at a similar stage to that 
described above for Sheffield. Having decided where cable should now be 
laid for restoration of service, choice of cable size and type was therefore 
simplified. 
Snow depths overall were not as great in the Oxford-Cust-Loburn areas 
as was the case in the Ashburton and Darfield areas. 
Improvement in conditions for access and cable laying was consequently 
achieved considerably earlier than applied generally in the Ashburton and 
Darfield areas. Moleploughing of cable in the Oxford area began within a 
week of the snow break (it actually began on Saturday, 11 August), whereas 
in Hororata-Glenroy it was barely practicable even a week later. In some 
parts it was somewhat later still before conditions were to be suitable 
for ploughing. 
In the Oxford area, single-lane road access was established fairly 
rapidly and restoration work in the township was practicable on Tuesday 
7 August. By Thursday 9 August most of the area could be negotiated by 
motor vehicle and steady progress with restoration work seemed assured. An 
Oxford contractor began cable laying (hire of services basis) by moleplough 
on Saturday 11 August. The initial supply of cable to be used here was 
uplifted from Cust where appreciable cable was on hand. On Monday 13 August 
114 
supplies of cable were being allocated to all parts of the district from 
national stock held at Hornby store. 
The amount of cable laid initially in the Oxford area from all sources 
was approximately 113,000 ft. This effectively restored service on the 
heavy line routes and permitted conservation of 0.45 supplies for use as 
interruption cable on light lines and leads to subscriber premises. 
A further length of some 82,000 ft of cable was to be required to 
replace temporarily repaired lines. The bulk of this was laid in the months 
following the storm and more recently the remaining 30,000 ft has been 
installed. 
Returning to the snow break period itself, restoration work accelerated 
as weather conditions improved and as newly laid cables were jointed. By 
Monday night, 13 August, one week after the storm, Oxford subscribers without 
service had been reduced to 110. 
The Lees Valley area had been under very heavy snow and remained 
isolated until Tuesday 14 August. 
All Oxford subscribers had their service restored by Saturday 20 
August, this being the thirteenth day following the storm. 
In the Cust exchange area, where some 75 subscribers lost service, line 
damage was minor to moderate, at least in comparison with Oxford area. Pre-
parations in the field were reasonably well advanced for cutover of an auto-
matic exchange planned for November/December. Some of the subscribers' 
cable had been laid and some diverted to Oxford as noted above. Restoration 
of service in Cust area was therefore achievable in the main by jointing and 
bringing into service the recently laid cable. Snowfall here had been 
relatively light and recently built lines beyond the cable limits were not 
badly damaged. Access throughout the area was available soon after the 
storm and service had been effectively restored by the evening of Sunday 
12 August. 
The Loburn area had experienced heavier snow than Cust and access to 
some parts was difficult in the early stages. However, the snow cleared 
quite early and good progress with restoration of service to the 70 subscri-
bers was maintained from the outset until reconnection of the last subscriber 
occurred on Wednesday 15 August. 
Subscriber lines in the northern sector of Loburn area were heavily 
damaged. Many poles failed on the heavily loaded line to Whiterock and 
extensive breakage of the 70 lb cadmium-copper conductor occurred there and 
elsewhere. 
Self supporting aerial cable and 7 pair plastic cable, to the extent 
of stock available locally, were used as temporary interruption cables. 
Service was restored in the Birch Hill area by moleploughing 2 pair 
cable, 0.49A. In the whole of Loburn area, a total of 54,700 ft of cable 
in sizes from 2 pair to 25 pair ·was laid by hire plant for permanent restora-
tion. (No further cable was to be required here later.) 
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Toll lines in the general Rangiora area were not badly affected. The 
toll lines to Oxford were cut in the early hours of Monday morning 6 August. 
Line wire breakages had occurred in six places between Cust and Oxford. 
Repairs could not be attempted until fallen power lines (at several crossings 
with the toll line) had been cleared. Nevertheless toll service had been 
completely restored by 4.00 p.m. the same day, 6 August. 
Loss of Power: Emergency Needs and Measures 
As noted elsewhere, the storm caused widespread damage to power lines. 
This resulted in power outages of two days or more at eight widely separated 
telecommunication installations. In addition, there were several installa-
tions where mains power failed for shorter intervals. 
The provision and maintenance of standby power for the period after the 
storm called for improvisation and for working under difficult and, at times, 
treacherous conditions. There was a meritorious response by staff to the 
challenge. An outline of what occurred now follows. 
The longest interruptions to the power mains were of 18 days duration 
and these occur~ed at the microwave repeater station at Lowmount and at 
the V.H.F. radio station at Mt Alford. The long interruptions made it 
necessary to check on fuel, oil levels, and the general condition of the 
engine alternator sets at these stations. Because of snow drifts, the 
visits were made by helicopter. Limited fuel supplies were dropped during 
these visits. 
The six other longer interruptions were at telephone exchanges. On 
Tuesday, 7 August, trailer-mounted Wisconson E.A. sets managed to get 
through to exchanges at Mayfield, Methven and Glentunnel. 
Because of conditions it was to be some three days or so after the 
storm that the Wisconson engine alternator sets could be towed into the 
U.A.X. 's at Springfield, Springburn and Mt Somers. The two latter were 
awaiting cutover from a manual system and provision of power was an essential 
part of the operation. 
As noted elsewhere, the storm severely damaged the main line to the 
West Coast. Part of the restoration measures involved replacement of aerial 
lines by a U.H.F. link between Cashmere and a hill at Springfield. A 24-
volt regulated supply was provided at both ends of the U.H.F. link, at very 
short notice. Initially, the primary source of power at the Springfield 
end was a mobile engine alternator set but this reverted to standby when 
mains were provided. This installation was made on the top of a snow 
covered hill to which access was difficult. 
ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES 
I. Regional Engineer Control and Engineer-in-Chief's 
Office Participation: 
By the night of Tuesday 7 August, although the full extent of damage 
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was still far from known, sufficient information was available to allow 
some co-ordination and direction of restoration measures. 
Consequently the Regional Engineer held a meeting on Wednesday 
morning (8 August) which was attended by Engineers and C. & M. Branch staff, 
the latter including overseers for the Ashburton, Darfield and Rangiora 
areas. 
The district's ability to cope with restoration with its own resources 
was considered in some depth. The need to obtain large quantities of 0.45 
from outside the region was acknowledged. It was agreed that Mt Somers and 
Springburn automatic exchanges should be brought into service as soon as 
possible and that design size cables should be laid elsewhere, whenever 
this offered a better solution to rebuilding line. It was acknowledged 
that the district and even the region, did not have the reserves of cable 
that would be necessary to achieve this. Helicopter surveys of areas in 
which the extent of damage had not yet been observed, were approved. It 
was also agreed that the Army should be approached for vehicles suitable 
for travelling over roads with some depth of snow on them, with a view to 
their being used initially in Mt Somers and Springburn. 
Another meeting, attended by many at the first, was held on Saturday 
morning, 11 August. This considered general progress and outstanding 
requirements. 
Later meetings were to be on a smaller scale for specific aspects of 
restoration. 
The Superintending Engineer, Field Section, Engineer-in-Chief's 
Office, visited Christchurch on Monday, 13 August. He was to approve 
specific uses of cable supplies held locally and to allocate supplies from 
national holdings at Hornby. 
II. Manpower: 
The emergency was handled in the main with district resources of man-
power supported by casual labour recruited for general recovery work. Two 
3-men line gangs from Greymouth gave assistance on restoration of-subscri-
ber service at Springfield after having carried out repairs as far as 
practicable on west sections of the Christchurch-West Coast toll link. 
Accommodation was provided at the Springfield Hotel. 
Duvauchelle personnel (5 men) were accommodated at the Sheffield 
Hotel and concentrated on restoration of subscriber service and tolls in 
that immediate area initially. 
As access to the area permitted, Christchurch and Sockburn staff were 
moved in. A Christchurch Transport Board bus was chartered to transport 
personnel to and from the area daily and up to 26 men were engaged on 
restoration work in this manner. Darfield staff of 6 men and two vehicles 
were engaged mainly in the Hororata-Glentunnel and Glenroy areas. 
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Restoration in the Cust, Loburn and Oxford areas was carried out by 
Rangiora and Amberley staff, augmented by three 4-men and two 2-men gangs 
from Christchurch, a total work force of approximately 56. Accommodation 
for the imported personnel was predominantly at Oxford where private board 
was arranged in the absence of hotel accommodation. The response by 
private citizens to an appeal for accommodation at that time was greatly 
appreciated. 
A work force of 46 men was engaged in the Ashburton construction 
area, comprising 30 Ashburton, 8 Rakaia and 8 Christchurch personnel. Hotel 
accommodation at Methven and Ashburton was provided for the Christchurch 
staff who were working in the area for two weeks. 
In addition, some Christchurch staff assisted in restoration work in 
the Timaru district. 
For some time after service had been restored to subscribers, casual 
labour was retained to dismantle wire from felled lines and to generally 
tidy up following replacement of such lines with cable. 
I I I. Plant: 
Post Office-owned vehicles were generally unsuited to travel on roads 
covered with reasonable depths of snow. This was true even of the short-
wheel-base Landrover. Once roads had been cleared however, Post Office 
vehicles were able to cope with all but those tasks requiring specialised 
vehicles. 
Most of the plant obtained from outside the Post Office has been 
mentioned elsewhere. A brief summary follows. 
Army R.L. Bedfords were used to traverse reasonable depths of snow, 
and later for cartage of recovered material from abandoned lines. 
Buses, large initially and mini later, were used in transport of staff 
from Christchurch to the Darfield area. 
R.N.Z.A.F. helicopters were used in survey work on Thursday and 
Friday, 9 and 10 August, in areas still inaccessible by road, generally in 
the back country areas of Mayfield, Methven and Hororata and on toll routes 
to Lake Coleridge and West Coast. 
Bulldozers and moleploughs were used for cable laying. (It is 
normal practice to hire such plant in ordinary times.) 
Bulldozers were also used to clear snow around some poles and to 
clear the road to Mt Alford V.H.F. station. 
A bulldozer was also used for some days at the Springfield site of 
the U.H.F. station, to get a building, masts and vehicles etc. up a road 
which it formed in very muddy conditions. It also moleploughed the power 
cable which eventually provided mains power to the installation. 
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Contractors used on hire of services for the cable laying shown in 
Columns A and B, of the table in the next section were: 
Doug Hood Ltd, Ashburton 
Donald Bros, Ashburton 
L.R. Rossiter, Oxford 
Contractors used on other works were: 
Doug Hood Ltd, Ashburton 
Ian Wills, Ashburton 
Briggs Bros, Mayfield 
E.K. Eaves, Springfield 
IV. Materials: 
- at Methven, Sheffield and 
Springfield 
- at Mayfield, Hororata and 
Glenroy 
- at Oxford and Loburn 
- road clearing to Mt Alford 
- snow clearing at poles, 
Ashburton Gorge 
- snow clearing at poles 
- work at Springfield U.H.F. 
radio site 
Very large quantities of 0.45 were used to provide temporary restora-
tion of service. Locally held supplies, both for normal use and for 
emergency purposes, were but a small part of the total requirement in this 
situation. Large quantities carne into the area from as far afield as 
Auckland. One consignment was brought in by road transport from Nelson 
at a time when local supplies were almost exhausted and the delay in 
augmenting these from further north would have resulted in an interruption 
to restoration work. 
A record of cable laid initially and additional cable which would be 
laid ultimately, is given in the table below: 
Area Cable laid Cable laid Cable to be Planned timing 
initially later (ft) laid (ft) for "C" 
(ft) (~) (~) (~) 
Mayfield 33,000 60,000 April '74 
Methven 145,000 30,000 65,000 April ~74 
Hororata-Glenroy 40,000 242,000 Jun-Oct ' 74 
Sheffield 44,000 10,000 72,000 May-Jun '74 
Springfield 8,000 10,000 12,000 May-Jun ' 74 
Oxford 165,000 30,000 160,000 Jun-Oct '74 
Loburn 55,000 
Totals 490,000 80,000 611,000 
Column A refers to cable laid to restore service. In Methven some 
75 percent was part of an earlier approved scheme and the other 25 percent 
was used to replace pole line. In Sheffield, some 9,000 ft had to be laid 
where pole line retention had been planned. In Springfield, some 2,500 ft 
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was laid in Kowai Bush area where there were no plans for pole line replace-
ment. The remainder was mainly approved cabling for Russells Flat area 
(currently part of Sheffield exchange but an area to be diverted to 
Springfield when Sheffield gets its automatic exchange). 
Column B refers to cable which was not available for laying during 
August but laid since then to replace temporary restoration work. The need 
was a matter for some concern. Limited quantities of cable in certain 
sizes became available and were laid to the extent shown in this column. 
Column C refers, except in the case of Mayfield, to outstanding cable 
requirements to complete (generally) approved works. A large proportion of 
this will replace lines on which temporary relief measures were taken. In 
the Mayfield case, planning for an approved work had not been done and 
the whole 60,000 ft represents cable required to replace temporarily 
repaired lines. A considerable part of this temporary line is in 0.45 
line laid out along the ground and fence lines. It is fortuitous that the 
summer just past has been notable for the absence of much wind from a nor-
west quarter. Had these eventuated with usual frequency, considerable 
loss of temporarily restored service would surely have occurred. At the 
time of writing, the Methven cable laying is under action (started 8 April) 
and the Mayfield laying will follow immediately that at Methven. The cable 
required for Mayfield is mainly 7 and 25 pair and there has been a serious 
shortage of thes~ sizes since the storm. 
V. Communication by fixed and mobile V.H.F. radio sets: 
The existing quantities of mobile sets were quite inadequate for a 
satisfactory communication set-up in this emergency. 
As soon as possible, radio-equipped vehicles were sent to Oxford and 
Mayfield to provide an emergency link in the absence of toll lines and to 
Methven where loss of junctions could occur, if the battery were to fail. 
Subsequently, Oxford, Methven and Hororata Post Offices were all to 
get fixed radio sets. 
At the time of the storm some three mobile sets were held on hire for 
pre-cutover work in areas where automatic exchange installations were under 
action. These and additional sets obtained on hire and loan from Tait and 
Pye were dispersed in vehicles. This dispersion, together with the 
existing coverage of the fleet, provided a very beneficial communication 
set-up. A small number of engineer's cars were so fitted. Normal P.A.B.X. 
access to the V.H.F. channel was also invaluable. 
The Head Office-held emergency V.H.F. system, comprlslng base station 
and six mobiles was also obtained. This was used, not in the way envisaged 
in the Engineering Instruction, but to extend coverage of the Christchurch 
channel 45A, to areas beyond Hororata and Springfield which were not 
accessible through the Christchurch base station. The emergency base 
station was set up on Lowmount. This again proved invaluable. 
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Some mitigating factors: 
There were many factors, some fortuitous, some the result of good 
construction practices, some arising from recent progress in automating 
service in rural areas, some arising from recent achievements in advancing 
the programme for prosecution of rural automation works and others too, 
which all made their contribution to alleviating the work of restoration 
of full or partial service. 
1. Extent of existing cable at automatic exchanges: 
The almost complete lack of vulnerability of the practically all 
underground subscribers' network and the underground junction cable was 
demonstrated in the case of Glentunnel. It was also demonstrated in the 
Mt Somers and Springburn areas where such networks, though not then in 
use, were unaffected. In Loburn and Springfield, provided earlier than 
Glentunnel and having appreciable quantities of aerial line as well as an 
inner network of cable and cable junctions, the same pattern was evident. 
2. Well advanced planning for rural automatic works: 
Had the storm occurred a year earlier, the task of restoration would 
have been immeasurably greater. Restoration was greatly assisted by having 
the following situations. 
(a) Mt Somers and Springburn were almost ready for a cutover (to a 
largely all-underground system) then intended to occur at end of 
September. These exchanges were brought into service without the 
usual pre-cutover testing. 
(b) At Cust some cable had been laid and it was only necessary to joint 
this to bring it into service. Cable, held for laying in Cust, was 
diverted to Oxford. 
(c) Cable had been delivered for works associated with the provlslon 
of automatic exchanges at Hororata and Glenroy. Some of this was 
used in these areas and some diverted for use elsewhere. 
(d) Cable had been manufactured for Methven, for the area referred to 
earlier as a quadrant still largely served by overhead line. This 
cable was available at Hornby and was taken direct to Methven by 
road transport. 
(e) Exchange cabling proposals, for planned automatic exchanges at 
Sheffield and Methven, had been prepared. These plans simplified 
the process of selecting appropriate cable types and sizes, to 
replace damaged over-head line. 
3. Location of national cable store at Hornby: 
It was fortuitous the cab~e factory and national store are in 
Christchurch. When the Superintending Engineer (Field Section, POHQ) made 
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allocations of cable from the national supply there was a minimum of delay 
in getting the cable on site. 
4. Existence of N.Z.E.D. communication line: 
It was fortunate this line existed in the section Lake Lyndon to Cass 
and that a satisfactory arrangement whereby the Post Office could make use 
of it for circuit restoration to the West Coast, without interfering with 
normal N.Z.E.D. use of the line. 
s. Facility with which emergency plans could be implemented: 
There were several cases where relief measures were achieved where 
normal circumstances might require three years or more for approval. Three 
examples follow: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Mayfield manual exchange was envisaged as being replaced eventually 
by automatic exchanges at Mayfield, Ruapuna and Lismore. With the 
recent advent of crossbar switching equipment in New Zealand it 
became practicable to consider a change from this plan to one in 
which exchanges would not be required at Ruapuna and Lismore. A cost 
comparison was prepared in this office in two days. This showed that 
an exchange at Mayfield alone was the preferred scheme. Within 
another day, telephoned acceptance of this scheme was received from 
Head Office, and relief cabling to accord with this could then be 
proceeded with. 
Negotiated agreement between the N.Z.E.D. and Post Office for short 
term use by the Post Office of the line between Lake Lyndon and Cass 
was accomplished at local office level within a few days. 
Undoubtedly, negotiation between Head Offices for longer term use 
has occurred since. 
Operation of a Christchurch to Springfield U.H.F. radio link was 
achieved quickly as described earlier in this report. Normally quite 
a long time would elapse between a proposal for such a system and its 
being brought into operation. Many sections of Engineer-in-Chiefls 
office would be involved before a decision to proceed would be made. 
The Director-GeneralIs office would then be involved in site selection 
and acquisition and roading to the site. Actual site purchase would 
be passed over to Ministry of Works and Development. If a particular 
building design was decided upon, detailed plans might have to be 
drawn up. 
6. Reliability of 192 lb copper-clad steel conductor: 
Wherever this conductor was installed on recently erected poles it 
was found to be immune from direct damage attributable to snow loading and 
wind. The failures recorded, e.g. on the Lake Lyndon line, resulted from 
trees, etc., falling across the line. 
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Where this conductor had been installed on existing poles of some age 
(and it had been erected in the section Mt Somers to Hakatere on some not 
very good poles), the line did fail under snow loading and wind. In these 
cases however, conductor breakages did not occur but pole failures did. 
(Other conductors failed badly in the conditions of this storm. The 
150 Ib G.I. wire was generally old and in the main was erected on old poles. 
The 200 Ib copper was on generally good toll lines, though many of the 
poles were old. The 70 Ib cadmium-copper generally failed, whether on good 
or poor poles.) 
7. Availability of additional V.H.F. communication equipment: 
The holding of an emergency V.H.F. mobile set system (by Head Office) 
was well justified by the use put to it following this storm. In view of 
the inadequacy of normal vehicle allocation of V.H.F. sets in an emergency 
like this it was fortunate some sets were available on hire from Tait. It 
was perhaps more fortunate that sets were available on loan from Pye, as it 
is believed the owner may not be retaining these. The latter were loaned 
without charge. 
Consequences in relation to programmed and other works 
I. Cutover date changes: 
Cutover of the Mt Somers and Springburn exchanges had been planned 
for the end of September. As described earlier these were brought into ser-' 
vice within a few days of the storm. 
Cutover of Kirwee was being planned for the end of August. This was 
deferred to 17 September. 
Cutover of Cust was being planned for November/December. Lack of 
sufficient cable required its deferment and cutover was achieved on 
1 April 1974. 
Other exchanges, planned generally for cutover during 1974, could 
experience some deferment, if full cable supplies are not received. 
Cutovers planned in other districts may also have been deferred as a 
result of loss of cable to snowstorm relief works in this district. 
II. Subsequent shortages of cable: 
The shortage of cable for important works in Christchurch City may 
in part be attributable to an extra burden having been placed on the cable 
manufacturer as a consequence of usage following the storm. 
Similar situations may exist in other districts. 
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Dedication of staff 
Staff required to work in the field on restoration work had to do so 
in very arduous conditions of low temperatures (particularly in the first 
few days following the snowfall) and wet situations. They did this with 
great dedication and resourcefulness. 
Many staff, involved in restoration work in a wide variety of 
capacities, worked long hours and many days without interruption. 
Appreciation of the work of field staff was widespread and was 
expressed in many letters of commendation. It was also acknowledged in a 
unique way at Oxford where the Local Businessmen's Association provided 
an evening function for Post Office and Power Board employees who had 
worked on restoration in that area. 
Conclusion 
General conclusions only are considered here, and any specific 
recommendations that should be made would be dealt with outside this report. 
The most obvious lesson to be taken from this storm is the immunity 
to damage that can be achieved by having all-underground or near all-
underground reticulation for subscriber networks, such as applied at 
Glentunnel and in the nearly completed reticulation at Mt Somers and 
Springburn. Adoption of such networks had been adequately justified on 
other grounds but events in this storm have added to that justification. 
Residents still on aerial line have been quick to seize this point 
also and letters have been received from a number requesting that their 
aerial lines be replaced with cable in areas where work is proceeding in 
preparation for automatic service. 
The vulnerability of general open-wire line undermines arguments 
adopted recently for retention of some outer sections of open-wire line 
(where an automatic exchange network is being provided) on the grounds 
that such line should be satisfactory for another five or so years. The 
case for doing the whole job properly at the outset is strengthened by 
recent snowstorm experiences. 
Where open-wire line must be used it can be expected to withstand 
this type of storm if constructed in 192 lb copper-clad steel, on good 
poles. The 70 lb cadmium-copper conductor should not be used in such cases. 
The Post Office therefore has the techniques available which enable 
snowstorm-immune networks to be provided and it can look forward with 
currently planned development to having fairly good coverage of vulnerable 
areas with such networks in the next few years. 
Power Boards however are not so favoured and herein lies the chief 
danger the Post Office may have to face in the future, namely loss of mains 
power at automatic exchanges. This opens the question whether standby 
power at rural exchanges might be justifiable (in some cases) or again 
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whether a vehicle capable of travel over snow should be acquired. The 
rural exchanges (existing and proposed) in Christchurch district are on or 
near to main roads and in the event of snowstorms, reasonably early 
clearing of these roads by Local Bodies could be expected. There would not 
appear to be much justification therefore, for acquisition of a snow 
vehicle for the purpose of reaching these exchanges. Justification could 
however exist for other types of installation e.g. microwave and V.H.F. 
stations in higher country in this and other districts and also perhaps 
for gaining access to rural exchanges in other South Island districts. 
Finally the degree to which mobile V.H.F. radio sets were obtainable 
in this storm might not be achievable in the next. A more liberal normal 
allocation could be justified. 
Regional Engineer's Office, 
Post Office, 
Christchurch. 
NEW ZEALAND POST OFFICE, TIMARU 
Heavy snow started falling in the Mackenzie Basin and in a band 
extending to within approximately 12 miles of the east coast on Sunday 
5th August. Heavy rainfall was experienced in coastal areas. 
The storm abated towards evening on the 6th, though there were still 
squalls of snow and rain on the 7th. 
The first indications of damage to Post Office plant came on Sunday 
night at about 9.00 p.m. when all junctions to Lake Tekapo U.A.X. were 
reported lost. 
By 9.30 a.m. on the 6th it was apparent that damage was extensive 
and the emergency organisation was set in action. 
At this stage the following junction/trunk routes were disabled: 
Lake Tekapo-Fairlie 
Ashwick Flat-Fairlie 
Albury-Fairlie 
Fairlie-Timaru 
Partial outages were experienced on the following routes: 
Clandeboye-Temuka 
Mt Cook-Fairlie 
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Staff despatched to effect repairs were greatly hampered by deep snow 
on many roads. Technicians were unable to get to Ashwick Flat U.A.X. to 
intercept outward calls until Tuesday morning. 
By Tuesday evening main roads were cleared and all junction routes 
had some circuits operational. 
Restricted progress could be made on subscriber line repairs at this 
stage because of deep snow in all side roads. 
Approximately 500-600 subscribers were without service initially, 
mostly as a result of aerial line damage, though of the order of SO were 
affected by cable faults in Fairlie and Hilton, the cable faults being 
caused by power contacts. 
Subscribers were restored progressively by temporary wlrlng laid on 
the snow or strung on fences and poles. By Monday 13 subscribers were 
given service and permanent restoration was underway. 
At 9 a.m. on August 6th all V.H.F. services from Mount Studholme 
station were reported lost, because power lines were broken by snow. An 
attempt to provi~e an emergency power supply was unsuccessful due to the 
conditions prevailing. No access was possible by any means that day and 
weather precluded the use of a helicopter until August 8th. 
On August 6th at Waitohi Microwave Station all mains power was lost 
but emergency plant was in operation. On August 9th at 1.50 p.m. fuel and 
a mechanic reached the station utilising N.Z.E.D. resources. 
Signals faded due to a buildup of snow over a building housing an 
aerial for the Timaru-Twizel U.H.F. radio junctions. However, the 
junctions were maintained by landline. 
Considerable difficulty was experienced at all stations as road 
access was blocked and a great deal of effort was made by various means to 
gain access. Circumstances were abnormal as most of the available 
resources were concentrated on the recovery and feeding of stock. 
Staff were loaned to this district by Invercargill, Dunedin and 
Christchurch districts. Their work, together with that of the local staff, 
was the subject of favourable comment from the South Canterbury organisa-
tions and subscribers affected by the storm. 
Total costs are expected to be in the order of $150,000. 
P.B. Keys 
District Engineer 
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Section 3: Damage to Fences and Buildings 
Catchment Authorities have commented on the type of damage 
done to fences by the snow. 
The Earthquake and War Damage Commission has prepared a 
report on damage to buildings. A note on repair costs from 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fairlie, is included. 
An engineer of the Ministry has studied the reasons for 
building failure and made recommendations for its avoidance in 
future. 
North Canterbury Catchment Board 
South Canterbury Catchment Board 
Waitaki Catchment Commission 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fairlie 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Lincoln College 
NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD 
SNOW DAMAGE TO RETIREMENT FENCES 
The southerly snowstorm during the period 5-7 August 1973, when snow 
fell to a depth of 3-4 ft and drifts much deeper, caused severe losses of 
stock (20,000 sheep and 500 cattle died between the Rakaia and Waimakariri 
rivers; Department of Agriculture survey figure, cited from Christchurch 
Star, 24.9.73). The New Zealand Forest Service reported losses of about 
one million cubic feet of sawlogs where the trees were fairly close to 
being milled in Canterbury State Forests (Press 8.9.73). Some buildings 
collapsed under the heavy-density snow and there was extensive damage to 
electric power and telephone poles and wires. This snow fell in a compara-
tively localised area between the Kakanui Mountains in the south to about 
the Hurunui River in the north and mainly on the foothills and eastern 
ranges and light falls only occurred further inland, e.g. Cass, about 
6 inches. 
In the North Canterbury Catchment Board District from the Glenfalloch 
run on the south bank of the Rakaia River to the Puketeraki Range in the 
north, this storm was classed as unusually severe and catastrophic in the 
damage that was caused. 
The considerable damage caused to the 42 miles 68~ chains of retire-
ment fencing is tabulated in the summary appended. All these fencelines 
have been walked by two men between 17.9.73 and 4.10.73, and they recorded 
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the damage. Avalanches of snow from mountain slopes or avalanches of snow 
from basins that swept down gullies and burst the fences, caused the real 
and major damage to the fences. Apart from the specific damage caused by 
the snow avalanches, the wires in the remainder of the fences have been 
slackened and require re-straining and broken wires joined. In the three 
sections of the Lake Coleridge fence of 16 miles 17 chains, the single 
barbed wire was broken in 163 places and for the six No.8 wires there were 
175 breaks. The many more breaks in the barbed wire leads to questioning 
the use of barbed wire at all, on this score only. The location of the 
fenceline was initially decided and agreed upon by both the runholder and 
staff and in all cases the runholder was satisfied with the location of the 
fenceline. The internal fences of the runholders have also suffered 
serious damage. Despite the damage to the retirement fences in this 
catastrophe, apart from two possible comparatively minor amendments, the 
local decision is to replace or repair the fences on the present lines. 
The 26 chains of fencing designed by the N.Z.A.E.I., Lincoln College, 
in two separate locations suffered no avalanche damage and stood up to the 
test equally as well as the customary iron fences. The 12~ gauge wires 
were broken in three places and will require joining and re-straining and 
one tie-back secured. The 12~ gauge wires have stood the snow pressure 
and temperature changes in the field equally as well as No.8 wire. 
Repair Costs 
The cost of the materials to repair the damage is estimated to be: 
Heavy T irons 
Intermediate T irons 
Standards 
Galvanised wire No. 8 
Labour: 
19 at $3.85 
464 at $1.85 
1332 at $0.72 
65~ cwt at $15.50 
73.15 
858.40 
959.04 
1015.25 
$2905.84 
The number of days required to repair the damage and re-strain the 
fences is particularly difficult to estimate. This type of work requires 
two men experienced in hill country fencing and a fit pack-horse. It is 
proposed to tender the work on an hourly basis. 
Estimated Cost: 
Materials 
Labour, transport and pack-horse 
Total 
Say 
$2905.84 
2000.00 
$4905.84 
$5000.00 
The Board considers this damage to be caused by a catastrophic event 
and the repair is not normal maintenance of the fences. In such circum-
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stances an application is made for $5,000 to repair the damage within three 
months. 
ESTIMATE OF MATERIAL FOR REPAIR OF SNOW DAMAGE TO RETIREMENT FENCES 
Retirement Length No. of Avalanche New Material Total 
Fence in Strains Damaged Required Material 
Chains Fence ---------- Cost 
------- HTI ITI STDS No.8 
Total No. of cwt. 
Length places 
in 
chains 
Brooksdale 407 40 6 2 34 66 2!z 149.17 
Red Hills 
Brooksdale 201!z 19 2 3.70 
Kowai 
Castle Hill 412 38 16 3 2 34 127 6 255.04 
Lake 398 35 47 10 3 102 326 15 667.47 
Coleridge 
Section I 
Lake 439 41 61 10 5 121 331 18 760.42 
Coleridge 
Section II 
Lake 460 42 54 12 3 113 298 16 683.16 
Coleridge 
Section III 
Ben More 198 20 17 5 6 37 105 6 260.15 
Mountain 
Ben More 121 12 4 19 ~ 24.96 
Pass 
W.F. Gerard 98 12 4 10 ~ 4 18.48 
Mt Torlesse 346 36 44 1 47.18 
Glenfalloch 168 18 12 ~ 4 26.08 
Snowdale 180 17 1 6 ~ 4 10.05 
TOTAL 3428!z 330 201 42 19 464 1332 65!z $2905.84 
SOUTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD 
SNOW DAMAGE TO FENCES 
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(1) "Soil Con" type fence has demonstrated its superiority over the 
conventional-type fence to withstand the rigours of exceptional snow-
fall, in nearly every case inspected. 
It has ability to sustain damage with minimal effect comparatively 
(mainly broken wires and pulled staples) and requires little labour 
and cost to repair. 
"Flexible" type fences with the ability to flex or even collapse 
under excessive load conditions could have real merit in certain 
situations and these aspects certainly call for further evaluation. 
(2) Driven posts proved superior to hand rammed posts on hill, in 
resisting damage by wrenching and lifting. 
(3) Where fences are sited across or at the toe of slopes subject to snow 
shift and/or avalanching, wires must be attached on the downslope side 
of posts,' using non-barbed staples. 
(4) Where posts are installed in positions subject to lifting stresses, 
more attention will have to be given to ensure they are adequately 
tied down. 
(5) Under exceptional stress, overall, No. 8 gauge wire seems just as 
susceptible to breakage (at strain points mainly)as 12~ g. H.T. wire. 
(6) In rigid type fencing construction, waratahs are better able to with-
stand downslope stress due to snow ioading than are flat standards. 
(7) Adequate clearance must be allowed when the holes in standards are 
punched, whatever the gauge of wire being used, to allow longitudinal 
movement of the wire when in situ. 
(8) Tie back and/or stay installation, regardless of type, are critical 
to fence performance under stress and cannot receive too much atten-
tion. 
(9) On all types of hill fences, intermediate strain points must be 
stayed (or tied) against both the direction of strain and direction 
of slopes (gravity). 
(10) Evidence shows that the barb has influenced fences collapsing by 
bringing them well beyond the point of stress by being attached to 
all uprights. Barbed wire should therefore not be used on sections 
of fence prone to heavy snowfalls. 
Where fence collapse has not occurred, the barbed wire has stretched 
to a surprising degree between all uprights, making re-straining a 
time-consuming and costly operation. 
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(11) Where soft ground is traversed, standard and "T" iron footplates 
should be installed on all steel fences to reduce the chance of 
sinking under snow loading and to improve fence stability. 
(12) Siting of fence lines is of paramount importance; in many cases it 
was a significant· feature in reducing the damaging effects of even 
this exceptional snowfall. 
(13) Netting fences have demonstrated a surprlslng ability to withstand 
the effects of exceptional snow loading and in the two cases 
inspected (on the hill) damage was minimal. 
(14) Wire Strainers: 
There appeared to be a definite link between broken wires and Hayes 
P.W. Strainers. These aids require further evaluation. (The now 
unavailable "Wylie" (or Donald pattern) wire strainers used in the 
Clayton retirement fence were far superior in this respect.) 
(15) Crimping of the top No. 8 wire could be looked at as an alternative 
to barbed wire, as a means of giving a measure of rigidity to steel 
fencing. 
1. General 
H.H. MacDonald 
Soil Conservator 
WAITAKI CATCHMENT COMMISSION 
SNOW DAMAGE TO FENCES 
(Kurow-Hakataramea Area) 
Damage occurred where snow drifted to depths of approximately 3 ft 
or more, especially in hollows. In some instances, damage also resulted 
from avalanches. 
2. Types of fence, and damage sustained 
2.1 A netting fence on "Round Hill", 5 waratahs per chain, no intermediate 
posts, 36 in. netting, 1 barb. Waratahs and netting bent under the 
weight of snow, and barb occasionally broken. Waratahs straightened 
and barbed wire rejoined without excessive difficulty. 
2.2 "Mt Otekaieke" A new fence of 6 x 12!z gao wires and 2 barbed wires, 
1 post and 5 waratahs per chain. No damage, in spite of extensive 
drifts. 
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2.3 "Hunters Hills" 6 x 8 gao wires and 1 barbed wire, 1 concrete post 
and 5 waratahs per chain. Only one length of about 5 chains has 
been severely damaged, with broken wires and bent waratahs. 
Occasional broken wires along the remainder of the fence. 
2.4 "Mt Aitken" Recently erected conservation fence of 6 x 12!z gao 
wires and 1 barbed wire, 1 post, 1 waratah and 6 droppers per chain. 
Moderate damage from broken plain and barbed wires. 
Minor damage only to a loosely strained old type fence of 6 x 9 gao 
wires and 1 post and 5 standards per chain. 
2.5 "Mt Florence" Moderate damage to a recently erected conservation 
fence of 6 x 12!z gao wires and 1 x 3 in. barb, 1!z posts and 5 
waratahs per chain, particularly along ridges. The barbed wire in 
several places was broken at each waratah, and plain wires at one or 
two points in each strain. Posts and waratahs remained upright and 
intact. 
2.6 "Moorland Farm" Subdivisions No.8 wire as badly affected as 12!z 
gao under 3-4 ft of snow. Tightly strained wires broke at joins or 
where bent sharply, e.g. at concrete strainers. 
2.7 "Glen Cary" and Highland Farm Settlement Boundary No.8 wire failed 
in a new fence of 6 x 8 gao plain wire, 1 barb, 2 posts and 6 
threaded droppers per chain. Plain wires broke at staples and joins, 
and staples were pulled out or broken. Barbed wire broke more 
frequently than plain. 
2.8 "Waikora" A conservation fence of 5 x 8 gao plain wire, 2 x 3 in. 
barbs, 1!z posts and 5 waratahs per chain. Both barbs on several 
lengths broke at each waratah. No. 8 failed under extreme pressure, 
at joints or where bent round sharp edges. 
2.9 "Kinbrace" 
(a) 8 x 12!z gao plain wire, 2 posts, 8 wooden droppers, stapled, 
per chain, slight damage only - no wires broken - the fence 
was slackened and required only re-straining. 
(b) 7 x 10 gao plain wire, 1 x 3 in. barb, 1 post, 6 waratahs 
per chain. Regular breaking of both plain and barbed wires 
at waratahs. 
3. Summary 
(a) Overall 
snow. 
been a 
on the 
damage has been surprisingly light, in view of the depth of 
Variation in the weight of snow, i.e. water content, may have 
contributing factor, together with the effect of topography 
depth of drifts. 
(b) Barbed wire has suffered the most damage. 
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(c) There are few netting fences in areas of deeper snow, and these 
suffered little damage. 
(d) 12~ gauge wire performed equally as well as No. 8 especially if not 
strained too tight. 
(e) In all situations, there was little damage to posts or waratahs, 
except in the case of netting fences mainly supported by waratahs. 
P.A. Hurst 
Assistant Soil Conservator 
EARTHQUAKE AND WAR DAMAGE COMMISSION 
As this snowfall was abnormal, damage to buildings was accepted by 
the Commission as being extraordinary disaster damage and assessors were 
not required to submit individual structural reports for all damaged 
buildings. 
Claims made on the Commission as a result of this snowfall involved 
some 327 farm properties and just on 600 farm outbuildings. The cost of 
claims for farm outbuildings and their contents amounted to $200,000. 
Although the loss under many claims was not great, 46 percent did involve 
payments exceeding $500 and a few individual claims exceeding $5,000. 
This Commission is concerned at the demands being made on the Disaster 
Fund for damage to farm outbuildings. This concern does not stem from the 
number of claims being made on the fund by the farming sector, but because 
of the number of claims which must be declined on account of sub-standard 
construction, lack of maintenance and repair or injudicious site selection. 
Under the Earthquake and War Damage Act, the Commission has authority 
to meet claims for storm damage to insured property, only in a case where 
such damage is extraordinary disaster damage as defined by legislation. 
This means not only must damage be the direct result of a storm of an 
abnormal and unforeseen nature and extraordinary effect, but also the 
damaged structure must meet an acceptable standard of construction, 
repair and maintenance so as not to be over-exposed to the risk of damage 
by wind, or snow. 
Where a storm is of such violence that well constructed and well 
maintained structures are damaged along with the not so robust, all losses 
will qualify notwithstanding the not so robust are usually far more exten-
sively damaged. However, where there is no real evidence of extraordinary 
storm conditions, only too frequently it is found sub-standard construction, 
lack of maintenance or inadequate foundation anchorage to be the reasons 
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certain structures fail and adjacent buildings are unscathed. 
Although local authorities have no control over post-construction 
repair and maintenance of farm outbuildings, nevertheless the Commission 
does feel some local authorities fail in what must be their duty to 
applicants for building permits. Frequently when a claim for damage to a 
not-so-old structure is declined because of sub-standard construction or 
inadequate ground anchorage, the defence is that a permit was issued and 
the structure passed by the building inspector. The owner obviously 
treats the issue of a building permit as a certificate of storm worthiness. 
Although a Council may have adopted the minimum standard expressed under 
Chapter 11.2 of N.Z.S. 1900 as the building by-law for farm outbuildings, 
it is quite clear in some cases that due consideration is not being given 
to ensure all facets of the structure meet minimum requirements or 
because of siting, these minimum requirements are adequate for wind and 
snow load to which the building is to be subjected. 
Prefabricated commercially produced steel-framed structures are a 
problem. Produced to be competitive, they are designed to meet minimum 
requirements, but only for average exposure. It is evident little consid-
eration is given tO,this when siting these structures. 
The Commission naturally would welcome any move to upgrade the 
building code for farm outbuildings, but also feels a firmer stand by local 
authorities in enforcing and policing building by-laws is desirable as a 
protection to many for their folly. One who fails to adequately maintain 
and repair his buildings deserves no sympathy. 
J.L. Gill 
Secretary 
COST OF REPAIRS TO STRUCTURES, FAIRLIE DISTRICT 
The total estimated cost of repairs of buildings and fences from 
68 replies to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries survey of the 
worst snow affected areas of Allandale, Cattle Valley, Sherwood, 
Ashwick Flat and Orari was $65,620. 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
SNOW DAMAGE TO FARM BUILDINGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the first week of August 1973, inland Canterbury and North 
Otago suffered a heavy snowfall which caused widespread loss of communica-
tion and serious stock losses. The damage to buildings was not of 
immediate concern and it was indeed remarkable that little disruption was 
caused to rescue operations by buildings collapsing on essential equipment 
such as tractors and bulldozers. 
The damage caused to farm buildings by the snowfall prompted a 
closer look at the capacity of buildings to withstand snow loads. 
The current code requires a design snow density which is less than 
typical of New Zealand values and it contains no information on design snow 
depths. A proposed amendment has been drafted to include such information 
and also data on the effect of the building shape. 
2. THE EXTENT OF SNOWSTORM DAMAGE 
2.1 The August 1973 storm - Canterbury and North Otago 
The storm was confined to a narrow band with the heavier falls 
occurring at the top of the Plains and extending only 15 kilometres or so 
into the foothills. Snow depths on open paddocks were as great as 1.5 m 
with depths of 0.5 to 1.0 m being typical in the areas where the majority 
of the damage occurred. Some people considered this snow to be wetter, 
and so denser than usual, but the density probably was not significantly 
greater than would be expected of snow at this altitude. 
Claims made on the Earthquake and War Damage Commission as a result 
of snowfall involved just on 600 farm buildings. The 1973 cost of claims 
for the buildings and their contents amounted to $200,000. A survey of 
120 farms in the Darfield area showed that of the 66 farm buildings which 
suffered structural damage, 30 percent of the failures caused damage to 
contents. 
2.2 Earlier Falls 
Previous to the August snow, the most recent snow event was in 
November 1967. The information collected by a team from the Ministry of 
Works and Development Hydrological Survey on snow depths and densities 
has been used in this report. Haybarns on 18 high country runs were 
substantially damaged and roofs on several woolsheds suffered partial 
collapse. 
In 1945, 0.34m of snow fell at Christchurch, Ashburton and Timaru, 
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and in 1895, 1.0 m of hard packed frozen snow layover much of the South 
Island. In addition, many lesser but yet damaging falls have been recorded. 
2.3 Types and Causes of Failures 
Many buildings were damaged to such an extent that it was impossible 
to deduce their initial mode of failure. The only member in a structure 
which is necessarily under-designed for a given load is the first member 
in the structure to fail at that load. From this first collapse, extra 
load will be thrown onto neighbouring members, so collapsing these. 
The types of failures were: 
1. Web failure in steel lattice truss - Lattice trusses are a very 
popular form of construction for haybarns and implement sheds in the 
areas visited. Consequently, we saw many failures in these trusses. 
In most cases, the web mamber in compression nearest to the truss 
end failed by buckling. These web members are generally of 13 mm 
(~ in.) round steel bars which are quite inefficient as compression 
members. The end web member failed first as according to theory and 
illustrated in Fig. 1. There were also odd examples of tension 
failures where the weld parted due to lack of penetration. 
2. Top chord failure in steel lattice truss - Two examples were inspected 
of compression failure within the top chord (see Fig. 2). These were 
in gable roof trusses with so called "snow braces" which imparted 
high chord forces in the vicinity of the snow brace connection. 
3. Timber beams failing in bending - Inadequately sized purlins were 
common within this category. Also, some lines of timber were of very 
low grade with many large knots. 
4. Timber frames with inferior joint details - e.g. Roof trusses with 
three or four 75 mm (3 in.)nails at the heel joint. 
5. Old timber structures with rotten or borer infested timber - These 
were reduced to a heap of broken timbers and twisted iron. 
6. Superficial damage - On the vast majority of buildings within the 
snow zone, spoutings were torn off as the snow melted and gradually 
slid down the rooft, even when the spouting was fitted with snow 
braces. However, the spouting on one woolshed escaped damage by 
being placed slightly below the line of the roof. See Fig. 3. It 
did not have snow braces fitted and was reputed to be effective in 
catching rain water. 
A factor which contributed to the collapse of some buildings was 
the shape of their roof. Two different methods of overload were 
observed. See Fig. 4. 
(a) Change in roof pitch. e.g. Lean-to's built on the side of a gable 
roof. The snow slid off the gable onto the lean-to which caused 
excessive compaction and depth of snow. 
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(b) Change in roof height. e.g. Two gable roofs built end-to-end but 
at different levels. A snow drift built up in the eddy formed by the 
drop in the roof line. 
2.3.1 The Strength of Two Common Structural Members 
Tabulated below are the strengths of two structural elements, a high 
proportion of which failed. 
(a) 150 mm x SO mm (6 in. x 2 in.) radiata pine purlins at 1 m (3 ft) 
centres and 4.6 m (15 ft) long. Dead load: 0.5 mm (26 g) corrugated 
steel. 
(b) 13 mm (!z in.) round steel web of 300 mm (12 in.) deep lattice trusses 
which are spaced at 4.6 m (15 ft) centres and are 6.1 m (20 ft) long. 
Dead load: purlins and corrugated iron as above. 
Density of snow: Chap 11.2 
Probable figure 
1 kN/m3 
2 kN/m3 
Working Stress values were extracted from the building codes. These 
working stresses are derived by applying safety factors to the average 
strength of the material; hence the Probable Strength Values. 
Compression Web 
Purlins of truss 
Working Stress 8.2 MPa 83 MPa 
Maximum snow pressure 0.44 kPa 0.39 kPa 
= 0.44 m @ 1 kN/m3 0.39 m @ 1 kN/m3 
0.22 m @ 2 kN/m3 0.20 m @ 2 kN/m3 
Probable Strength 17 MPa 140 MPa 
Maximum snow pressure 1.00 kPa 0.74 kPa 
1. 00 m @ 1 kN/m3 0.74 m @ 1 kN/m3 
0.50 m @ 2 kN/m3 0.37 m @ 2 kN/m3 
E. EXISTING BUILDING CODE REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR PITFALLS 
The following are extracts from the draft and current codes relevant 
to the design for snow loads -
DZ 4203/302 Cl.3.4.2 (Draft code to replace NZS 1900 Cl.8.24): 
Roofs and verandahs shall be designed for snow loads in localities 
where snow is prevalent. Snow loads need not be assumed to occur simul-
taneously with the live loads given in Table 2. Snow loads shall be 
assessed at 0.1 kPa for each 0.1 m of fresh snow (6 psf for each 1 ft), and 
the design depth of snow shall be based on local records and to the approval 
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of the engineer. 
N.Z.S. 1900 C1.11.2.5: 
Where snow is prevalent and the roof is less than 45 degrees pitch, 
the live load on roofs shall be assessed at 0.1 kPa for each 0.1 m of 
fresh snow and the design depth of snow shall be based on local records 
to the approval of the engineer. 
Two criticisms of the above clauses are: 
(a) The information on snow densities is quite erroneous and relates only 
to high-altitude continental snow. It has been discovered in recent 
times that the low densities associated with this type of snow are 
extremely rare in New Zealand. For snowfalls in the 0 to 1000 m 
altitude range, and of a sufficient depth to cause damage, the 
density in New Zealand is approximately twice the code value, i.e. a 
specific gravity of 0.2. 
(b) There is no information as to the design snow loadings to be used in 
a particular region for a particular shape of building. The building 
code is the obvious place to present such data, as has been done for 
wind loads in the new draft code. 
Any amendment* should be placed in Chapter 8 as well as affecting 
Chapter 11.2 because concern has been expressed that exposed beams and 
timber trusses for domestic construction are not being designed to with-
stand sufficient snow load. This problem is new as the traditional house 
framing is generally over-designed. 
4. PARAMETERS IN THE DESIGN FOR SNOW LOADS 
4.1 Maximum Snow Depth to be Expected Once in Fifty Years 
A fifty year recurrence interval has been chosen, as this period is 
used for selecting a design wind speed. The New Zealand Meteorological 
Service has produced a map of this snow depth (see Fig. 5). From this map 
local bodies may adopt more definite boundaries to snow zones. The map 
represents the best estimates available from all the data accumulated by 
the Service since the middle of the last century. However, because 
measurement of maximum snow depth and its density pose considerable prac-
tical problems, the values are subject to appreciable error. 
The depths shown on the map apply to flat open ground and make no 
allowance for the effects of snow drift. 
Some areas of the country, for example Fiordland and inland Westland, 
are particularly difficult to deal with due to lack of information. In 
such areas the map is liable to large errors and design depths should be 
taken from the map and modified by local experience. 
* (For details of proposed amendment refer Pinnell, G.C. 1974: Snow Damage 
to Buildings, N.Z. Agricultural Engineering Institute Internal Report 48. 
pp 34.) 
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4.2 Effect of Shelterbelts 
Shelterbelts have a strong but not necessarily predictable effect on 
snow drifting. The porosity of the shelter together with the orientation 
of the wind (with respect to the shelterbelt) have a strong influence as to 
where the snow is swept and deposited. 
As an indication of the increase in loading caused by snow drift, the 
Canadian code increases the ground snow load by a factor of up to three 
for snow drift onto the lower level of a multi-level roof. The upper roof 
could be considered as the shelterbelt although the shelterbelt is partially 
permeable and not directly analogous. 
4.3 Shape of Building 
The Canadians have done a considerable amount of research in this 
field and it has been recommended that their treatment be adopted in 
New Zealand. 
4.3.1 The effect of roof pitch on wind and snow load 
In general, if the pitch of a roof is increased: 
(a) snow load decreases 
(b) wind load increases to a peak around 100 to 300 and then decreases 
again. 
People frequently enquire as to the pitch at which balance occurs 
between wind loading on the one hand and snow loading on the other. There 
is no general solution to this question but the table below gives some 
specific examples. It tabulates values of open field snow loads which 
produce the same total load (dead plus imposed) as a wind of 44 m/s basic 
wind speed (an average exposure condition). 
Table 1 - Open Field Snow Loads which Produce the same Total 
Load as a Basic Wind Speed of 44 m/s 
Roof 
Pitch 
All Sides Enclosed One Long Side Open Canopy Roof (open sides) 
00 
50 
100 
150 
200 
300 
45 0 
600 
Load 
(kPa) 
0.39 
0.44 
0.59 
0.59 
0.34 
0.34 
0.55 
2.06 
Depth Load 
(m) (kPa) 
0.20 0.78 
0.22 0.83 
0.30 0.98 
0.30 0.98 
0.17 0.59 
0.17 0.59 
0.27 1. 03 
1.03 2.74 
Depth Load Depth 
(m) (kPa) (m) 
0.39 0.74 0.37 
0.42 0.89 0.44 
0.49 1. 02 0.51 
0.49 1. 18 0.59 
0.30 1. 32 0.66 
0.30 1. 48 0.74 
0.51 
1.37 
(For assumptions used to derive the above table, refer Pinnell, C.C. 1974: 
Snow Damage to Buildings, N.Z.A.E.I. Internal Report 48. pp 34.) 
Failures in a Steel lattice Truss 
STEEL LATTICE TRUSS 
i T = Tens'ion C = Compression 
BENDING MOMENT ( Beam analogy) 
~ ~ 
-----------------
Chord forces are hIgh where bending moments are high 
SHEAR FORCE (Beam analogy) 
Web member forces are high where shear forces are high 
WEB BUCKLI NG 
CHORD BUCKLI NG 
Bottom chord buckled or truss end rotated 
FIG. 1 
Failure In a Gable Roof-truss with 
Snow Brace 
Truss end rotated 
FIG. 2 
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~Routing. details 
Spouting with snow brace Spouting below roof line 
FIG. 3 
Effect of Roof Sha~e 
Snow slid off gable 
Wind eddy 
~TI 
Change ; n slope of roof Change in height of roof 
FIG. 4 
Shed damage on High Peak Station. 
- G.C. Pinnell 
FIG. 5 
Maximum Snow Depths to be Expected Once in Fifty 
Years. (Based on data 1862 to ~973 inclusive.) 
- N.Z. Met.Serv. (Tomlinson & Edie). 
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Collapsed lattice truss caused by buckling of every second 
round steel member under compressive load. High Peak 
Station. 
- G.C. Pinnell. 
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4.4 SNOW DENSITY 
The determination of snow density is the subject of much debate. 
Some factors influencing the density of freshly fallen snow are air and 
ground temperature, the depth of snow and hence the compaction under its 
own weight, and the amount of rain caught by the snow. In addition, a 
most significant factor influencing snow density is the period elapsed 
since the time of fall. Melt, water is absorbed by the snow until the 
snow becomes saturated after which the excess water is passed through to 
the ground. The density at this latter stage is often quoted but is of 
no significance to us. We are interested in the maximum snow load which 
occurs before any melt water is lost. The accompanying map of snow depths 
is based on maximum snow depths i.e. depth of snow immediately after the 
storm. The density of the snow must be taken at the same time. 
Rain often accompanies snowstorms and causes high snow densities 
and the density figure chosen is based on storm events when there was 
some rain. 
Data collected on snow densities in November 1967 when the Hydrolo-
gical Survey took readings on the upper Canterbury Plains and Mackenzie 
Basin regions has been analysed in Appendix A and a snow specific weight 
of 2 kN/m3 (12.5 pcf or 0.2 specific gravity) is recommended. Although 
this snowfall was unseasonal it is not necessarily atypical because it 
occurred during a period of low air temperature. 
The work of Morris and O'Loughlin (1965) supports this value. At 
1400 and 1700 m altitude in the Craigieburn Range they found densities 
of freshly fallen snow varied from 0.11 to 0.20, the average being about 
0.15 specific gravity. 
A yardstick often used by farmers on the Canterbury Plains is that 
180 mm (7 inches) of snow is equivalent to 25 rnrn (1 inch) of water, i.e. a 
specific gravity of 0.14. 
The Canadian code uses a specific gravity of about 0.2, being an 
average between freshly fallen snow and the denser snow lying beneath it. 
Tomlinson (see Met. Service report) states that, "the deepest snow-
falls at low levels have a high specific gravity of about 0.3 while at 
levels above 1000 m the specific gravity is commonly 0.1 to 0.2 It must 
be emphasised that these figures are based on limited data". 
4.5 REDUCTION IN LOAD CAPACITY FOR SNOW LOADS 
The draft loading code favours the strength method rather than the 
working stress method of design. As in the present code (Chapter 9), what 
are effectively the allowable stresses are increased between one quarter 
and one third for rare events such as wind and earthquake loads, irres-
pective of the material of construction. Snow loads are not included, but 
it is rational (although not conservative) that they be included. 
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There are probably two reasons for increasing the allowable stresses 
for rare events: 
(a) Human nature allows an increase in the acceptable rate of structural 
failure if the cause of failure is an 'act of God'. 
(b) In timber design, the duration of loading is of significance; the 
load carrying capacity of timber being substantially higher for 
short duration loading. 
On both points, snow could be included with wind and earthquakes to 
warrant a reduced ultimate load capacity. An explanation to the load 
factors proposed for the load capacity equations in Section 3.2 may be 
found in the Commentary to ACI 318 - 63: "Strength design procedures differ 
from working stress design in that dead and imposed loads are not simply 
added. It is logical and reasonable to apply a greater safety factor to 
imposed loads than to dead load, since dead load can be determined with 
reasonable accuracy whereas imposed loads are often more uncertain and 
subject to change during the life of the structure". 
The duration of the load factor for timber will probably be taken 
into account in the revision of Chapter 9.1 on timber design. See tables 
2 and 3. 
Table 2: Duration of Load Factors for Strength (Timber Design) 
Duration 
of Load 
Permanent 
Medium 
Short 
Brief 
Instantaneous 
Multiplying 
Factor 
1.00 
1.25 
1.35 
1.50 
2.00 
Type of Load or Application 
Dead loads. Imposed loads that are 
essentially permanent, e.g. on storage 
areas. 
By law, live loads greater than 2.0 kPa 
excluding those caused by crowd loadings. 
Frequent snow loads. 
By law, live loads up to 2.0 kPa and crowd 
loadings. Infrequent snow loads. 
Concrete formwork. Vehicle, pedestrian 
and livestock loadings. 
Wind, seismic, erection and maintenance 
loads. 
Impact loads. 
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Table 3: Duration of Load Factors for Deflection (Timber design) 
Multiplying factor when 
stress is: 
Duration of Load 
long* 
long* 
short** 
Initial 
Moisture 
Content 
26% or more 
18% or less 
any 
Bending or 
Compression 
3 
1 
1 
* Long duration means a load duration of 12 months or more 
** Short duration means two weeks or less 
Tension 
1.5 
1 
1 
Factors for intermediate conditions may be obtained by linear interpolation 
5. THE INCREASE IN CAPITAL COST OF CONSTRUCTING STRONGER BUILDINGS 
The total cost of construction should take account of not only the 
initial (capital) cost but also 
(a) the maintenance cost 
(b) the cost of losses, both material (the building plus its contents) 
and human, in the event of failure 
(c) the general social inconveniences resulting from failure. 
In this respect it is short-sighted to only consider the capital cost, 
but nevertheless the builder is most concerned with this factor. 
In the same way, a building should be designed such that the risk 
of failure from the various loading conditions (e.g. snow, wind) are to 
the best of knowledge, equally unlikely. This is a necessary requirement 
for loaning institutions and insurance companies to demand. 
To give an indication of this increase in capital cost, a shed able 
to withstand a 2.5 times increase in snow load was designed and costed. 
This shed was of steel lattice truss construction with three sides enclosed, 
which is typical of implement sheds erected on the Canterbury Plains. The 
cost increase amounted to $100, which represents a 4 percent increase in 
its erected cost. 
6. RECORDING FUTURE SNOW EVENTS 
The data presented on the regional distribution of snow loads for 
inclusion in the code is of necessity prone to significant error because 
of insufficient data. It is therefore desirable that all future events 
occurring within habitable areas be recorded. Also of value would be a 
frequency evaluation of storm events to allow a semi-probabilistic design 
0' 
.' 
Rafters wh{ch failed on Mr F. Byme'S property, 
springburn~ 
_ G.C. Pinnett . 
The buckling of round steel members in the lattice truss 
allowed the truss to sag and draw inwards the front and 
end columns. 
:... C.C. PinneZl. 
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method. This would enable a low life, low occupancy rate building to be 
designed for say a once in 20 year storm event. 
A request will be made to the local District Soil and Water Officer 
or the Ministry of Works and Development for the recording of future events. 
The other facet of design snow depth, prone to considerable error, 
is the effect of snow draft around shelterbelts. Whether engineers like 
it or not, farm buildings are erected adjacent to shelterbelts and will 
continue to be. It is logical that an investigation as to the effect of 
snow drift should be incorporated with regional snow surveys as recommended 
above. 
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APPENDIX A 
DETERMINATION OF THE SNOW DENSITY FOR THE SOUTH 
CANTERBURY SNOWFALL OF NOVEMBER 1967 
Hydrological Survey made runs of the November 1967 storm, measuring 
snow depth (by probing) and water equivalent (with snow samplers). Chinn 
extrapolated the measured snow depth back in time to estimate the "depth 
at (the end of the) fall". A few measured snow depth depletion rates were 
used as a basis of the extrapolation. 
From Chinn's results, the snow density at the end of the fall was 
calculated by dividing the measured water equivalent (assumed to Qe equal to 
the water equivalent at the end of the fall) by the estimated depth at the 
end of the fall. "The water equivalent varies with time, but the water 
equivalent depletion curve normally has an initial flat for an undefined 
period when melt water is absorbed,by the snow instead of being passed 
through into the ground. The time taken for the snow to become saturated 
with liquid water or 'ripe' is dependent on many factors including melt 
rate, snow depth and type of snow", (from Chinn). Fig. B.1 shows no marked 
banding of measurements made on different days, which indicates that 
little melt water had been lost from the snow. 
Fig.B.1 is a plot of the calculated specific gravity of snow at the 
end of the fall compared with the depth of snow at the end of the fall. 
At snow depths which cause damage, the specific gravity ranged from 0.10 
to 0.20. The scatter of points at low depths indicates the greater 
inaccuracy of measurement (Chinn quotes up to 25 percent error)- and the 
greater significance of rain falling into the snow. 
The quantity of interest to designers is load, i.e. depth times density 
or water equivalent. Fig.B1 shows the general trend of decreasing density 
as depth increases, a trend which tends to even-out the snow loading through-
out the region. This effect is probably due to differing air temperatures. 
Water equivalent for this storm had quite a strong dependence on 
altitude as can be seen in Fig.B2. In the under-350 m altitude range 
35 percent of the survey measurements exceeded the equivalent of 0.6 m 
(2 ft) snow depth at 1 kN/m3 (6 pcf) which-is the commonly used design 
figure; none exceeded 0.7 m snow depth at 0.2 specific gravity. The 1973 
storm was more severe and there were large areas covered in 1 m or more of 
snow. 
On the basis of the above analysis, a specific gravity of 0.2 for 
heavy falls of snow at low altitudes is considered a safe design value. 
G.C. Pinnell 
Assistant Engineer, 
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, 
Lincoln College. 
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APPENDIX B 
FIG. Bl: Snow Loadings (pascals) for Differing Snow Density 
Snow Depth Specific Gravity of Snow 
(cm) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
25 245 490 735 980 
50 490 980 1470 1960 
75 735 1470 2205 2940 
100 980 1960 2940 3920 
150 1470 2940 4410 5880 
(After Tomlinson A. I.) 
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Section 4: Effect on Trees 
The Forest and Range Experiment Station of the Forest 
Research Institute of the New Zealand Forest Service, and 
Canterbury Conservancy staff of the Service have reported on 
damage to indigenous and exotic trees in the storm. 
Unpruned, close plarrted Pinus radiata growing at lower 
altitudes on lee slopes suffered worst. Pruned, spaced trees 
and other species fared better. 
New Zealand Forest Service, Forest Research Institute, 
Protection Forestry Division 
Ashley Forest 
Omihi Forest 
Ashley and Omihi Forests 
Mt Thomas Forest 
View Hill Forest 
Kakahu Forest 
Summary of Damage 
NEW ZEALAND FOREST SERVICE, FOREST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
PROTECTION FORESTRY DIVISION 
1. GENERAL 
Heavy snow fell on the 5th and 6th August 1973 on the Upper Canterbury 
Plains, parts of the Mackenzie Basin and Inland Otago. The greatest depth 
over the Plains was 3 feet (90 cm) at Methven, but it was double this depth 
in some areas, as at Sherwood Downs, 16 km north of Fairlie. In these 
areas it was the heaviest snow since July 1945. 
The wet adhesive snow was driven by a strong south-easterly wind. 
This caused extensive drifting and consequent damage to power and telephone 
lines, fences and farm out-buildings. In spite of large rescue operations, 
thousands of stock were lost. 
2. GENERAL WEATHER SEQUENCE 
During the first two days of August an anticyclone was centred east 
of the South Island, while low pressures to the north and north-east brought 
fair weather to most of the country. A depression over the North Tasman 
Sea then moved southward across the country with associated troughs of low 
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pressure which brought fairly general rain. As this depression moved away 
to the east, another over the South Tasman Sea moved on to the South Island, 
bringing rain to the West Coast on the 4th. This depression moved slowly 
north-eastwards over New Zealand on the 5th and 6th, while an anticyclone 
developed over Campbell Island. There was general rain in the cold, strong 
south-easterlies and h~avysnow was reported on the Upper Canterbury Plains 
and in parts of Inland Otago. The depression moved slowly north-eastwards 
over the next two days. On the 11th, 12th and 13th a depression over the 
North Tasman Sea move~ southwards, (warmer northwest winds locally), and 
became complex, while a belt of high pressure over Tasmania extended towards 
Campbell Island. The weather was milder with general rain. 
3. CRAIGIEBURN WEATHER SEQUENCE 
Sunday 5th 
Monday 6th 
Tuesday 7th 
Wednesday 8th 
Thursday 9th 
Friday 10th 
4. AVALANCHES 
Overcast with rain turning to light snow at approximately 
1600 hrs. Snow continued to fall for the rest of the day. 
Overcast, heavy snow all day. 15 cm depth at 900 m a.s.l. 
by 0900 hrs, and approximately 65 cm by 2145 hrs. Main 
Road closed. 75 cm of fresh snow at 1550 m a.s.l. by 
1100 hrs. 
Overcast; snow fell intermittently throughout most of the 
day and became steadier during the early evening. 90 cm 
depth at 900 m a.s.l. by 0900 hrs, and 125 cm depth at 
1550 m a.s.l. by 1100 hrs. Snow started to break at 
approximately 2100-2200 hrs. 
Fine and sunny; became partly cloudy later in the day. 
110 cm of snow at 900 m a.s.l. at 0900 hrs and 130 cm 
of fresh snow at 1550 m a.s.l. at 1100 hrs. 
Overcast during the early morning, later clearing .. Strong 
north-westerly winds. Clouded over in the afternoon with 
showers of rain. 
Partly cloudy to overcast with heavy rain until 1800 hrs. 
Warm northwest weather occurred soon after the snowfall, giving rise 
to a large number of avalanches in the Craigieburn and adjacent areas. On 
the morning of the 12th, numerous small avalanches were reported in Camp 
Stream, Alans Stream, Mt Wall and the head basin of Broken River. The 
larger avalanches were: 
(a) Centre Creek (Harper-Avoca) - On the 6th September an inspection of 
Centre Creek catchment revealed that between the lower Centre Creek 
gorge and the main forks 15 large snow avalanches had descended 
directly into the stream bed, depositing large quantities of snow, rock, 
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soil and beech forest debris into the valley bottom. Possibly as 
much as 4 hectares of forest had been annihilated by snow.avalanches 
in the low and mid-catchment. The valley bottom avalanche debris 
bridged the stream along approximately 30 percent of its length 
between the gorge and the forks, and had formed massive piles of 
snow and rock up to 9 metres high through which the stream had cut 
tunnels. The battered body of a young red deer, which obviously 
had been swept down-slope by a snow avalanche, was found in the 
stream bed near the main ,forks. 
(b) Craigieburn Valley - A large avalanche came down across the end of 
the Craigieburn Valley Ski Club road. It destroyed the bottom 30-40 
metres of the main rope tow and annihilated the small wooden toll 
hut, the remains of which were scattered over a distance of several 
hundred metres. Scrub vegetation and mature mountain beech trees 
were either uprooted or flattened along either side of the valley 
bottom below the road. The total length of the avalanche was 
approximately 1100-1300 metres. 
(c) Broken River, Ski Basin - A slab avalanche came down off Nervous Knob 
and terminated a few tens of metres from Palmer Lodge. The avalanche 
track was approximately 350 metres long. 
5. CANOPY DAMAGE 
The combination of wet adhesive snow and the heavily branched, 
flattened or rounded crowns of the mountain beech trees caused a high 
percentage of the snow which fell in forested areas to remain in the canopy. 
This resulted in extensive canopy damage in some areas along the frontal 
country. 
Several transect lines were sited in both the Coopers Creek and 
Blowhard track areas. These showed approximately 30 percent of the vegeta-
tion had been damaged to some degree, 6 percent of which could possibly be 
considered permanent. 
The percentage of damage to the mountain beech in the Craigieburn 
area was less than the 6 percent sustained during the November 1967 snowfall. 
Forest and Range Experiment Station 
Rangiora 
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SNOW DAMAGE: ASHLEY FOREST 
(Extract from report by Forest Ranger A.W. Henderson) 
Definitions: 
Toppling, refers to trees which are up to 1.8 m tall and are able to be 
corrected by tying back with twine - Area: 55.2 ha. 
Partial snow damage, refers to areas of larger trees which have been bent 
over, or broken off, but leaving sufficient straight trees to make a crop -
Area: 86.1 ha. 
Total snow damage, refers to almost complete throw or breakage with very 
few, if any, straight trees. None of the stands in this survey is salvage-
able because of the small nature of the trees concerned - Area: 27.8ha~ 
The majority of. snow damage occurred on the north-east and easterly 
aspects, but was not confined to these areas. Compartments 153, 115 and 
114 all have a south-east aspect, and suffered considerable snow damage. 
SNOW DAMAGE: OMIHI FOREST 
(Extract from report by Officer-in-Charge B.D. Haggitt) 
The snowstorms of the 6th and 7th August 1973 left several areas of 
damage in Omihi Forest. 
In the 1960-63 age group the damage was generally breakage of the 
trees at the 3 to 5 metre height level with some uprooting. 
Toppling occurred in the 1968-71 age group, the former now being too 
large to tie back up. 
Damage density has been divided into three groups: 
Heavy: 
Moderate: 
Areas of almost total destruction where replacement of the 
crop is necessary - 32.5 ha. 
Areas where produce could be obtained and where crop replace-
ment may be necessary depending on the number of remaining 
undamaged stems - 28.1 ha. 
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Light: Areas where final crop stocking is still standing and no treat-
ment is necessary - 8.4 ha. 
SNOW DAMAGE: ASHLEY AND OMIHI FORESTS 
After several delays because of unsuitable weather, a flight was made 
over Ashley and Omihi Forests on 20 August 1973 to assess the extent of 
snow damage. The observers were Forester Viles, Forest Ranger Clemett and 
me. 
Conditions were sufficiently good to cover Crofts Block in Omihi 
Forest and good enough to determine the nature and broad extent of damage 
in Ashley Forest, but not good enough for mapping. 
In Omihi Forest the damage is characteristically in large d~ives 
in Cpts 14 and 18 and with a high percentage of damaged trees in the 1959 
P. radiata in Cpt 15. 
In Ashley Forest the damage to stands established prior to 1955 
consisted largely of tops, usually containing most or all of the crown being 
broken out. Younger stands had been blown over and they include some with 
trees 2.4 m high or more which will be too large to straighten artificially 
and which will be unlikely to straighten naturally. In some areas up to 
4 hectares, all trees have been damaged, but there is a large total area 
of damage which is less intense. Some of it, however, will be intense 
enough to enforce clear felling. Damage seems to be heaviest on the north 
faces and more so in the lower slopes. These are the lee faces in this 
southerly storm. 
Under the flying conditions prevailing it was not possible to map the 
damaged areas. Mapping from the ground is not feasible, and except for 
extremely favourable light conditions, photography will not be suitable for 
mapping. In the older stands definition of extent and intensity of damage 
is readily assessed by the occurrence of the freshly exposed wood where the 
top has been broken off. The most suitable method for mapping will be from 
an aircraft on a fine day mapping compartments individually. The ideal 
aircraft will be a helicopter; but although one has been sought from 
Alexander Helicopters for other purposes it may not be available until too 
late. The alternative which would be readily available would be a light 
aeroplane, preferably low wing. This would be rather less satisfactory 
and probably nearly as costly overall, but one should be available much 
sooner than a helicopter. The stands should be mapped as lightly, moderately 
and heavily damaged. 
Without this mapping, there is no estimate of the area involved or 
the volume of timber. It is to be expected that sapstain will appear 
rapidly in spring, especially in the younger trees. 
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Cpts 2, 4, 14, and 15 appear the worst damag~d of the older stands. 
Cpts 34 and along the eastern boundary are also badly damaged, but salvage 
in these may be complicated by the presence of slash from thinning to waste. 
The youngest stands, where toppling has occurred, may best be mapped from 
the ground. 
Damage by breakage has been severe in the beech forest and over 
confined areas it has been severe in Douglas fir stands. 
There is a suggestion that the current schedule of pruning with very 
early thinning has had the least damage. The worst affected area was a 
woodlot on the Makerikeri belonging to J.D. Stewart which was completely 
thrown. This was on a very steep lee slope and was awaiting first pruning. 
APPENDIX 
Heavy Damage 
Moderate Damage 
Light Damage 
H.H. Wilson 
Principal Forester 
Ashley Forest Spacing Trial 
Degree of Damage 
(Stems Broken) 
75-100% 
25- 75% 
<25% 
(After Viles D.) 
SNOW DAMAGE: MT THOMAS FOREST 
Spacings (ft) 
4x4, 6x6, 8x8 
10x10 
12x12, 16x16 
(Extract from report by Forest Ranger R.V. McAslan) 
(1) Location of Damage 
Snow damage was confined to P. radiata of the 1970-71 plantings. 
Most damage occurred on the lee of the ridges where drifts of between ten 
and fifteen feet deep were encountered. 
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(2) Type of Damage and Corrective Measures 
The damage sustained was mainly to trees from 3 m to 4.5 m in height. 
The majority had a lean of 300 or more, but can be recovered with tying 
and pegging. (Area - 125.2 ha) 
Indigenous Forest Area 
Considerable snow damage, occurred in the indigenous forest area. 
All walking tracks were closed by fallen trees and broken branches. 
158 
SNOW DAMAGE: VIEW HILL FOREST 
(Extract from report by Acting Officer-in-Charge R.L. Bull) 
A survey of Compartments 1 and 2 was carried out to ascertain snow 
damage to unpruned trees as compared with pruned trees. The following are 
the figures obtained. 
COMPARTMENT 1 
Pruned Unpruned 
Undamaged 
Toppled 
Broken tops & branch damage 
750 
9 
19 
96% 
1% 
3% 
1148 
92 
126 
Damage was evenly distributed throughout the Compartment. 
Total damaged area 4.8 ha. 
COMPARTMENT 2 
84% 
7% 
9% 
Pruned Unpruned 
Undamaged 
Toppled 
Broken tops & branch damage 
755 
18 
14 
95% 
3% 
2% 
1004 
91 
58 
87% 
8% 
5% 
Damage was evenly distributed-throughout except for slightly heavier 
toppling in swampy areas along the creek line some of which were 
toppled previous to the fall of snow. 
Total damaged area 6.8 ha. 
COMPARTMENT 3 (unpruned) 
Undamaged 
Toppled 
Broken top & branch damage 
284 
75 
15 
Damage was confined to swampy areas and top western corner. 
Straightening was carried out in these areas. Some damage also 
occurred in Compartments 5, 7, and 9 in which straightening 
operations were carried out. 
Total damaged area 9.3 ha. 
76% 
20% 
4% 
159 
SNOW DAMAGE: KAKAHU FOREST 
(Extract from report by Officer-in-Charge R.J. Blackmore) 
Introduction 
This report outlines the areas of established P. radiata damaged by 
the recent snow storm in Kakahu Forest. Damage at Pioneer Park and 
Raincliff is only slight and is confined to P. radiata in Compartments 603 
and 611. 
Areas damaged in Kakahu can be interpreted as follows: 
Areas either flattened or leaning due to snow damage which can be 
remedied to varying degrees, according to age-class (72.8 ha). 
Those areas flattened and considered at this stage to be beyond 
salvage, replanting'is feasible in some areas (29.1 ha). 
Areas of generally older trees with top and branch damage which 
already proposed silvicultural work will help to remedy (15.7 ha). 
Snowfall 
Most of the snow fell on and between the nights of 5th and 6th of 
August 1973 and was recorded in Geraldine in the form of rain, as 76.2 mm 
(3 in.) and 86 mm (3.38 in.) respectively. 
Forest staff and workmen could not reach Kakahu Forest on the 6th 
due to snow and only managed to reach the Kakahu Forest HQ on Wednesday 
8th, where approximately .3 m of snow lay on the lawn. 
Now that access has been obtained to most of the forest (20th August 
1973) it is apparent that over most of Kakahu a cover of .45 m - 1.2 m of 
snow occurred with drifts in places up to 2.4 m or more. 
The snow was driven before a strong S.W. wind (up to Force 7 
estimated) which resulted in a thin coating of snow on ridge tops and a 
heavy drift-type build-up on the upper northern faces. 
Waitohi Hill and the Kakahu River area in Nelson's block was on 
21 August not thawed sufficiently for salvage to start. Aerial obser-
vation indicated snow depths of about .15 - .3 m with drifts in gullies 
far in excess of this. 
South Block, that being south of SH 79, received only a light fall 
in comparison to the higher country of Nelsons', Main, and Curtis blocks. 
Damage in the South block is relatively light, although apart from 
standing up newer planted areas in C.30, the damage sustained in the older 
stands is likely to be permanent. 
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Details of Damage 
A helicopter was hired to map the areas affected onto recent aerial 
photography. I consider this method ideal for an initial inspection of 
damaged areas and well worth the cost of $130. My only regret is that a 
machine was not available sooner and that more time wasn't spent in 
detailed mapping. 
A wait of 12 days for a machine could not be avoided, however, as 
most machines were busy on urgent stock rescue work, which was still 
continuing even after the removal of the Government subsidy to farmers. 
A total of 72.8 hectares of P. radiata require propping and tying 
operations to ensure sufficient crop trees remain. This area could 
increase drastically to include all of the last two years, and this year's 
new planting unless a heavy thaw occurs within the next few days. 
Areas of 5-8 year old P. radiata, considered at this stage to be 
beyond salvage, total 26.6 hectares. Of this only that area in Compartments 
19b and 10 should be considered for re-establishment attempts. 
No detailed inspections of other species have been carried out but 
impressions are that Douglas fir, poplars, and Corsican pine have sus-
tained little or no damage. 
Thuja plicata in Cpt 15 has suffered minor damage, due mainly to 
heavy gorse toppling onto it under the weight of snow. 
This species, where damage is likely to affect amenity values, has 
already been propped. 
SUMMARY OF DAMAGE 
Canterbury Forests 
Damaged Light Moderate Heavy 
(ha) (ha) (ha) 
Omihi 8.4 28.1 32.5 
Ashley 55.2 86.1 27.8 
Mt Thomas 125.2 0 0 
View Hill 20.9 0 0 
Kakahu (Geraldine) 72.8 15.7 29.1 
-----
282.5 129.9 89.4 
(698 ac) (321 ac) (221 ac) 
161 
Section 5 Effect on Livestock 
Photo: Christchurch Press 
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Figures received from district officers of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries show that at least 133,193 sheep and 
4,137 cattle died as a result of the storm whether directly 
from snow, or from strong winds and heavy rain. Several farms 
in Ashburton County lost 20 percent or more of their stock but 
most in the snow zone lost about 5 percent. 
Two factors contributed to the large numbers of deaths. 
First, there had been an unusually dry summer and autumn in 
much of Canterbury, and ewes generally went into the winter in 
light condition. Second, pre-lamb shearing was taking place on 
Plains properties, many with inadequate post-shearing feed 
because of the lack of autumn growth. 
Pre-Lamb Shearing 
Pre-lamb shearing of ewes will undoubtedly help lamb survi-
val in adverse weather because ewes normally go to shelter -
but they must have shelter available and enough food to cope 
with their increase~ demand for heat and to suckle the lamb. 
Newly-shorn sheep on full feed can stand temperatures down to 
-SoC (23 0 F, or 90 F below freezing) before they need to draw on 
body reserves in order to survive, but the temperature need only 
fall below 20 0 C (68 0 F) for shorn sheep on a maintenance ration 
to have to draw on their reserves (see Review 14, p.5). In 
extreme weather such as this snow, shorn ewes, especially 
machine-shorn ewes, are at a disadvantage because they cannot 
keep as warm as fully-woolled ewes. Two of the few factors in 
their favour are their greater mobility and lower weight of cold 
wet wool to carry. In other words, in bad weather pre-lamb 
shearing favours the lamb but not the ewe, while leaving ewes 
woolly may favour the ewe but not the lamb. In very bad weather, 
lamb survival depends on ewe survival and the woolly sheep is 
more likely to be the survivor. As so many farmers found out, 
pre-lamb shearing is a gamble which pays off in lamb survival in 
most winters if sheep have enough food and shelter; but the 
combination of food shortage, exposure, and heavy rain or 
driving snow is lethal. 
Stock Health 
In Malvern County, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Animal Health Division sent four teams of staff to visit 72 farms 
on 14th August and three teams on 15th to inspect stock and 
advise on animal health and treatment. Elsewhere Ministry 
veterinarians and tnstructors gave similar service. Federated 
Far~e.r~."persuaded the Government to fly from the North Island 
by R.N.Z.A."F. Hercuies some 3,000 gallons of glucos~-sp~ring 
substances such as Ketol and Glysatone. 
1:63 
Future Precautions 
J . L . Baker, a veterinarian, writing in ,Journalo! Agriculture, 
July 1974, says that ewes died not only from pregnancy t,0xaemia 
(or sleepy sickness) and chills and pneumonia but also from milk 
fever. He recommended that any sh,e,ep which app'ears listless 
should be drenched at once with a substance such as Ketol or 
Gl y sat 0 n e an din je c ted wit h ,c a 1 c i urn bo r 0 g lueo n ate and pe n ic i 11 in. 
Ample supplies of these chemicals should always be held by 
farmers in snow-prone regions~ 
Stock Losses 
Disposal of Carcasses 
Comments by Individual Farmers 
STOCK LOSSES 
(a) North of Waimakariri River (Rangiora M.A.F. office) 
over 6,000 sheep 
SO cattle 
(b ) Malvern County (Darfield t><1.A,. F. afficle) 
27,000 sheep 
500 cattle 
(c) Ashburton County (Ashburton M.A.F. ,o'ffice) 
28,550 sheep 
594 cattle 
(d) Geraldine County (Timaru M.A.f. offi.ce) 
7,000 sheep 
2,000 cattle 
(e) Mackenzie County (Fairlie M.A.F. office) 
20,743 sheep 
543 cattle 
(f) Waimate County (except Hakatarame.a Valley) 
21,000 sheep 
250 cattle 
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(g) Waitaki County and Hakataramea Valley 
12,900 sheep .. 
200 cattle 
(plus estimated; 10,000 pre-lamb shorn ewes killed by driving· rain 
in North Otago) 
Total sheep deaths 
Total cattle deaths 
133,193 
4,137 
Note 1: Figures are losses caused by the storm whether from snow or rain. 
2: These figures were obtained by survey and therefore are as accurate 
as has been possible to get. However because of non-replies and 
deaths after the survey, losses probably would have been greater 
than the figures given. 
3: 1974 lambing percentages fell due to damage caused to ewes by the 
snow. The check also reduced the level of conception of cows and 
hence increased barrenness in herds. This will be reflected in the 
1975 cal ving .. 
(Estimates compiled by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries) 
DISPOSAL OF CARCASSES 
(1) Scattered carcasses on faces and out of way places - only gather what 
is accessible and obvious. 
(2) All other carcasses in creeks, public eye, drinking places and adjacent 
to buildings, tracks etc. to be gathered up. 
(3) Burying on farm - (i) Above water table 
(ii) Aw~y from dririking creeks or intakes 
(iii) 4 feet cover on top and pressed 
(4) Take to designated pits. Open from 1-4 p.m. each day or by arrange-
ment. An Animal Livestock Instructor will be present and will service 
two pits. 
(5) Half cost of digging and covering (hiring of plant) will be paid by 
Crown, half by users. Farmers provide their own cartage to pits. All 
receipted invoices for costs to be submitted to Emergency Committee. 
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(6) Overall di$posal to be organised and supervised by Animal Health 
staff. 
(Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Darfield) 
COMMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL FARMERS 
(Survey by Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Darfield) 
Any animal crushed or damaged did not recover, but she~p buried up to 
8 days were O.K. 
Some ewes· lambing were short of milk. Some lambs born dead look as 
though they had died some time before birth. 
Six ewes with wool .out, loss of condition and aborted lambs. Some 
others not so bad. 
Most stock died or were killed afterwards from the setback. Cold 
winds as well a contributing factor. 
Twenty-five ewes with sleepy sickness put on cleared break of oats 
and grass and. all but 10 recovered. One cow death caused by exposure from 
calving in cold weather. Calf deaths - 1 hard birth - 4by exposure, 20 
slipped. 
Twelve ewes died due to sleepy sickness - 30 ewes recovered. 
Animals went down with sleepy sickness owing to shock and no greenfeed. 
Twenty calves still recovering, very thin but no losses. Hay being bought 
to sustain them. 
About 50 percent of badly affected sleepy sickness cases did not 
recover after being dosed with glycerine. 
Four sheep appeared to suffer from shock but recovered on greenfeed. 
Number of lambs born dead about 2 weeks after storm. 
A number of ewes had premature dead lambs (mostly twins). 
More sheep recovered from sleepy sickness than usual. 
About half dosed sheep recovered but fairly weak and a few slipped 
lambs. 
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Sheep extracted within first week - about half recovered: ewes found 
later than a week did not recover: some found alive 16 days after snow. 
These lived for about 2 ,days afte'r "rescue. 
',j 
A few dopey, but pretty good recovery, on the whole. 
Segregation of 20 ewes showi'ng pregnancy toxae'~ia symptoms and do~ing 
very effectively with Vet. Club-recommended liquid and feeding available 
greenfeed (autumn sown wheat) saved all but one ewe. 
I ~ " 
One cow with mastitis (weaned). Sheep'havecome through the winter in 
remarkably better condition than I expected following the bad summer and 
autumn. Wool is better than usual and I attribute much of our luck to double 
shearing, making ,sheep I,more mobile;,{X' 'brred :ewes). We :dort't start lambing 
until about 20 September and this must have helped. A few ewes dopey, but 
have saved some with Ketol. 
Some, calves' 'could have d'ied' ow;ingto mother having mastitis.' Sheep 
came right after grazing Tama and oats kept for late winter feed. 
Ewes were pre-Iamb shorn 'and soon improved 'when gras:s"wasavailable. 
The use of Ketol and nuts and good hay and back to turnips as soon as 
possible seemed 'successful. 
When feed and a drench, got to sheep recovery of affected animals quite 
good. 
Recovery good when shorn and put on green feed. 
l" 
Ewes - 120 ~:in poor· condi tioR,"'" "some' will, die. Main inob picking 'up 
well but high abortion :rate. Bad· break in ,woo'!. . \ 
Quite a few slipped lambs but most now recovered. 
Treating cases of sleepy sickness was not very rewarding until we could 
get them, to grass as:well., 
Some recovered quickly. Those that remained dopey or weak for a week 
or more, eventually died. Hoggets were in poor heal~h at time of storm. 
1,- " 
A few ewes showed signs of sleepy" si'eknes's .i.. nearly all recovered 
quickly with Ketol and greenfeed. 
;, 
Many slipped lambs dead. Lambing survival estimated at about 400-500 
from 1300 ewes origina:lly, putt6ram~', Approx~~66percent ewes recovered 
alive have since died or had to be destroyed. 
,'I ,,: 
Only about half lived of those which could not walk when found. 
Recovery generally good. Very little sleepy sickness and no lambing 
difficulties~ The losses weredue;to' sl1eep,being freshly shorn and all were 
those in the extreme cold and wind of the first day of storm. 
Most sheep recovered well if treated for sleepy sickness out of the 
snow. Several sheep aborted and had dead lambs .. 
Very few ewes with sleepy sickness recovered. 
Sleepy sickness was a major problem to overcome, the majority of my 
sheep were affected to a greater or lesser degree, acute and moderate 
cases being treated with Glysatone. ( 
Only a few recovered, sleepy sickness still a problem. 
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Ewes seem weak and are losing condition after lambing. A lot of lambs 
born dead. 
Most of the sheep drowned in creek runnin£ through property. Very 
little sleepy sickness. 
A few recovered but most died. Sheep and cattle mustered from the 
hill some time later had made a good recovery. 
Use of Ketol and greenfeed most important factor. 
Some debil~tation. No abortions. 
I attribute the recovery of a large number of dopey ewes to the feeding 
of grain. 
Thirty-five ewes stuck in icy water for three days wouldn't respond 
to calcium borogluconate, regular Ketol, turnips, hay. Put them in slings, 
we shore them etc, and one lived. 
Being six weeks away from lambing we have not as yet had many cases 
of sleepy sickness but some slipped lambs.. Have noticed four slipped 
calves from cows due on 26 August. Difficult to assess to what extent when 
cattle are running on tussock. 
Pregnancy Toxaemia treated with 'Ketol' and new grass. Good recovery, 
95 percent. 
We would have done more good snow raking, carting water, calcium 
borogluconate and Ketol or a similar preparation than initially carting hay 
I think. 
Treatment was only successful if administered before animals went 
down. 
All cattle brought to station homestead for treatment died. Of 400 
sheep brought to the woolshed, because of sleepy sickness, 240 recovered 
(60%). 
Ninety-seven hoggets smothered in corner of paddock. 106 ewes died 
of sleepy sickness (unable to be fed for 2 days). Could have saved more 
sheep if roads had been opened sooner enabling us access to our tractors. 
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Good recovery after drenching with Glysatone and transported to 
turnips at Darfield. 
Of those that were carted home about two-thirds recovered. 
Four hundred blade-shorn sheep no trouble. Woolly sheep tended to 
get frozen to snow and also some were smothered in snow, not being able to 
move due to sleepy sickness. Unless got to green grass within 2 days then 
chance of survival was :small. They all responded to Glysatone. 
Surviving cows from hill are mostly very thin but remarkably fit. 
Most of the sick sheep recovered. Ewes are not due to lamb till late 
September thus reducing risk of dopiness. 
Very difficult job in 4-5 ft of snow even after 4 or 5 days they 
seemed to recover reasonably well, although all were very dehydrated. 
Fifty animals died through being stuck or smothered during the first 
two days. Remainder died of sleepy sickness before grass appeared. 
Many sheep dug out·of snow drifts have developed severe abscesses -
often fatal. Injection of antibiotic at time of rescue could have saved 
these. About 50 percent of sick animals have so far recovered, there being 
30 ewes -still under treatment. 
Ewes that were treated first week mostly responded to Ketol. 
Sheep are very slow recbvering from severe storm. There are a lot df 
slipped lambs and quite a lot of still-born lambs. 
Ewes going dopey three days after snow - lack of greenfeed - but 
plenty of lucerne hay.- Saved 150-200 with Ketol. Cows died up to 14 days' 
after - pneumonia and dopey - two still will probably die - down and can't 
get up. All dead cows had calved before snow - some up to four week? 
Eight snow blind recovered~ 12 ewes sleepy sickness dosed Ketol and 
put on greenfeed. Four of these lambed dead lambs and died. 
Only sheep caught at early stage of sleepy sickness recov~red. 
Treated by Glysatone. 
Few of those treated fully recovered. 
Most sick sheep died. 
Recovered where able to get greenfeed. Lambing losses unusually high 
although lambing started 7 August. 
Half of the treated animals recovered, still some not fully recovered 
but gradually recovering-on youhg grass. 
Helicopters and snowrakers saved about 100 cows and 150 sheep for 
which we will be ever grateful. Cattle are not as tough as they look, if 
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you don't get them up within 48 hours no amount of dope will do it. Glucose 
and high quality hay seems to be as good as anything: Very fast recovery in 
sheep after the snow, even the ones that went down with pregnancy toxaemia. 
Fifteen sheep died due to sleepy sickness and not snow. Extra hay fed 
out in snow to preve~t further losses. 
Slow recovery - will lose a lot if we don't get good growth in spring. 
Hill hoggets still listless one month later and until growth starts 
we can't do much for them. 
Sheep recovered rapidly when put on turnips. Cattle slower as no 
greenfeed available, only good hay. 
As we had plenty of hay and turnips, losses kept to a mlnlmum. Ewes 
only 10 days off lambing, but in low condition, carrying only one lamb 
helped. 
Have had quite a few with sleepy sickness. Those we got on.to as soon 
as we found them, r~covered after being drenched with Ketol. 
Due to helicopter not arriving, most snowraking and hayfeeding was done 
with hacks and packhorses. 
Few recovered from sleepy sickness although they were drenched with 
Ketol. 
Animals which succumbed to cold never seemed to recover no matter what 
treatment. 
The majority of the ewes affected by the snow later slipped their 
lambs. 
Difficulty with cows producing very little milk. Lambing' only starting 
but appears to be very slow. 
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S~ction 6: Stock Rescue and Government Assistance 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries organised live-
stock recovery and feeding operations through its district ' 
offices at Rangiora, Darfield (temporary office at Hororata), 
Ashburton (temporary offices ~t Methven and Mayfield), Fairlie, 
Timaru (temporary office at Geraldine), Waimate (temporary 
office at Waihaorunga) and Oamaru. In the Mackenzie Country 
and Kurow/Hakataramea Valley areas, Waitaki Catchment Commis-
sion staff helped the Ministry by taking over some local 
relief activities. In the latter district, the Police and 
local Department of Lands and Survey farm manager were also 
active. 
Meetingsof Disaster Relief Committees comprising repre-
sentatives of farmer organisations and of local bodies and 
Government departments involved in relief work were convened 
by Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in north mid-
Canterbury (Darfield), south mid-Canterbury (Ashburton), 
South Canterbury (Timaru), Hakataramea Valley (Kurow) and North 
Otago (Oamaru) .. 
The following reports are from Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries district offices together with reports of some 
Disaster Relief Committee meetings. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Darfield 
North Canterbury Area Relief Committee 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Ashburton 
Mid Canterbury Disaster Relief Committee 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Geraldine 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fairlie 
South Canterbury Disaster Relief Committee 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Waimate County 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Waitaki County 
Hakataramea Valley Area Relief Committee 
Kakanui Area Relief Committee 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Palmerston 
Waitaki Catchment Commission 
Department of Lands and Survey, Highland Farm Settlement 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Climatic Emergency 
Relief 
State Advances Corporation of New Zealand, Climatic Relief 
Assistance 
New Zealand Army, Ministry of Defence 
Royal New Zealand Air Force, Ministry of Defence 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Use of Helicopters 
in Snowstorm, 5-7 August 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Use of Air Services 
in Abnormal Climatic Emergencies 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, DARFIELD 
Snow started falling in this district on the afternoon of Sunday, 
5th August 1973. 
By 9 p.m. power and telephone services were starting to be disrupted. 
The snow was at this stage accompanied by very strong south-east winds, 
and in some areas blizzard conditions prevailed. 
Monday 6th - By Monday morning (6.8.73) eight inches of snow lay 
in Darfield with progressively heavier falls inland to the stage where 
there was more than 3 ft in areas such as High Peak and west of Springfield. 
All power and telephone communications were out of order by this time, with 
poles and wires snapped and twisted over a wide area. 
The snow did not however extend eastwards beyond the Kirwee township. 
Lambing was just starting on the plains in the Darfield district, 
and heavy losses in 'lambs born at this time did occur, but the greater 
stock losses at ·this time were among shorn sheep. Three cases are quoted 
where individual farmers lost 1,000, 500 and 300 ewes respectively. 
On the Monday, I travelled as far as Sheffield on the Main West Road 
and Homebush on the Hororata roads. This was dnn~ hy following the grader 
and was the limit to which I was able to travel. 
At Racecourse Hill, I assisted in digging 400 ewes out of a snow 
drift against a gorse fence. 
Snow was still falling with a very strong south-east wind. 
Tuesday 7th - On Tuesday snow continued to fall, and the wind was 
still strong. During the afternoon I travelled by Landrover to Springfield 
and visited Brooksdale and Ben More Stations which were covered by approxi-
mately 3-6 inches of snow. 
Wednesday 8th - After discussions with the Regional Advisory Officer, 
a fixed-wing plane was ordered from the Central Flying School (piloted by 
J. Reid). I carried out an aerial survey in the area between the Rakaia 
and Waimakariri Rivers. It was established that the snow was very deep, 
and comparatively few stock were observed as many were completely covered 
by the snow. By 11 a.m. an Iroquois helicopter was available from the Air 
Force at Wigram and a further survey was carried out, this time including 
the Waimakariri basin, and landings were made to establish the needs of 
individual properties. The Malvern County Council continued to bulldoze 
and grade roads in the area. 
Thursday 9th - An Iroquois and one fixed-wing plane were utilised. 
The fixed-wing was used by the Livestock Instructor and two runholders for 
spotting stock and I went in the Iroquois, feeding hay to stock. The 
Emergency Committee had its· first meeting (Ministry of Agriculture and 
172 
Fisheries and local chairman of Federated Farmers). At this meeting I was 
appointed co-ordinator. 
Friday 10th - Emergency Headquarters were set up in the Darfield 
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with a sub-branch at 
Hororata to handle volunteer helpers. An extra telephone line was installed 
and radiotelephone links established with Hororata and outlying districts. 
One Iroquois and one private Bell helicopter were working in the district. 
A request was made for help from Army vehicles and men to get to inacces-
sible areas. 
Saturday 11th - Resuce operations continued with three Iroquois 
helicopters being employed for part of the day, dropping hay and men for 
snowraking. The Police and Ministry of Transport were requested to close 
roads in the affected areas. Approximately 200 volunteers were working on 
affected properties having been directed from the Hororata and Darfield 
bases. 
Sunday 12th - Operations continued on the same scale as Saturday, -but 
with two Iroquois and two-Bell helicopters. Roads were again closed and 
the Army was operating four tracked vehicles in the area. Carried out 
helicopter survey whiie men were being picked up in the Iroquois. Again 
200 volunteers gave assistance. 7,000 bales of hay have been offered free, 
and arrangements made t'o move 6,500 head of stock to grazing. 
Monday 13th - Operations continued with two Iroquois helicopters 
and 150 volunteers plus the four Army vehicles. Northwest conditions 
brought about a quick thaw, and flooding was a problem in some parts, i.e. 
Whitecliffs and Waireri Valley areas. 
Tuesday 14th - One private Hughes helicop~er was used for dropping 
men for snowraking and hay drops. Four teams organised by the Animal 
Health Division visited 72 farmers in the affected area and inspected. 
stock and gave advice on animal health and treatment. Some treatment was 
administered on the spot. Arrangements were made with the Malvern County 
Council for the digging of pits and the disposal of dead stock. 
Wednesday 15th - A private Hughes helicopter was used again. Three 
Animal Health teams again visited affected properties. Hay supplies still 
being received and dispatched. Two Army vehicles were still in the High 
Peak area and two in the Waimakariri basin. 
Thursday 16th - Two Army vehicles returned to base from Waimakariri 
area. Two still operating at High Peak and Thur~o. Very good thaw was 
still taking place. Base at Hororata closed down. 
Friday 17th - Pressure eased off at the Darfield base. In the after-
noon I made an inspection of the Whitecliffs area and visited five farms 
in that valley. Estimates of deaths on two properties were as high as 
half the sheep, but on others in the vicinity of 200 each. Cattle deaths 
were also reported. 
Saturday 18th - Visited properties in the Windwhistle, Snowdon and 
High Peak areas and discussed the use of the one Army tracked vehicle still 
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operating in the area. Deaths variable, but estimates as high as half the 
sheep and 30 cows on one property. 
Sunday 19th - Visited properties in the Porters Pass and Waimakariri 
basin. Snow still one foot deep in these areas, but has cleared on 
northerly faces. Thaw shows pattern of drift caused by strong winds while 
the snow was falling'. 
Monday 20th - The last of the Army carriers returned to base from 
High Peak. 
In general stock were weakened by the affects of the storm, and 
comments were made by a number of runholders that the hoggets in particular 
would not tolerate another storm until they had had a chance to pick up. 
It is impossible to get an accurage estimate of overall losses at 
this stage (undated). Generally a good save was made on the flats and 
lower hill country, but it will not be possible to count losses on the 
higher country until next muster. 
There must be some adverse affect on lambing, apart from those lambs 
which were actually lost in the storm. 
A considerable number of dead cattle h~s been observed or reported 
lost. In addition, a number of dead calves has been reported, and the storm 
could have a severe effect on calving percentages. 
One striking feature of the snowstorm was the offer of assistance 
from farmers further down the plains and from other areas. In many cases 
they offered labour, vehicles, hay and grazing and many who offered this 
had already been hardest hit by the recent series of droughts. 
One point worth noting was the great value of bulldozers for clearing 
snow on the flat and easy hill country, to provide access to stock and feed 
supplies. 
In operating the base, the most frustrating point was the difficulty 
experienced with communication and this was in spite of the excellent 
service provided by the amateur radio operators. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Officers should have radiotelephone training and some sets should 
be available within the Department. 
(2) Protective clothing ~hould be located in each office. 
(3) Some training (familiarization) with aircraft and helicopters should 
be carried out - arrangements could be made with the Air Force for 
officers to become familiar with their area and the properties from 
the air and have training in map reading in conjunction with the Air 
Force (this training could also include a nucleus group of say five 
farmers in the area).' 
ll4 
(4) Training in setting up an Emergency Committee (i.e. list of duties 
and arrangement within the office for radiotelephone and two extra 
telephone lines). 
(5) A Landrover should be located in this (Darfield) district. 
(6) Discussions and agreement with Police, Ministry of Transport and 
County Council etc. on emergency procedures. 
(7) Each office should carry a list of contractors and farmers with heavy 
equipment, i.e. bulldozers. 
(8) Familiarization with Army - vehicles and equipment including radio-
telephone. 
(9) Each office should carry a good supply of maps of the area. 
R.L. Bennetts 
Farm Advisory Officer 
Darfield 
Rescue operations High Peak Station. 
- R.L. Bennetts. 
Extract from Minutes of "Central and North 
Canterbury" Area Relief Committee Meeting held in 
yard of Hughey Ltd, Hororata, on 9.8.73 
Definition of the Area 
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On the information available at the time the Committee defined the 
area for the interim only as: 
The whole of the Sheffield Branch Federated Farmers District 
The whole of the Hororata Branch Federated Farmers District 
That area of the Darfield Federated Farmers area west of Darfield. 
The final definition of the area would be decided when reports from 
all areas had been received and at a meeting of the full committee. 
Extent of Assistance 
Mr Barrer (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) described to the 
Committee the assistance available from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
Extract from Minutes of "North Canterbury" Area 
Emergency Relief Committee Meeting held at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Darfield, 
on 16.8.73 
Title of Committee 
Although the area for which the Committee is responsible is mainly in 
Central Canterbury it was felt by the committee that the title 'Central 
Canterbury Area Emergency Relief Committee' could be confused with the 
relief committee operating in the Methven area and it was decided that the 
committee should be known as the North Ca~terbury Area Emergency Relief 
Committee. 
Membership of Committee 
Because of the difficulties in communications caused by the climatic 
conditions the steering committee set up previously with a view to repre-
sentation on the area relief committee were in fact unable to attend the 
meeting. 
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A new membership was therefore drawn up comprlslng representatives 
of Federated Farmers, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the 
State Advances Corporation. 
Definition of the Area 
The boundaries of the area were defined: 
To the South - the Rakaia River 
To the West - the Main Divide 
To the North - the south branch of the Waipara River 
To the East - from the south-Ardlin Road, Derretts Road, Holden 
Road, Bealey Road, Coaltrack Road, McLaughlins Road, 
Kimberley Road, Kimberley Junction Road across the 
Waimakariri River to Burnt Hill then in a line through 
Okuku, Mt Grey and Mt Brown to the Waipara River. 
The Secretary was instructed to inform the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission of the boundaries of the area in case this had any bearing on the 
payment of claims. 
Government Assistanc~ 
The Chairman reviewed the standard assistance set out in Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries Circ. 1972/19 of 25.5.72. 
The following points were made: 
1. Transit Costs - After arrival, aircraft were also used for search 
and rescue, Post Office, and other relief committees, making 
allocation of transit costs to individual farmers impossible. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee recommend to Government that the full 
transit costs of aircraft to the emergency area be met by 
Government. 
2. Hay Cartage Costs - Hay was moved into the area to relieve 
immediate shortages. Most of this hay was donated. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee recommend to Government that the transport 
costs on hay brought into the area b~ met by Government. 
3. Ground Equipment Costs - In many cases the use of ground equipment 
(e.g. bulldozers) was necessary to get to stock and was cheaper and 
more suitable than using helicopters. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee recommend to Government that the conditions 
applying to aircraft be equally applied to hired ground 
equipment. 
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4. . Stock Cartage Costs - The problem in this case was to remove stock 
quickly because of flood conditions caused by the thaw. Stock were 
removed to safe areas and fed hay but should be returned to the area 
by 28.8.73. Those whq sent stock out for ordinary and more pro-
longed grazing should not qualify for assistance. 
s. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee recommend to Government that cartage costs 
both ways on all classes of stock, both sheep and cattle 
moved out of the area because of climatic conditions be 
refunded provided they are returned to the area by 28.8.73. 
Miscellaneous Costs - In the course of the emergency operations 
decisions had to be made on the spot to supply small but important 
items to volunteer labour e.g. ropes, wire etc. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee recommend to Government that miscellaneous 
expenses incurred in the organisation of assistance be met by 
the Government. 
Stock Disposal - The Committee was informed that Government would refund 
half cost of the burial and covering of dead stock in communal pits. 
Mr Diack (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) reported that, apart 
from Whitecliffs, no problems had been encountered in disposing of stock. 
At Whitecliffs difficulty in obtaining a' pit was being experienced. The 
Committee directed Mr Diack to take whatever measures were nec:essary to 
arrange a pit at Whitecliffs. 
Water Cartage - No assistance would be sought. 
Fodder Beet - No assistance would be sought. 
S.A.C. Loans - Mr Perry (State Advances Corporation) distributed copies of 
S.A.C. Circ. 14/1970 of 17.3.70 which set out details of S.A.C. finance 
available in circumstances caused by a major climatic disaster.' 
Publicity - The Committee authorised the Chairman to release to the news 
media (1) details of the recommendations for assistance (2) advice that 
S.A.C. finance could be made available upon application and (3) advice 
that damage to buildings should be reported to insurance companies who would 
advise as to War and Earthquake Damage insurance cover. 
Review Committee - It was suggested that a committee should be set up to 
review all aspects of the disaster and its effects and lay down guidelines 
for any future disaster. 
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Mr A.F. Wright (Federated Farmers) pointed out that this was a topic 
set down for discussion at a Federated Farmers meeting on 21.8.73 and it 
was felt that any further action should be left until after that meeting. 
Extract from Minutes of "North Canterbury" 
Area Emergency Relief Committee Meeting held 
in the ro~ms of Federated Farmers, Armagh Street, 
Christchurch, on Wednesday 26 September 1973 at 2.30 p.m. 
BUSINESS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES 
1. A report in the Christchurch Press on 22 September 1973 quoted the 
Minister of Defence as saying that the full cost of Defence equipment 
employed during the disaster would be met by Government. Information 
sought from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in Wellington 
as to this statement confirmed that the whole bill was chargeable 
in the first instance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
but that 50 percent of transit and on-farm operational costs were to 
be recovered from farmers. Ferry time and reconnaissance were to 
be met fully by the Ministry. 
2. An account had been received from the Ministry of Defence covering 
operational costs. Discussion followed. A difficulty was seen in 
defining liability of both the three disaster regions and individual 
farmers in respect to total Defence contribution. It was resolved: 
That the Committee attempt to gain reference to Air Force operating 
logs so that an accurate assessment of the time spent in each.region 
and if possible on each farm can be made. 
3. The Chairman reported that Government had made available the following 
standard relief measures to storm-affected farmers namely: on the 
transport of hay and straw a transport subsidy of $10 per ton maximum 
and on livestock sent to grazing a refund on the first 100 miles of 
the outward journey only. 
Extract from Minutes of "North Canterbury" 
Area Emergency Relief Committee Meeting held 
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in the rooms of Federated Farmers, Armagh Street, 
Christchurch) on Wednesday 30 October 1973 at 2.30 p.m. 
MATTERS ARISING FROM MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING 
1. Air Force Account Mr Bennetts (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries) reported that he had been in touch with Wigram who 
advised that a detailed breakdown of the Air Force account was 
being forwarded from Auckland. However, to date, it had not been 
received. 
GENERAL 
1. Mr Perry (State Advances Corporation) reported that one enquiry had 
been received re a loan as a result of the storm. 
2. Mr Bennetts read the results of a survey conducted in the area on 
stock loss and other damage during the storm. 
3. The calculation of ferry time for helicopter and surface equipment 
accounts was discussed. The committee directed that Mr Bennetts 
confer with the Chairman and Secretary prior to accounts for 
recovery of costs being dispatched in order that an equitable 
calculation of ferry time be made. 
Extract from Minutes of "North Canterbury" 
Area Emergertcy Relief Committee Meeting held 
in t~e rooms of Federated Farmers, Armagh Street, 
Christchursh, on Friday 7 December 1973 at 11.30 a.m. 
GENERAL: 
Accounts for helicopter work by the Royal New Zealand Air Force and 
private firms had now come to hand. The allocation of ferry and produc-
tion time had been made by R.L. Bennetts,.A.J. Ebert and P.R. Barrer of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Schedules showing the 
allocation of time and the amounts to be charged to farmers were presented 
to the meeting. 
THANKS: 
The various Federated Farmers branch representatives thanked those 
concerned in the running of the committee, and Mr Barrer on behalf of 
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Ministry of Agriculture and Fisherie's thanked Federated Farmers for their 
assistance. 
The Conunittee was disbanded and the meeting closed at 12.30 p.m. 
A heZping hand from Mark Forscutt, Methven. 
- Christchurch Press. 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, ASHBURTON 
MONDAY: AUGUST 6 
Heavy rain fell on the lower part of the County, with snow on the 
top third, starting on Sunday night. Reports on Monday indicated 2 ft of 
snow at Montalto, 1~ ft at Methven, 1 ft at Mayfield and 6 inches at 
Carew. Winchmore received 84 mm of rain and Ashburton 76 mm. The bottom 
half of the County was badly affected with surface flooding. 
Rain continued all day with snow and heavy wind in the top part of 
the County. 
TUESDAY: AUGUST 7 
Rain and snow continued through Monday night and by morning it was 
evident that there was an emergency situation in the County. Although 
there was no real communications with the foothills area, it seemed there 
was some 5-6 ft of 'Snow at the base of the hi~ls. 
The following action was taken on Tuesday morning: 
1. A private helicopter was ordered to meet me (Senior Farm Advisory 
Officer, Ashburton) at Methven at mid-day. 
2. Local Federated Farmers Secretary was asked to call a Disaster 
Committee meeting at 3 p.m. in Ashburton. 
3. An emergency headquarters was set up in Pyne Gould Guinness Ltd 
at Methven by 1 p.m. 
During the afternoon: 
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1. Disaster Committee approved my actions to date. They asked that the 
area be declared a disaster area and requested Government assistance. 
2. Helicopter was commandeered for Search and Rescue, but one 
reconnaissance flight was made over the area. 
3. Decision was made that this was a disaster of major proportions anJ 
every available resource was called in from late in the afternoon on, 
private helicopters and bulldozers especially. This early effort 
put us 24-48 hours ahead of other sup-regions, in rescue work. 
WEDNESDAY: AUGUST - TUESDAY: AUGUST 14 
A full scale emergency organization was set up and operated. Main 
base was Methven with a sub-base at Mayfield, ~ self-contained sub-base 
which had authority to operate as it saw fit in that part of the County), 
and a home base in Ashburton office. 
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At a fairly early stage we had operating: 
4 private helicopters plus an Airforce machine 
16 bulldozers 
27 Army trucks (50 personnel) 
200 volunteer workers 
a large amount of privately owned equipment on a voluntary basis 
By the 5th day~ most properties had been contacted by some means and 
the following operations were also being .organized: 
1. Movement of stock to snow-free areas (200,000 sheep and 500 cattle 
had been moved out of snow areas to date). 
2. Organization of feed (especially hay). 
3. Organization of water supplies. 
Towards the end of the period,killing of badly affected stock and 
disposal of carcasses was also organized. 
By Tuesday, August 14, all bases were closed down and operation 
directed from Ashburton. By this stage, almost all the functions of the 
emergency organization had been taken over ,by other organizations. 
MAGNITUDE OF THE DISASTER 
This would appear a worse snow than in 1945 and would be similar to 
one in 1918. Effect was particularly severe for the following reas,ons: 
1. Unexpectedness of the snow. There was no real Meteorological Office 
warning. 
2. The area worst affected had just come through one of the worst 
droughts ever. Stock were in very light condition and feed reserves 
on farms were low. 
3. Over much of the flat area,3-4 ft deep snow (deeper in drifts), 
made any movement impossible for 4-5 days. Many farmers could not 
get to their haybarns, let alone their stock. 
4. Number of farmers and amount of stock involved. Over 300 farmers 
plus 20 runholders and somewhere in the region of a million sheep 
would have been above the snowline. 
5. Due to the depth of snow and number of farmers involved, assistance 
could not be gi v,en to all until ,about the 5th day. 
6. The slowness of. thaw. Some 14 qays later, 1 ft to 18 in. of snow 
still lay on a number of flat propert~es. 
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Therefore, with the above in mind, I think this could be classed as 
a once in a life-time occurrence. Much worse than a normal disaster (if 
there is such a thing). 
STOCK LOSSES 
Losses on some properties are quite high, several around the 20 
percent mark and the odd one higher. However, generally most farmers 
are in the 5 percent range with a few even lower than this, especially on 
the fringe areas. Total sheep losses in the County would be in the region 
of 30,000 plus 700 adult cattle. 
OTHER LOSSES 
Sheds, fences and trees also received substantial damage. Loss of 
income would be approximately equal to value of stock lost. Total cost 
to the farmers in this County could be in region of $2 million over the 
next 12 months, and the effect would last much longer. Effect on.individ-
ual farmers could v~ry from $1000 to $100,000. 
RELIEF MEASURES 
I consider the farmers' requests for assistance to date very reason-
able. In a disaster of this magnitude, it would be justified in making all 
costs of the emergency operations a charge on Government. 
The tremendous amount of voluntary help in machinery, labour, feed 
and fuel that was donated, showed that this community has helped itself 
and is an area to be proud of. It rates every assistance possible. 
Obviously, with a disaster like this, the main benefit to farmers 
will come from disaster loans from the State Advances Corporation. Interest 
on these loans should be made suspensory for the first 2 years. 
Considerable problems are going to arise when the final costing of 
this operation is done. At times there was a very grey line between 
search and rescue work, County responsibilities and Disaster Committee 
responsibilities. Helicopter hours are relatively well accounted for. 
Bulldozers are only fair due to difficult communications. Army records are 
poor as they tended to do some 50 percent of their own tasking. 
STAFF PERFORMANCE 
Throughout the emergency, all sub-regional staff performed excep-
tionally well and all went up in my estimation. Ian Ritchie who organized 
and controlled the Mayfield base, showed remarkable capabilities for an 
officer with less than 2 years departmental experience. 
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Help from other members of the Committee, farmers and general public 
was also of a high order. G. Robertson, a member of the Disaster Committee 
and Chairman of Methven Federated Farmers, did an outstanding job. 
D.O. Collie 
Farm Advisory Officer 
Mi~Zing cattZe~ no refuge and ~itt~e feed. 
- Christchurch Press. 
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MID CANTERBURY DISASTER RELIEF COMMITTEE 
The Mid-Canterbury Disaster Relief Committee held seven meetings. 
The first was on 7 August 1973 in Ashhurton. 
It approved the action taken by the Farm Advisory Officer, Ashburton, 
in setting up emergency headquarters in Methven. 
The following resolutions were carried: 
(1) Emergency Headquarters ... 
That all of the Ashburton County west of a line drawn from Highbank 
to Lismore and then to Arundel be declared a disaster area. 
(2) Air Assistance ~ 
That immediat~ air assistance be applied for. 
(3) Ministry of Defence -
(a) That the Ministry of Defence be asked to make equipment 
including radio communication and operators available on 
standby. 
(b) That authority be granted the members of the Committee 
stationed at Methven to request all Ministry of Defence 
assistance required. 
(4) That all disaster relief measures available be approved for the 
disaster area. 
At the second meeting on 15 August, Mr Neilson (representing the 
State Advances Corporation) detailed the help which the Corporation could 
offer. Farmers would be required to make individual application to the 
State Advances Corporation and the Committee agreed to publicize this 
throughout the district. 
Relief Measures - The Committee was fully agreed that additional relief 
measures would be essential for farmers follow:i,ng a storm of the magni-
tude experienced. 
The following resolutions were carried: 
(1) Air Assistance -
That approval be granted for the payment 9f all transit time by 
the Government and that farmers pay SO percent of flying time on 
own properties. 
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(2) Ground EquipJll~nt -
That approval be granted for the payment of all transit time by the 
Government and that farmers pay 50 percent of time on own properties. 
(3) Army Operation -
That the full cost of the A~y operation be borne by the Government. 
(4) Stock and Household Water -
That all charges for water supplies to stock and farm households be 
borne by the Government. 
(5) Dead Stock Disposal -
That all charges for the digging of, disposal ,pits including pits 
on individual farms for dead stock be paid by Government. 
(6) Stock Cartage -
That payment of stock cartage costs for stock carried out of the 
disaster area 'and return cartage costs for all breeding stock pro-
vided they are returned to the farm by a date to be specified by 
the Committee be approved by-Government. 
Extract from letter to Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries: 
The Committee 'considers that the granting of the above approvals 
is essential and that the standard relief measures are inadequate following 
the major disaster which has been experienced. There was no warning of a 
storm of such ma'gnitude and no comparisons could be drawn in living 
memory. The area affected has a large concentration of farmers and live-
stock and in the greater part of the area snow to the depth attained 
would never ever be expected • 
. ~ , 
The situation was 'one in which farmers were helpless to help them-
selves ~ normal heavy -farm machinery was useless under the conditions 
during the first four and five days and the only methods of assistance 
which could be employed was either air or the heaviest of bulldozers. 
In spi teof,:-the use ''o'iup to fou:t;helicopters and a large force of 
heavy ground equipment, it was up to five days before emergency assistance 
of any sort could be offered in some areas. 
It is now two weeks since the snow ceased, but a major portion of 
the district is still under deep snow cover. In one area, a helicopter 
is still the only means of access and heavy ground equipment under hire 
is still beingusea,~foi' rfi";"fee'ding: stranded stock. 
Where snow has been cleared, pastures have become waterlogged and 
will receive permanent damage through pugging, following the return of stock. 
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The full effects of the storm will not be known for some time, but 
stock replacement following heavy losses,.purchases of additional feed, 
payment for heavy machinery still required for feeding out and repair work, 
possible pasture renewal, repair. of structural damage, payment for 
veterinary services, purchase of grazing, shelter belt replacement and a 
considerable loss of income over the next few years, will place a very 
serious strain on farmers' financial resources. 
The Conmlittee asks that favourable consideration be given to all of 
the recommendations made. 
The third meeting was held on 28 August. Further resolutions 
were carried: 
(1) Disaster Relief -
Since the previous meeting it had been possible to assess more 
closely the effects of the storm in the area and members were fully 
agreed that further assistance to farmers was very necessary. 
(a) Tax Relief 
That Tax relief under'Section 103A of the Land and Income Tax 
Act be approved and that this relief be extended to permit 
farmers to debit stock losses to their 1972/73 income year. 
(b) Cartage of Feed 
That the cartage subsidy on hay be extended to include grain, 
feed concentrates and root crops. 
(c) Farmers own transport 
That farmers who used their own transport to carry livestock 
be permitted to claim cartage costs. 
(2) Thanks-
That a notice of thanks for all assistance received be published and 
that a letter of thanks be sent to Pyne Gould Guinness Ltd, the 
R.N.Z.A.F., and the Postmaster, Methven. 
Accounts for radios, maps, toll calls and equipment hire were passed 
for payment. 
Extract from letter to Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries: 
Stock losses sustained in the defined area will be in the vicinity 
of 30,000 sheep and 600 adult cattle. Coupled with the large capital loss 
that these figures represent will be the loss of income resulting from 
these deaths by farmers who could be faced with heavy tax commitments. 
188 
The value of structural damage in the area which has been obtained 
by survey, is estimated to be in excess of $250,000. The replacement 
value will add considerably to the financial difficulties of farmers.who, 
from depleted incomes, must also make provision for stock replacement. 
At the fourth meeting, 14 September, very keen disappointment was 
expressed by all members that no extension of standard relief measures 
had been granted following the maj or disaster which. had been experience.d. 
It was resolved: 
That the Committee's applications be re-submitted urgently 
requesting further favourable consideration. 
Emergency Period 
That the Committee set the following closing dates: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Emergency ass~stance: 
Feed cartage: 
Stock cartage: 
Disposal pit assistance: 
21 August 1973 
31 August 1973 
7 September 1973 
7 September 1973 
A note was made that the Committee would consider special cases 
that did not comply with the closing dates set. 
Publicity 
Approval was given to publicize the relief measures available 
within the limits laid down by the Committee. 
Extract from letter to Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries: 
The Comndttee feels that a 'once-in-a-life-time' disaster of such 
magnitude, merits special attention and asks that the extensions to the 
standard relief measures which were outlined in letters dated 20 and 30 
August, be reconsidered and more favourable approvals granted. 
Although the response from commercial firms and operators who 
supplied a large quantity of 'free-of-charge' service and non-affected 
farmers who donated feed, together with free holding or grazing areas, 
was a magnificent one of very considerable financial benefit - a con-
servative estimate of the cost to the disaster area is $2 million. This 
figure gives some indication of the magnitude of the storm. 
The Comndttee is convinced that within their very restricted 
limitations imposed by the storm, farmers made a very full effort to 
help themselves and that specially with stock cartage, feed cartage and 
Defence Ministry assistance, the extensions requested are fully 
warranted. 
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With livestock cartage, it became an urgent necessity for farmers 
to uSe their own transport to shift stock out of the· snow as soon as 
roads were cleared. Commercial transport just could not cope with the 
demand in spite of using all available resources and with staff working 
unusually long hours. An additional cost to the shifting of stock was 
deli w.~ry of feed to the holding areas where stock were relocated. 
Grazing has been extremely short for a number of years in the Ashburton 
County was specially so at the time of the storm. None of the shifting 
involved long mileage hauls and the Committee suggests that if both away 
and return cartage is not to be fully subsidized, payment of a return 
journey up to .the maximum of 100 mileS be approved. 
AS has been stated, the shortage of grazing has also meant that hay 
has been in short supply and feed of all types was in heavy demand. Root 
crops and concentrates were extensively used. 
The adverse financial effects of the disaster will be long term 
for the majority of farmers and in making these further representations, 
the Comndttee feels farmers must receive as much immediate help as is 
possible. 
The fifth meeting of the Committee; 2 November, was called to 
authorise payments for grading, bulldozing, digging disposal pits, 
helicopter hire, and stock and hay transport. 
The business of the sixth meeting on 17 December was similar. 
The final meeting was held on 21 June 1974 for tidying up out-
standing accounts. 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, GERALDINE 
Monday (6,.8. 73) 
Storm and blizzard conditions following commencement of storm on . 
Sunday. A limited reconnaissance was made because of road conditions. 
Tuesday (7th) 
Two Farm Advisory Officers (Jarman and Crump) proceeded by car to 
Beautiful Valley, Peel Forest, Arundel. Telephones were out of action. 
Assessed little problem to lower country. Back country inaccessible and 
difficult to assess the snow problem. 
Wednesday (8th) 
Two Catchment Board Landrovers with Farm Advisory Officers travelled 
throughout Geraldine "county contacting farmers and assessing si tuationand 
severity of stock problems. The severity of problem now became apparent~ 
At this stage many farmers were unconcerned and did not think they 
required assistance. Other farmers felt the situation was serious but did 
not know what action to take. Only a few farmers assessed the situation 
correctly and took action immediately after the storm. 
Thursday (9th) 
An office was established at. Geraldine. County offices for the 
purpose of co-ordinating rescue activities. The office was initially 
manned by four men from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The 
Catchment Board, Federated Farmers, private farmers and private farm 
consultant subsequently provided manpower assistance. Because there was 
no telephone communications, two Landrovers and cars were used to contact 
farmers. Lack of communication was a major problem. A private heli-
copter had been working for the two days 8th and 9th in the South 
Canterbury area. Further helicopters were on order. 
Friday (10th) 
There was now a flood of requests for bulldozers, helicopters and 
manpower. Two helicopters were operating including one R.N.Z.A.F. 
Iroquois. Use of County and Catchment Board radiotelephones proved 
useful. 
Saturday (11th) 
A large labour force was mobilised - probably in excess of 100 men. 
Volunteers included the Geraldine Football Club. Three helicopters 
working. Use was made of Air Force communications for maintaining contact 
with helicopters. 
Sunday (12th) 
As for 11th, poor weather conditions hindered operations by heli-
copter. One Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries guide remained with 
helicopters and maintained contact. 
Monday (13th) 
Two helicopters, a decline in request for assistance - last day of 
R.N.Z.A.F. Iroquois operation. 
Tuesday (14th) 
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Two helicopters operated throughout the day. Very few requests for 
assistance. Farmers now organising direct. 
Wednesday (15th) 
One helicopter operated throughout the area until 23 August. Snow 
raking also continued for another seven to eight days in the most severely 
affected areas. 
D.K. Crump 
Farm Advisory Officer 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, FAIRLIE 
Introduction: 
During the days of August 5 and 6 one of the heaviest snows on record 
fell in the Waimate, Mackenzie and Geraldine Counties and further north 
through the mid and north Canterbury foothills. This was accompanied 
in the coastal area by heavy falls of driving rain which killed many, 
mainly pre-lamb shorn, ewes. 
In the Mackenzie County, falls of up to 5 feet were recorded with 
drifts on some properties exceeding 20 feet. In this area the snow fell 
over virtually a 24 hour period from 3 p.m. 'on Sunday, August 5, through 
into Monday night. There was very little wind with the snow and most of 
the drifting which did occur was at high altitudes in exposed areas. By 
6 p.m. on Sunday, August 5, there were three inches of snow lying in 
Fairlie and the intensity of the snowfall was increasing. 
Pattern of Snowfall: 
A phone check was made of the Tekapo area where eight inches was 
lying and at Clayton Station which had eight inches also. This was 
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reported to the Farm Advisory Officer, M.A.F., Timaru, at 9.15 p.m. A 
further check later that night showed an average increase of three inches 
over the district. By the morning of Monday, 6 August, virtually all 
phone communications' in the area were di$rupted but reports from the 
Electricity Department, Power Board and Post Office showed that t~ere was 
now 20 inches at Tekapo, more than 12 inches in th~ Sherwood-Clayton area 
and 8 inches in Fairlie. A further report was passed to M.A.F., Timaru, 
at 9 a.m. by the Post Office radio~ 
Many reports were received during the day indicating varying depths 
of snow but generally increasing from Fairlie towards the Clayton area. 
In the Mackenzie Basin, 4 inches was reported at Maryburn Station, 18 
inches at The Wolds and 30 inches near Tekapo. The reports of maximum 
snow depth at that stage were 3 feet. The,toll circuit to Timaru w~s 
reg~ined latei on Monday morning and a request0as
c
made fOT a four-wheel-
drive vehicle with chains to be sent to Fairlie as soon as possible. 
However, even with this vehicle, which arrived on Monday evening, there 
was no access to the Clayton-Sherwood area or beyond Burkes Pass. By 
10.30 a.m. on August 6, the Geraldine-Fai!li~ Roa~ was blocked by, snow as 
was the road inland from Cave. Thiee fe~t of snow was reported on MtCook 
Road from Pukaki and motorists were idvised ihat at that time the, 
Mackenzie County was completely inaccessible. At 10.45 a.m. State Highways 
8 and 83 were officially closed and there was only very limited access in 
other areas of the County by heavy vehicles with chains. These reports 
from Ministry of Works were bro'adcast over radio station 3ZC Timaru. 
During Monday the snowfall continued and while the County had all 
its machines and snowploughs operating, its efforts, combined with the 
Ministry of Works, were unable to maintain road access even on the main 
state highways. By Tuesday morning there was 15 inches of snow in Fairlie 
and reports from the Ashwick area showed 3-4 feet on the flats at Ashwick 
and Sherwood and up to5 feet in the Clayton Statlon area. A radio report 
from Tekapo indicated 3 feet in the Tekapo Village. At this stage there 
was no access to Clayton Station or the other five stations beyond and 
Burkes Pass was also closed. 
During Tuesday most of the roads between Clayton and Fairlie were 
opened to four-wheel-drive vehicles and late on Tuesday night the Clayton 
bulldozer met the County machine at the Butlers Road junction at Sherwood. 
It was not till the following day that theOry Creek bulldozer opened 
the first track over the Meikleburn Saddle to Clayton. It was obvious 
by Tuesday morning that this was an exceptional winter snow and that 
emergency relief measures would be necessary. 
Organisation: 
A toll circuit to Timaru had been restored on Monday morning and 
following discussions with F.A.O~, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Timaru, an inspection of the area.waS arranged by a, Hughes 300 helicopter 
from Whirlwide based at Levels Airport, Timaru.- The machine was arranged 
to arrive in Fairlie at 2 p.m. on the Tuesday. However, this machine did 
not eventually arrive until approximately 5 p.m. the following day!, ' 
Unfortunately, an oversight was a Helicopters eN.A.) Ltd Bell which was 
unused at Geraldine. At the ,same time as t'ne helicopter was called, 
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arrangements were made for the first bulldozers to be sent out to proper-
ties in the Sherwood area. At that stage farmers were told that they 
would be totally responsible for the bulldozer costs. This was accepted 
and an initial IS machines were called in from contractors in South 
Canterbury. This included several machines which were working in the 
Fairlie area. 
With difficult communications, the South Canterbury Catchment Board 
was also called on for assistance and one of their radio-equipped Landrovers 
was brought to the base in Fairlie. Following the experience of the 1967 
November snow, it was decided to continue to obtain all available bulldozers 
and get them operating as there was a serious problem in all the known areas 
at that stage. 
By Thursday most of the 32 bulldozers which were ordered were working 
in the area of the Fairlie-Sherwood basin. At the same time several more 
machines, approximately eight, were working in the Tekapo region. 
An aerial inspection of the Clayton area on Wednesday evening 
indicated heavy snow throughout this district. However, darkness forced 
a return to Fairlie before a complete reconnaissance could be made. A 
complete reconnaissance of the Fairlie, Sherwood, Four Peaks, Rangitata 
and Tekapo areas .was completed during the morning of Thursday, 9th August. 
This indicated a general disaster situation throughout the whole of the 
area inspected. The Waimate area inspection was left to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries of that area with the arrival of a helicopter 
at their base. 
During Thursday all available helicopters were called in to assist 
with the reconnaissance and stock feeding programme which had been initiated, 
and up to seven machines were working in the South Canterbury area including 
two Air Force Iroquois. With the increase in machinery in the district, 
the disrupted communications service was totally inadequate to handle the 
necessary communications and an Army signals troop of seven mobile units 
was requested. These arrived on the evening of Thursday 9th and "were vital 
in establishing and maintaining communications with the bulldozers 
working in the area plus liaison with with the helicopters. In some of 
the areas where the signals vehicles were used, telephone services were 
almost normal but with everyone away from the house and helicopter landing 
pads and bulldozers working in remote areas it was virtually impossible 
to co-ordinate rescue efforts by telephone means. The Army signallers 
therefore provided a co-ordination set up over and above the normal tele-
phone contact and enabled far better utilisation of man power and machinery. 
In many instances the only access to stock was by a long helicopter 
haul or four-wheel-drive trucks and it was decided early on the Friday 
morning to request 10 RL Bedfords from the Army to enable the safe distri-
bution of volunteer manpower and the shifting of quantities of hay from 
inaccessible haybarns to suitable landing pads. 
During the Wednesday-to-Friday period over 100 men were sent out to 
assist with snowraking and stock feeding. It was obvious that more 
volunteers were going to be needed during the weekend and with the 
additional offer of assistance from Twizel Ministry of Works, adequate 
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transport for manpower was vital. The 10RL's arrived on Friday evening 
and were used to transport over 200 volunteers out to properties In the ' 
morning and collect them at night. 
In addition to this, these vehicles collected hay for farmeri in 
areas where normal transport could not be used. The Army vehicles were 
used fully throughout the period and would distribute m~n from one, truck-
load into groups of two and three to properties as required.' From an 
accounting point of vidw it would be very difficult to lay' the charges 
for these vehicles to anyone property or properties d eto the nature of 
the work they were used on. 
Tekapo Area: 
Snowfall in the Tekapo area varied wi~ely. Hald6n Roa~ properties 
had virtually no problem and there was no snow at all at Haldon. Only 
light falls were recorded in the lower half of the Mackenzie Basin. All 
runholders from the non-affected areas moved up towards Tekapo where the 
major snows had fallen to a depth of about four feet. 
The contractors' machines plus other runh()lders dozers enabled the 
situation to sort itself out fairly rapidly and the co-ordination of work 
in this area was passed to the Waitaki Catchment Commission Soil 
Conservator at Tekapo. 
Major manpower requirements were supplied from the Ministry of Works, 
Twizel and by station staff. The only real requirement was a limited 
amount of helicopter flying time. Generally speaking, only three proper-
ties had significant problems and these were Richmond, Mt Gerald and 
Lilybank. Many other properties certainly had heavy snow to three feet 
but with experience of snow these problems were handled rapidly without 
much assistance. 
Stock Evacuation: 
Following the weekend of II-12th August, it was possible to get 
stock transport trucks into the area and also possible to load stock out 
from rough tracks in spite of all yard facilities being totally inacces-
sible. During the following week starting August 13th, many stock (about 
50,000) were moved out to the limited grazing and feed pads made' 
available below Cave in the coastal area. Following the dry autumn, 
only a small percentage of the stock were able to be placed on good 
pasture, greenfeed or brassicas and the majority were settled on feeding 
pads and rough blocks and fed hay. 
The major objective was to get stock out of the snow and on dry 
land thus minimise the incidence of sleepy sickness which by ihis stage 
had taken a significant toll in ewe losses throughout the district. In 
most cases stock sent away to pads had to be fed purchased hay as there 
was still little access to farmers' hayba;rns in the worst affected areas. 
Stock are continuing to be shifted down country at this time 
(August 20th) and over 18 inches of sriow is iti11 lying a fortnight 
after the actual snowfall. 
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Losses: 
A majority of properties have suffered relatively minor losses to 
date but in the worst hit areas, up to two-thirds of the total stock are 
still unaccounted for on individual properties. Some estimate of losses 
on the downlands properties should be available in two or three weeks 
but on the high runs, "figures will not be known until the shearing musters 
in October-November. At the present time we are getting very little thaw 
following severe frosts and any stock remaining in the area will be 
severely affected due to lack of feed combined with the cold wet condi-
tions. 
Government Assistance: 
At this stage I feel it is vital that the Government consider 
additional measures to assist badly affected farmers as in these circum-
stances standard forms of disaster relief are inadequate. These measures 
should include two way transport on stock taken out of the district and 
being returned, as it should be noted that many of these stock are going 
on to feeding pads rather than grazing in the conventional sense. Other 
assistance will be required at a later date for the re-stocking of the 
worst affected properties. The full costs of the Army's assistance 
should also be met due to the difficulty in allocating the charges to 
individual properties. 
T.H. Donaldson 
Farm Advisory Officer 
From the MAP reconnaissance Zicopter~ a vtew OJ 
Creek Station. 
- T.H. Donaldson. 
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SOUTH CANTERBURY DISASTER RELIEF COMMITTEE 
First Meeting 
The first meeting of the South Canterbury Disaster Relief Committee 
was held in Timaru on 17 August Ig73. 
A committee was elected and the disaster area defined as being the 
counties of Levels, Geraldine, Mackenzie, and part of Waimate County 
excluding Hakataramea Valley. The disaster was declared to have started 
on 5 August 1974. 
The Chairman (Mr B. McSweeney, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) 
explained what was available to the farmers in the way of assistance, and 
standard forms of relief. The Government had already agreed to pay for 
half the on-farm cost of helicopters, half the cost of getting the 
helicopters to disaster headquarters and the full cost of ferrying. The 
same applied to ground equipment. In the past, standard forms of relief 
included subsidy on cariage of hay to $10 per ton and cartage of stock 
one way to a maximum of 150 miles. 
The meeting discussed additional forms of relief. It resolved to 
ask the Government to: 
(1) pay all helicopter ferry costs to and within the area; 
(2) meet half the on-farm cost of bulldozing (including farmers working 
on farms other than their own); 
(3) pay ferrying time for bulldozers; 
(4) pay the full cost of transporting stock both ways, with a maximum 
of 75 miles (with closing date for return of stock to be decided by 
the Committee); 
(5) pay the cost of cartage of hay up to a maximum of $10 per ton; 
(6) pay the full cost of Army operations; 
(7) subsidise the cartage of root crops and other fodder to a maximum 
of $10 per ton; 
(8) guarantee bank overdrafts. 
In addition the Committee resolved to encourage County Councils, 
Pest Destruction Boards, and the Department of Lands and Survey to consider 
rate and rent relief in deserving cases. It also reserved the right to 
make recommendations in cases of severe financial hardship. 
Second Meeting 
The second meeting was held in Timaru on 14 September. 
Relief Measures 
The meeting was advised that the Government had not approved: 
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(1) two-way cartage of stock; 
(2) cost of transit of aircraft and equipment between Defence Service 
base and disaster emergency headquarters; 
(3) cartage of root crops and other fodder. 
Aircraft Hiring 
The question was raised as to whether in a future disaster a Relief 
Committee could obtain first use of aircraft before individual farmers 
hired them privately - as had happened in the present event. The Committee 
agreed to pay the cost of early private hires for relief in this disaster 
but set up a sub-committee to look at the possibility of getting prior 
rights for an Emergency Committee in future. 
Communications 
The Committee heard that Geraldine County was not satisfied with the 
,communications position and that further investigations were being made 
regarding the provi~ion and maintenance of a reliable communication system 
for use in any future emergency of this nature. 
The possibility of having a pool of radiotelephone sets maintained 
perhaps in Timaru was suggested, so that they could be immediately 
available for placement by helicopter in key areas as soon as required. 
Pack sets were said to have been very successful in the Tekapo area. 
It was stated that they could be tied in with Ministry of Works and 
Catchment Board channels and would be of considerable benefit in an emer-
gency. However, it would be desirable to have a skilled operator 
available for each set. 
Officials Report 
The meeting then, spent some time discussing the recommendations of 
a meeting held on 24 August of officials of organisations concerned with 
relief: 
The representations by the South Canterbury Disaster Relief Area 
Committee were considered by Government. 
Government approved the following measures for farmers seriously 
affected by snowstorm in the relief areas defined by the Committee and 
within the time limits set by the Committee'for the emergency caused by 
the snowstorms. 
(aJ Refunds of freight costs from point of purchase to farm gate up to 
$10 per ton on hay which the Relief Committee is satisfied had to 
be obtained because of the emergency conditions caused by the 
snowstorms. 
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(b) Refund of freight charges for livestock which the Comndttee is 
satisfied were removed from farms in the relief area because of 
the emergency conditions for grazing elsewhere; the concession to 
apply to the outward journey for a maximum of 100 miles. 
The hay and stock cartage refunds to be payable only in ,respect of 
freight charges by commercial transport operators. 
(c) The Government agreed to bear half the cost of the use of local 
authorities' equipment and that of private contractors (excluding 
farmers' own machines) used to bury dead stock. 
(d) In respect of the air and surface exercise to rescue livestock 
the Government would bear: 
(i) not more than 50 percent of the operations on each farmer's 
property i.e. productive time multiplied by cost per hour; 
(ii) not more than 50 percent of the costs for Air Force/Army 
personnel brought into the area; 
(iii) not more· than 50 percent of the transit costs of aircraft 
and or equipment and personnel between the Air Force, Army 
or other base to the headquarters established for the snow-
storm emergency operations; 
(i v) the full costs of "ferry time". This is defined as the time 
taken by air or ground equipment to travel from the emergency 
headquarters to the individual property and from one 
individual property to the next. Ferry time also includes 
spotting, investigation and similar air time not directly 
attributable to the property of a particular farmer, during 
the time the aircraft or equipment is at the emergency 
headquarters. 
The State Advances Corporation was prepared to consider applications 
for loan finance from competent creditworthy farmers who were experiencing 
financial difficulty for reasons beyond their control and having reason-
able prospects of recovery. Farmers who needed this assistance were 
invited to apply to the Corporation. 
Later, in November, Cabinet approved an additional relief measure in 
the form of a suspensory loan to be available to farmers suffering severe 
financial hardship as the result of adverse climatic events. 
It would be necessary for Relief Committees to be satisfied that 
conditions were such that individual farmers were facing hardship, and to 
recommend to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries that he seek 
Ministerial approval of the provision of suspensory loans within the 
Committee's area. If and when approval was received, the Committee's task 
would then be to ensure that farmers were aware of the availability of 
this form of assistance. Investigations into the circumstances of 
individual applicants, and decisions as to the actions to be taken in each 
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case would be the responsibility of State Advances Corporation. 
Cabinet also agreed to the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture and 
Fisheries in future approving certain relief measures without reference to 
Cabinet. These measures were: 
(1) Subsidy on stock cartage 
(2) Subsidy on hay cartage, 
(3) Regrassing subsidy, in case of floods. 
In the event of serious climatic adversity, Relief Committees could 
expect early decisions on request for these 'standard' forms of assistance. 
It was noted that provision of Government-guaranteed bank overdrafts 
was no longer on the list of 'standard' relief measures. It was felt that 
the existing forms of financial assistance available through the State 
Advances Corporation should be sufficient to deal with most situations, and 
where cases of severe hardship existed, Relief Committees could ask for 
approval for the suspensory loan provisions mentioned. However, if neither 
of these means of financial help was considered sufficient, and the 
Committee felt that, Government-guaranteed bank overdrafts would fill a real 
need, Government was prepared to consider such requests. 
Proposed Meeting 
The proposed third meeting of the Disaster Relief Committee 
scheduled for 8th November 1973 was cancelled due to lack of business but 
participants were advised on 30th October that to date payments of $66,691 
had been made or approved. The Government had confirmed that it would 
not extend assistance to include payment for freight on stock foods other 
than hay. Neither would it waive the transit costs of aircraft. 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
(Waimate County excluding Hakataramea Valley) 
A sub branch was set up in V. Meehan's "Pentland Hills" homestead 
at Waihaorunga on Thursday 9th August. Fortunately the telephone line from 
Pentland Hills to Waimate was intact. From this base the Ministry 
organised helicopter transport of hay to cattle,and men for snowraking. 
Fifteen farmers in the district received help. The branch office closed 
down on Wednesday 15th August. 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, OAMARU 
(Waitaki County and Hakataramea District (Waimate County)) 
The Ministry of Agriculture convened a meeting in Kurow on 
14 September where all the organisations involved in relief were repre-
sented. 
Mr J.D. Currie of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries chaired 
the meeting and defined the objectives as: 
(1) A balanced review of storm area relief work. 
(2) A better understanding of the responsibilities of the organisations 
involved. 
(3) A published concensus of opinion with recommendations to guide relief 
work in the event of a similar emergency in the future. 
He referred the representatives to the 'Tussock Grasslands Review' 
No. 16 published on March 16, 1969, that provides a detailed report of a 
similar snow emergency in the Ma.ckenzie County in 1967. Representatives 
of the organisations involved were then invited to review their responsi-
bilities with comments on any problem encountered. 
SUPERINTENDENT DEAN (N.Z. Police) explained his responsibility for 
co-ordinating all the police stations in his district from Timaru and he 
explained the local constables' role when the snow was widespread. He 
defined the duties of the police as the protection of human life and 
secondly the protection of property. The Civil Defence Act 1962 covers 
emergencies that can be declared because of earthquakes, seismic waves, 
cyclone storm, tornado or other happenings not attributable to any enemy 
or warlike act, which causes losses of life or injury to persons. The 
August storm did not qualify as a civil emergency, once the local constable 
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had confirmed that human life was not in danger. Constable Eathorne was 
able to establish contact with all the people involved by Wednesday night 
and he could then assist with co-ordination of livestock recovery provided 
no human emergency arose. The Superintendent had flown over the area on 
Tuesday. 
MR CURRIE described the Ministry's role in disaster circumstances: 
To co-ordinate relief for livestock through a local relief committee 
formed at the request of Federated Farmers. The storm that commenced on 
the coast in the early hours on Sunday 5th and then continued until Monday 
6th evening had been of unpredicted severity. Squally southeasterly winds 
had brought 100 mm of rain along the coastal plains and downs and snow 
fell above 200 metres (650 feet). The depth of snow increased from 0.3 
metres (12 in.) in Kurow to over 1.0 metre above 300 metres in altitude. 
Snow fell along the Kakanui Range then up through the Hakatararnea Valley. 
The southern·boundary of the heavy snowfall was the Macraes Flat area 
and the western boundary along Lake Benmore. Deep drifts built up in the 
Danseys Pass and Hakataramea Valley and these were to cause the greatest 
problem in livestock recovery. The snowfall was the heaviest recorded 
since 1918 although similar heavy falls were recorded prior to this date. 
The Ministry's involvement commenced on Monday 6th when reports of 
he~vy losses in 'pre-Iamb shorn ewes were received. Co-ordination of 
relief was established from the Oamaru office, and was considerably 
assisted by the farming community and news media acceptance of the 
Ministry's role in disaster rel~ef due to earlier drought administration. 
Initial efforts were directed to disposal of carcasses and to 
management advice aimed at the survival of chilled pre-lamb shorn ewes. 
Waitaki Industries' offer to assist with disposal of carcasses resulted 
in some confusion, before it was finally established that dead carcasses 
could not be handled at an export works. County assistance with quarry 
burial was appreciated on Tuesday. 
Communication with higher altitude farmers was not possibie with 
telephone lines down and road access blocked on Monday. The weather 
continued squally on Tuesday and,enquiries on the availability of an aero-
club plane for spotting showed that the airport was closed and the only 
available plane was grounded at Tiwzel. Following discussions with the 
President of Federated Farmers, Dunedin office of the Ministry was asked 
to arrange for a helicopter to be on standby. 
An inspection of the Hakataramea Valley by four-wheel-drive vehicle 
was carried out on Wednesday immediately behind the County grader, and 
that evening a helicopter was asked for the next morning. The 
Hakataramea committee was formed under the ·chairmanship of Mr Brown 
on Thursday morning and the first helicopter arrived at 3 p.m. A further 
helicopter from the same company, Alpine Helicopter, arrived on Friday 
morning and was diverted to the Kakanuis in the afternoon. A second 
relief committee was then formed to cover the district south of the 
Waitaki river including the Kakanui Range. Both helicopters worked in 
the Hakataramea district from 4 p.m. on Saturday until Sunday evening, 
by which time all but one of the original requests had been serviced. 
One helicopter was then retained until Thursday morning and kept pace 
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with follow-up servicing requests. 
The policy adopted for helicopters by the committees was based on 
priorities of, first, spotting to define requirements, second, lifting 
hay to trapped cows and calves and, third, ferrying of personnel for snow-
raking. Uncertainty as to the policy for bulldozers, necessary for 
opening access t~acks to livestock, led to initial reluctance to assume 
full responsibility for employing contractors. However the Hakataramea 
committee recognised the urgent necessity for bulldozers and undertook 
their co-ordination with very much appreciated assistance of Mr D.K. 
Fraser at Cattle Creek. Some 24 machines were employed. 
Initial estimates for stock losses are as follows: 
Waitaki County Plains and Downs 11,000 sheep 
High altitude 3,000 sheep 
High altitude 50 cattle 
Hakataramea Valley basin 3,500 sheep 
Higher altitude 5,000 sheep 
~igher altitude 300 cattle 
Waihemo 2,500 sheep 
Total = 25,000 sheep and 350 cattle with an estimated replacement 
value of $500,000. 
It must be appreciated that the pre-lamb shorn ewes make up the 
bulk of the Plains and Downs total in the Waitaki County and this estimate 
has been confirmed by a survey by Federated Farmers. However accurate 
figures for higher altitudes will only be available with mustering and 
when the runs from Lake Benmore to the Stonewall are included the estimate 
could be conservative. No allowance has been made for the deaths and 
poor lambing performance that is now occurring with high-altitude ewes 
that were severely checked by prolonged starvation. A similar problem 
is faced with cattle. 
The direct cost for farm relief of helicopters, bulldozers and 
stock and hay cartage was estimated at $30,000. 
The Ministry considers helicopters were the key to efficient relief 
work and will be preparing a detailed report on their use. The available 
machines were fully employed at all times, with the pilots outstanding. 
Volunteer labour reduced the probable stock losses by at least 50 percent 
and co-operation with the committees had been excellent. Communication 
was noted as the major limitation. 
MR SMITH (Federated Farmers) commented that the main points made at 
the Upper Waitaki Federated Farmers meeting the previous night were lack 
of communication and the loss of a day in getting into the snow area. 
MR BROSNAN (Federated Farmers) president of the Upper Waitaki Branch 
of Federated Farmers said that farmers at the meeting spoke highly of the 
people involved. Communications need improving. An underground telephone 
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cable, two-way radio and someone with authority to direct a helicopter 
into the area at the very first opportunity was requested. As weather 
could restrict helicopter use, better telephone and radio communications 
were a priority. A local committee representing a cross section of the 
community possibly convened by the local constable could meet annually 
to review available sources. The local County are responsible for 
access and communications and have radiotelephones and machinery. They 
should have a man responsible for emergencies. There appeared to be a 
lack of public awareness of the County's role in civil defence, and the 
County plan would need updating. An overall co-ordinating authority 
was advocated. 
MR WARDELL (Federated Farmers) representing the Kakanui farmers, 
stressed communication as the key. Farmers' radio telephones had proved 
invaluable and an emergency band was suggested. 
MR SMALL (Sheep and Cattlemen's Association) was isolated until 
Thursday on his property at the head of the Hakataramea Valley, then he 
received considerable assistance. An earlier survey of the district by 
helicopter and communications and access were priorities. The County 
have the equipment and the personnel to provide access but they should 
have an employee preparing an annual review of their ability to cope in 
an emergency situation. 
MR NEWTON, Engineer for the Waitaki County said that Counties have 
basic machinery to service normal access, rather than disaster conditions. 
Grader drivers know to go out on their own immediately, regardless of the 
hour. It took about a day to assess the overall situation and to call 
in local contractors. The necessity to bury stock was a new experience 
but the central pit provided on the coast operated satisfactorily. In 
any future emergency the County would prefer requests for burying of 
stock directed through the Ministry. 
MR P. PAVLETICH (Waimate County) said that the County concentrated 
on opening up the roads. Lack of communication to the Engineer" on Monday 
delayed the arrival of equipment until Tuesday afternoon. Once access 
to homesteads is cleared help is provided in any way. He did not see how 
the foreman responsible for equipment being used in opening roads could 
be at headquarters directing overall rescue operations, and he favoured 
other bodies coming in behind the County and being responsible for their 
various sections. The County is looking into the cost of snowploughs to 
speed up road clearing. Communications will be improved by installing a 
standby repeater permanently on Mt Studholme. 
MR HARDY (Ministry of Works) considered the problems encountered 
south of the Waitaki river were not serious. State Highway 83 was the 
main problem, and the Ministry was also involved in the Pig Root and the 
Lindis. The M.O.W. main concern is to keep the main arterial roads open. 
The Waitaki County had done an excellent job. The M.O.W. have a radio-
equipped fleet of vehicles on a national network that keeps them well 
informed of emergencies. Once the overall position had been assessed a 
radio-equipped four-whee I-drive vehicle was put at the disposal of 
Constable Eathorne. This service is always available for emergency. 
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MR NORMAN (Waitaki Electric Power Board) said the Power Board 
received their first call at 8 p.m. on Sunday from Hampden and the second 
call at 6 a.m. on Monday brought the Otematata staff out. In the 1967 
storm radio communications were not available but this had been corrected, 
and their radios were in constant use and proved invaluable. The control 
centre was in Oamaru. Restoration of power supplies was hampered by lack 
of access, and a serious fault at Lake Waitaki when snow brought lines 
down. 
This meant that power was not available until 4 p.m. on Tuesday. He 
was interested to know how seriously people are affected when power is 
unavailable under these circumstances. 
MR WHITING (N.Z. Post Office) defined the district serviced from 
Dunedin with one man at Kurow and two dozen at Oamaru. The prime concern 
of the Post Office is to have operational toll circuits between centres 
before moving into farming areas. 
By 6 p.m. on Sunday night they were aware of trouble in the Dunback-
Pig Root area and the Kurow-Otematata district. The exchange was in 
difficulty due to lines in other areas being affected by the snow. By'mid-
Monday they were aware of difficulties in Fairlie and Mid Canterbury. 
Initial action 'concentrated on circuits to Otematata and Ranfurly. 
Lack of information on Monday resulted in staff going to Palmerston then 
later in the day the need at Hakataramea was recognised. Staff from 
Dunedin went to mid-Canterbury and to the Pig Root. 
The Post Office is aware of the limitations of early warnings that 
can give a misleading picture. The M.O.W. is relied on for access and 
the Civil Defence for providing emergency communication. The Post Office 
does not supply an emergency radio service, and only some staff have 
mobile radio equipment for routine work. 
MR ROBINSON (Waitaki Catchment Commission) tabled a very compre-
hensive internal report prepared by the Waitaki Catchment Commission. 
This was read and discussed as a very helpful summary of events and 
suggested follow-up action. The Commission is prepared to assist in an 
emergency such as this but has no direct responsibility. Suitable equip-
ment is available such as the four-wheel-drive vehicles that were pro-
vided, and the Commission office could be a very appropriate headquarters 
in an emergency situation. 
The Chairman then suggested that the handling of the emergency be 
discussed in more depth by selecting important aspects. 
1. STORM WARNING 
The unexpected severity of the storm raised the question of the 
Meteorological Service forecasting any future storms. The north-east 
showers of the previous day and a predicted southerly change was suggested 
from local experience as likely to bring severe weather. A letter has 
been sent to the N.Z. Meteorological Service asking for the Saturday night 
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August 4 forecast and any suggestions that would enable us to be better 
prepared for a similar storm. 
2. HANDLING THE EMERGENCY 
The very good weather that followed the storm should make us all 
aware of the very serious position that could have developed if severe 
frosts and overcast conditions had followed. Farmers in the known snow-
risk areas were better prepared than the farmers on lower altitude, more 
intensively farmed properties. Deep freezers that are well stocked are 
still vulnerable to power cuts, and all electric houses need other cooking 
facilities, and a water supply from a gravity fed reservoir is an 
advantage. At the head of the Hakataramea Valley five of the fifteen 
settlers have bulldozers, and these machines along with the large tractors 
would appear to be a necessity for farmers of high snow-risk areas. 
Ground inspection was restricted to cleared road access. The method 
followed was a grader following a bulldozer. The V type snowploughs could 
be made available by Counties but they can only cope with 6 in. of snow so 
would need to be on the job immediately. The only type of snowplough that 
could cope with ~ fall of the magnitude experienced is a rotary t~pe that 
blows the snow to the side but at a cost of $60,000 these could not be 
justified in ou~ low risk conditions. 
COMMUNICATIONS proved a problem with telephones out over a long 
period, and the breakdown of the Mt Studholme repeater. The Ministry of 
Agriculture could obtain a clear picture only when the road access was 
cleared on Wednesday. Greater use could have been made of the Power Board 
and Ministry of Works two-way radio service and the Lake Benmore system 
based on Mt Mary could have been of assistance if offered. There appears 
to be an urgent need to co-ordinate, evaluate and clarify the present 
available services. 
The suggestion was made that a group of settlers be zoned with a 
radio between them able to operate on an emergency frequency. A local 
service based on Kurow has limitations for an organisation with wide cover-
age such as the Power Board or M.O.W. 
The Post Office is responsible for licensing and the regulatory side 
of radio services. The telephone service has been improved considerably 
in the Hakataramea Valley district with underground cable, but aerial wires 
with the associated risk of failures will be in use for a long time. The 
limitations to underground cables are primarily technical and are associated 
with a loss of voice with smaller conductors used. It is not possible to 
extend this cable to the Kowhatu exchange at present. There are three 
systems that can supplement the telephone service. 
(1) Medium high frequency glvlng a wide national coverage. 
(2) Very high frequency used by anybody with a fleet of vehicles e.g. 
Police, Power Boards, Post Office and transport operators. 
(3) Citizens Band also V.H.F. with a coverage limited to line of sight. 
A land mobile service such as the one in use at Lake Benmore can 
cover the Hakataramea Valley. This is costly but worth looking at on the 
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basis of zoned settlers working as cells. The responsibility of the 
Catchment Commission for tussock fire control would suggest that they 
should be included in a radio link that could be used for other 
emergency conditions. 
3. CO-ORDINATION OF RELIEF can be improved. The meeting has clarified 
the responsibilities of the organisations represented, but there is 
a definite need for closer liaison when assessing the overall emergency 
situation and then for utilising all the available resources to the best 
advantage of the whole community. Local authorities have the responsi-
bility of deciding whether a state of emergency has developed that 
qualifies under the Civil Defence Act of 1962. They are also supposed 
to have an up to date listing of the itemised resources of their counties 
available. The Police remain in charge until Civil Defence are called in. 
In the Kurow example where the emergency related to livestock sur-
vival, there was no justification for calling in the Civil Defence. 
However there was an apparent lack of County involvement in co-ordination 
and this was highlighted by the emergency being on two County boundaries. 
There is a need for a more clearly d~fined policy in these circumstances. 
A central communications control room has considerable merit. This 
should be operated by an independent person with local knowledge but no 
immediate responsibility for relief work. In Kurow the Waitaki Catchment 
Commission is an obvious example of a suitable headquarters with five 
telephone lines that can be hooked in with the Police and the Ministry. 
The establishing of a continuous service number for passing on messages 
would greatly improve liaison between all involved, without interfering 
with the direct responsibility and communication of individual authori-
ties. 
It was clear that the overall communications and co-ordination of 
available facilities should be studied in greater depth as a basis for 
guiding any future relief work. This could best be done after reference 
of the report from this meeting to the organisations involved. 
It was moved Hardy, seconded Robinson, that the Chairman arrange 
a further meeting between the representatives of Government Departments, 
Counties, the Catchment Commission and Federated Farmers to pool informa-
tion as a basis for overall recommendations. 
The Chairman agreed to arrange the meeting after the organisations 
concerned had had time to consider the points raised in the report. 
4. HELICOPTERS were a new experience for the district, and convincingly 
demonstrated their vital role in disaster-circumstances. Once on 
the job they were fully employed and the skill and co-operation of the 
pilots, Bill Black and Rex Dovey, was outstanding. Criticism was directed 
at the delay of two days in their availability and this was highlighted 
by sightings of three helicopters moving around the Hakataramea Valley on 
Wednesday before the first official machine became available on Thursday 
at 3 p.m. It was unanimously agreed that authority should be available 
to ensure that helicopters are immediately available for reconnaissance 
and that it is very important that their location be known and that their 
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use be directed within their normal operational zone. 
The Chairman commented that the Ministry has the authori ty ':"'.nd a 
working plan for the use of helicopters in snow relief but the delay could 
be attributed to a number of factors. Inexperience, the difficulty in 
locating helicopters, the competition from intensive publicity from 
Methven when the snowfall was widespread throughout Canterbury, the priority 
for police work where human l,ife was involved, pilots away on a training 
course, and the initial problem of communications in assessing the overall 
situation. All Ministry staff involved in relief committees will be 
meeting to review their experiences. Prior to this, when the account from 
Alpine Helicopters is received, the local chairmen will be carefully 
analysing the use made of helicopters in district relief work. 
Scheduling had ensured efficient productive use, and the full records 
of operations and servicing and the experiences of the navigators will 
provide the background to a summary of suggestions to guide future opera-
tions. Details of the disaster relief approved by Government will be dis-
tributed to all farmers concerned, with advice on claim applications. 
There was no problem in diverting helicopters to essential work for 
N.Z. Electricity Department and the Power Board, but concern was expressed 
regarding the insurance of, for example, snow rakers when flying in heli-
copters. The withdrawal of helicopters was decided on locally when there 
was no further initial relief work required. 
5. STOCK LOSSES were the major economic concern. With low-country 
pre-lamb shorn ewes, all will be more aware of the importance of adequate 
shelter. The advantages in spreading the work for shearers and in flock 
management are well known and this practice will continue with greater 
attention to management. At higher altitudes, higher stocking, stock 
spread out, the drift pattern that trapped stock, and inexperience, along 
with a delayed reaction all contributed to losses. Fit stock stood up to 
the conditions better than fat stock, and the position would have been far 
more serious if the snowfall had been six weeks later with ewes due to 
lamb. Calving cows received priority, and there was some concern where 
low-quality straw was ferried out when lucerne was more suitable. 
Losses were attributed to exhaustion and starvation, with water and 
glucose likely to give the best recovery. Sleepy sickness and milk fever 
were over publicised, and few if any sheep were considered to have genuine 
sleepy sickness. It was noted with cattle in particular that many were 
not accustomed to snow as a source of water, and they tended to dehydrate 
and reject hay. 
Bulldozers were vital in opening up access to small groups of 
animals requiring feeding and there was a commendable district response 
in providing the needed good-quality lucerne hay either on a reciprocal or 
reasonably priced basis. Federated Farmers arranged a register of offers 
and the committees directed the hay to the most deserving farmer. 
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Mr A. Boa of Waihaorunga checking the hoggets. 
- J.J. Hore 3 Photography. 
6. OTHER DAMAGE on farms was noted as fencing and a haybarn. Spouting 
came down on houses but this would be attended to by the assessors 
of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission who have been through the 
area. 
7. PUBLIC RELATIONS were of a high standard, with all local press and 
radio coverage praised for being balanced and factual. The early 
acceptance of the Ministry's role in co-ordination of stock relief and the 
establishing and maintaining of liaison through spokesmen was important, 
and was to work to our advantage for assistance with snowraking and 
additional hay. Sightseeing was kept to a minimum by the placing of a 
notice and patrolling the only access road into Hakataramea Valley. 
Extracts from Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of 
the Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee 
held at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Office, Kurow, on Thursday 9 August 1973 at 10.30 p.m. 
PRESENT 
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Representatives of Waitaki Catchment Commission, Federated Farmers 
and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
DEFINITION OF AREA 
Resolved: 
That the snow relief area be all that area west of the Maerewhenua 
River stretching up to Otematata River taking in the Kirkliston 
Range, all of the Hakataramea Valley down to the area known as the 
Stone Wall." 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE 
Resolved: 
That approval be sought from the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for the engaging of helicopters to undertake emergency 
relief operations on properties affected, subject to the farmers 
concerned meeting their share of the transit cost of helicopters, 
equipment and personnel to the emergency headquarters, and half 
the cost of operations on their respective properties. 
PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE 
(a) The Chairman stated that first priority for relief should be given 
to cattle calving or due to calve. 
Resolved: 
That farmers with cattle due to calve or calving, be given first 
priority with feed supplies by helicopter. 
(b) Resolved: 
That this committee's second priority be to carry out spotting to 
ascertain the overall situation. 
After today's work in assessing the situation, members of the 
committee will be in a much better position to decide what further relief 
operations be undertaken. 
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MANPOWER ASSISTANCE 
Resolved: 
That we contact farmers in the less-affected areas, with a view of 
providing assistance if required. 
Extracts from Minutes of the Second Meeting of the 
Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee held at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Office, Kurow, 
on Friday 17 August 1973 at 3 p.m. 
RE-DEFINITION OF AREA 
Resolved: 
That the snow·relief area be that area in the Waimate County 
extending from Lake Benmore to the Stone Wall and including the 
Hakataramea Valley. 
EXTENT OF LOSSES 
The area experienced the heaviest snowfall since 1918 resulting in 
the complete blockage of roads and breakdown in communications. An 
estimate for losses is at least 10,000 sheep (the majority in lamb) and 
300 cattle. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE 
(a) Helicopters: In view of the difficulty in apportioning the 50 percent 
charge between users it was decided to amend the resolution passed 
at the first meeting. 
Resolved: 
That the transit cost of helicopters, equipment and personnel to the 
emergency headquarters be met by Government. 
(b) Bulldozers: 
Resolved: 
That a 50 percent subsidy be granted to farmers for the use of bull-
dozers in the clearing of access tracks for stock recovery and 
feeding. That Government pay full transit expenses between the 
bulldozer's base and the relief work and also pay cost of ferrying 
between farms. 
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Resolved: 
That subsidy apply to hired bulldozers. 
(c) Stock Cartage: 
Resolved: 
That the full cost of transporting livestock to grazing because of 
the emergency be eligible for payment by Government. The concession 
to apply to the outward and homeward journeys, for a maximum of 100 
miles on each journey. Stock must be returned to qualify. 
(d) Feed Cartage: 
Resolved: 
That the freight costs for hay, grain and stock nuts obtained because 
of the emergency conditions be eligible for payment by Government up 
to $15 per ton. 
(e) Finance: 
Resolved: 
That finance be made available on favourable terms for the replace-
ment of capital stock preferably through the State Advances or 
Marginal Lands on low interest long term basis. That Government 
Guaranteed bank overdrafts be available. 
(f) Taxation: 
ROPE 
Resolved: 
That farmers in the affected area be eligible for reassessment for 
provisional tax. 
At the start of the emergency rope was required urgently and none was 
available in the stores at Kurow. The committee purchases some rope from 
Oamaru and borrowed other supplies from Kurow organisations. 
During the emergency it was found that the use of rope and wire for 
bundling up hay was a far quicker method of feeding out than using the heli-
copter nets. This resulted in reducing helicopter costs. 
Resolved: 
That the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries be requested to meet 
the costs for rope and one coil of wire supplied by the Committee 
and used in the emergency. 
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Extracts from Minutes of the Third Meeting of the 
Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee held at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Office, Kurow, 
on Friday 9 November 1973 at 1.45 p.m. 
CORRESPONDENCE 
Letter from the Director-General, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Wellington, re eligibility for re-assessment for provisional tax. If a 
farmer considers that by reason of the snowstorm his income for his 1974 
tax year will be less than for his 1973 year, he can ask his local tax 
office for an immediate adjustment to his provisional tax. 
EXTENT OF LOSSES 
The Chairman outlined stock losses known to date from sixteen 
questionnaires returned by farmers: 
Sheep 
Cattle 
8,000 
110 
39 men ferried into area 
362 bales of hay distributed to properties by helicopter. 
RECOMMENDATION FOR ASSISTANCE 
Resolved: 
That the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries be asked to give 
further consideration to the granting of subsidy on cartage of 
grain and other concentrated stock food. 
CALCULATION OF SUBSIDY 
The committee agreed that the number. of bales of hay constituting one 
ton be as follows: 
Resolved: 
That 3S bales of lucerne and 40 bales of meadow hay constitute 
one ton as the basis for the calculation of freight subsidy. 
CLOSING DATE FOR CLAIMS 
All claims should be lodged by 1 January 1974 
Claims for hay, livestock, bulldozing and transporation were 
approved for payment. 
Extract from Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the 
Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee, held at 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Office, 
Kurow, on Friday 23 November 1973 at 1.30 p.m. 
Claims for hay, livestock, bulldozing and transportation were 
presented and approved; 
Extracts from Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the 
Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee held at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Office, Kurow, 
on Friday 18 January 1974 at 1.30 p.m. 
EXTENT OF LOSSES 
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Chairman outlined stock losses and figures known to date from nineteen 
questionnaires returned by farmers. 
Sheep 
Cattle 
8,900 
140 
580 bales of hay fed out from helicopters. Sheep transported out of 
area - 3,080. Hay carted into area - 11,500 bales. 
CORRESPONDENCE 
Reply from Head Office re Committee's request for subsidy on cartage 
of grain and other concentrated stock food. Government is not willing to 
extend the standard measures already approved. 
CLAIMS 
Further claims for subsidy were approved for payment. 
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Extract from Minutes of the Sixth (and final) Meeting 
of the Hakataramea Valley Snow Area Relief Committee held 
at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Office, 
Kurow, on Friday IS February 1974 at 3 p.m. 
Further claims for payment were approved. 
Extracts from Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting 
of the Kakanui Range-Danseys Pass Snow Area Relief 
Committee held at Mt Dasher 
on Friday 10 August 1973 at 1 p.m. 
PRESENT 
Senior Livestock Instructor, Representatives of Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries and Farmers. 
GENERAL DEFINITION OF AREA 
Southern aspect of the Kakanui Range, original Kuriheka run, northwest 
to include major runs to and including Danseys Pass. 
REASON FOR CALLING MEETING 
There had been an abnormally heavy fall of snow probably the worst 
for fifty years. 
Requests had been received from approximately 12 local residents for 
a helicopter to spot and feed stock. 
DISASTER AREA 
Resolved: 
That the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries declare the area as 
defined a disaster relief area. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE 
Resolved: 
That approval be sought from the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for the engaging of a helicopter to undertake emergency 
relief operations on the properties affected, subject to the 
farmers concerned meeting their share of the transit cost of 
aircraft, or equipment and personnel to the emergency headquarters, 
and half the cost of operations on their respective propert~es. 
Extracts from Minutes of the Second Meeting of the 
Kakanui-Waitaki County Snow and Storm Area Relief 
Committee held at the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries Office, Oamaru, on Thursday 16 August 1973 
at 3 p.m. 
RE-DEFINITION OF AREA 
Resolved: 
To include assistance to all properties in the Waitaki County 
affected by the storm commencing in the early hours of Sunday 
5 August and continuing until the night of Monday 6. The boundary 
to be the Waitaki River in the north, Kurow township to the west, 
and the Kakanui Range in the south. 
THE EXTENT OF LOSSES 
The storm pattern resulted in 100 mm of heavy squally rain from the 
southeast killing an estimated 10,000 pre-lamb shorn ewes on the lower 
altitude plains and downs. Snow above 1500 ft varying from 0.5 to 1.0 
metre in depth, isolated and trapped breeding cows and sheep. Losses are 
not expected to be high at the higher altitudes where steep gorges and an 
early thaw gave some relief; Otekaieke Station in the Danseys Pass area 
being the worst affected. An estimate for losses at higher altitudes is 
3,000 sheep and 50 cattle. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE 
1. Helicopter: That the 15 farmers who took advantage of the helicopter 
service be granted the 50 percent subsidy requested for spotting, 
feeding and ferrying of personnel and equipment for stock recovery 
on their properties. That the Government pay for transit between 
properties. That the Government pay full transit expenses between 
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the helicopter base and the relief headquarters in view of the 
difficulty in equitable apportioning of a 50 percent charge between 
users. 
2. Bulldozers: That farmers hiring a bulldozer for clearing the access 
necessary for stock recovery and feeding be granted a 50 percent 
subsidy for work done on their properties. That the Government pay 
for transit between properties. That the Government pay full 
transit expenses between the bulldozers base and the relief work. 
That a subsidy on bulldozers hired for burial of dead stock be 
granted on the same basis. 
3. Stock Cartage: That the full cost of transporting stock to grazing 
be eligible for payment by Government. That both outward and return 
costs be eligible. That a limit of 200 miles total be approved. 
That stock must be returned to qualify. 
4. Hay Cartage: That cost of cartage for hay or any other concentrated 
high quality stock feed be eligible for payment by Government. That 
the maximum payment be $10 a ton. 
5. Finance: That finance be made available on favourable terms for the 
replacement of capital stock. That this be preferably through the 
State Advances or Marginal Lands on low interest long term basis. 
That Government Guaranteed bank overdrafts be available. 
6. Taxation: That farmers be eligible to withdraw deposits from the 
voluntary freeze account. That farmers be made aware of (a) the 
need to re-estimate their income for provisional tax, and (b) the 
opportunity to carry forward trading losses. 
Resolved: 
That the six recommendations for assistance be forwarded to the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries for his approval. 
APPRECIATION 
Resolved: 
That this committee put on record their sincere appreciation of the 
outstanding assistance provided by all people involved in relief 
work. Alpine Helicopters and their two pilots Mr Bill Black and 
Mr Rex Dovey warrant special mention for their skill and co-operation 
at all times. That the many volunteers be acknowledged, and that 
the Waitaki County be thanked for their prompt co-operation. 
FUTURE POLICY 
1. That Federated Farmers offer to provide information on sources of hay 
and grazing be accepted with thanks and that details of this feed be 
provided on request to affected farmers. That allocation be on an 
equitable basis with the committee deciding priorities. 
2. That a full report on the relief work be prepared with recommenda-
tions to assist in any future emergency. 
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3. That agreements for helicopter payment be posted to farmers for 
signing and that information on approved relief claims be distributed 
when accounts are circulated. 
4. That a meeting with the District Appraiser, State Advances Corporation, 
be arranged. 
Extracts from Minutes of the Third Meeting of the 
Kakanui-Waitaki County Snow and Storm Area Relief 
Committee held at th'e Ministry of Agricul ture and 
Fisheries Office, Oamaru, on Monday 
26 November 1973 at 8 p.m. 
CLAIMS FOR ASSISTANCE 
Claims for subsidy assistance for cartage, truck hire, bulldozing and 
transportation were tabled and approved. 
COMBINED MEETING AT KUROW, AUGUST 
Communications. Chairman advised that Ministry of Works and Post 
Office Department were to provide further information. 
COMBINED MEETING - TIMARU 
A meeting had been arranged for all Relief Committee Chairmen to meet 
and discuss problems and procedures in the various areas. Tentative date 
had been set as 12 December. Chairman would be attending this meeting. 
218 
Extracts from Minutes of the Fourth (and final) Meeting 
of the Kakanui-Waitaki County Snow and Storm Area Relief 
Committee held at the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries Office, Oamaru, on Thursday 
28 February 1974 at 2 p.m. 
Further claims for assistance were approved and the Chairman reported 
on meeting of sub-regional representatives of Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries held at Timaru on 10 December 1973. 
Rescued stock waiting to be fed. 
- N.Z. Post Office~ Timaru. 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, PALMERSTON 
The Ministry Office at Palmerston had little direct involvement in 
stock rescue except for arranging some bulldozing. No helicopters were 
hired. It worked in with the North Otago Disaster Relief Committee based 
in Oamaru to authorise financial assistance to farmers. 
Extracts from monthly reports concerning the August 1973 snowfall. 
August 1973 Report 
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August was a colder than usual month with extremely heavy snow falling 
at higher levels from the Kakanuis through Macraes Flat to the back of 
Waikouaiti on 5th and 6th. Three feet of snow was recorded at Glendale 
Station. 
The snowstorm and associated rainfall at lower levels took toll of 
sheep just off shears and two losses of around 400 have been reported. The 
storm came at a time when feed reserves were low and stock were in many 
cases in low condition following the summer drought and poor autumn. Heavy 
losses were expected of sheep that were snowbound for two to three weeks 
but it now appears that losses may be less than expected. Even so on 
some properties 5 to 10 percent may have been lost. The actual figures 
will not be known until there is a muster but in one case 30 were found 
dead in an area where 500 woolly sheep had been put just before the storm 
and an additional six died later probably of sleepy sickness; a loss of 
7 percent. Younger sheep and those newly shorn would be more vulnerable. 
September 1973 Report 
Reports indicate that losses in the early August storm are less than 
at first anticipated. Where 105ses are now reasonably well known in the 
worst affected areas they range from 2 percent to about 9 percent of total 
flock numbers on individual properties. Losses were higher in some mobs 
shorn immediately before the storm but earlier shorn sheep fared relatively 
well. In addition to these direct losses the severity of the storm will 
affect flock performance through slipping of lambs and general lowering of 
stock condition. With the effects of the storm following on the hard 
autumn condition of ewes, lambing percentage will be lower than usual. 
Typical Losses Reported 
250,,· 300 out of 7000 sheep, no cattle. 
200 out of 8000 sheep, 4-5 cows. 
100 out of 5000 sheep, 2-3 calves. 
240 of 1870 shorn and only 60 of 2800 woolly sheep. 
400 out of 4500 sheep. 
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Cattle losses were generally light and water appeared to be at least . 
as important to them as feed. 
S.M.J. Stockdill 
Farm Advisory Officer 
WAITAKI CATCHMENT COMMISSION 
1. General 
As a result of a south-westerly storm over the period 5-6 August snow 
fell to low levels and to considerable depth over a large area extending 
from North Otago to North Canterbury. 
Strong winds led to blizzard conditions and a variable pattern of 
snowfall with several areas of particularly deep snow. 
Areas which were most severely affected were Waihaorunga, Pentacotico, 
Hakataramea Valley, north-east Mackenzie Basin, Fairlie, Four Peaks, part 
Rangitata and Ashburton gorges, Upper Rakaia Gorge~ Mt Somers, Methven, 
Danseys Pass and Otekaieke areas. 
Depths of 3-5 feet were experienced in the above areas together with 
substantial snow drifts. 
2. Effect of Snowfall on Areas Severely Affected 
All road access was closed. 
Except in Tekapo area all telephone communications were severed. 
Except in Tekapo and Kurow area all electricity supplies were dis-
rupted. 
In Kurow-Hakataramea, radio links were lost when power was lost in 
Station Peak. 
Substantial losses of both sheep and cattle were sustained, parti-
cularly in areas with recently shorn sheep, 10w feed supplies and farmers 
inexperienced or ill-equipped to handle snow. 
Widespread damage to buildings and tree plantations occurred on 
lowland areas. 
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3. Action in Mackenzie District 
Ministry of Works began to clear main highways soon after snow began 
to lie. The combined efforts of graders from Tekapo and Twizel achieved 
single-lane clearance relatively rapidly and full clearance within two days. 
As soon as was possible on Monday, 6 August, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Timaru (thence to Fairlie) was notified by the Soil Conservator 
of the snow position in Tekapo area and asked to alert R.N.Z.A.F. helicopter 
squadron. 
Following discussions with police, the urgent need for a helicopter 
was confirmed to rescue stranded persons, assess area and carry out urgent 
transport of personnel. This information was relayed to Police Headquarters, 
Timaru and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Timaru. 
On Tuesday morning a meeting between the chairman of the Mackenzie 
County Council and the Project Engineer, Ministry of Works, attended by 
the Soil Conservator, Tekapo, resolved initially to concentrate County 
plant in Fairlie area and Ministry of Works plant in the Tekapo-Burkes Pass 
area. This action' was later confirmed with the Soil Conservator to 'assist 
with co-ordination. 
Over the next five days, numerous helicopters, snow-ploughs, bull-
dozers, graders and men from several sources were deployed rescuing stock 
trapped in snow over an area extending from Mt Cook Station to the head of 
Lake Tekapo and to Burkes Pass settlement. 
At the end of five days all roads were clear and the majority of 
livestock accounted for. Snow raking continued on a few runs over a large 
part of the following five days. 
4. Comment 
Due to several factors the overall losses of stock in the Mackenzie 
district were not high. These factors include: 
(a) the relatively limited number of runs severely affected, 
(b) the experience of and equipment held by most runholders of the 
district, 
(c) the prompt and concerted action by Ministry of Works, Twizel, 
neighbours and others to assist those in difficulties. 
The speed and determination of those concerned in coming to assist 
others rescuing stock is a good measure of the goodwill and community spirit 
within the district. 
There is no doubt that communications within the district were very 
important. Telephone services played a major role, and had they been 
disrupted, a great deal of valuable time would certainly have been lost. 
Communications from Tekapo to Timaru were achieved initially through a Post 
Office mobile unit which was stranded for a period in the area. Later the 
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N.Z.E.D. and M.O.W. telephone and radio communications systems were used 
several times until toll circuits were restored. The absence of an emer-
gency radiotelephone system covering Twizel-Tekapo-Fairlie-Timaru-Kurow was 
for a period sorely felt. Similarly, the urgency for provision of base to 
vehicle and/or packset radio communications at Lake Tekapo was clearly 
demonstrated. 
The importance of fast-moving snow ploughs was very apparent. 
Bulldozers are slow and graders without snowploughs often cannot handle 
deep snow. A few runholders and both Mackenzie County Council and Ministry 
of Works, Twizel, have deficiencies in snowplough requirements. The use of 
60-90 HP four wheel drive tractors as the motive power for snowploughs 
would be a valuable means of speeding the opening of access before snow 
becomes dense and wet. 
The value of helicopters for rescuing persons, assessing the situa-
tion, and rescuing stock in times of heavy snowfall was again confirmed. 
There were difficulties in scheduling helicopters due to factors of 
competing demands, weather, communications, servicing, and guaranteeing 
payment for services; Periodic consHltation between those likely to be 
organising helicopters and helicopter operators (including R.N.Z.A.F.) 
could well overcome ~any of these difficulties which might be met under 
similar conditions. 
Fundamental farm management factors in avoiding stock loss in snow 
are clearly: 
(a) having stock in accessible and low-snow-risk areas, 
(b) having stock in good condition throughout the year, 
(c) prompt start to snow-raking operations, 
(d) being well equipped with a suitable snowplough (for access) and 
cross country vehicle (for transport), 
(e) having adequate supplies of good quality hay and water, where 
necessary, for feeding stock. 
Even yet there are some runholders ill-equipped to meet heavy snow 
conditions and who expect assistance from the nation and others in spite of 
the fact that snow is a normal hazard of farming in the area. 
A South Canterbury Disaster Committee has been formed to represent 
affected farmers' interests and associated relief organisations in dealings 
with Government and other agencies involved. The Mackenzie District is 
represented by the Chairman, Mackenzie Branch of Federated Farmers and 
the Soil Conservator, Lake Tekapo. Assistance with helicopter and bull-
dozer expenses and with feed supplies, transport of stock and finance for 
re-establishment has been offered by the Government and the Committee is 
currently handling details of this. A full inquiry on the disaster is 
planned for the near future. 
The arrangements for dealing with heavy snowfalls generally agreed 
to after the November 1967 snow worked satisfactorily and the value of an 
operations centre for a region was proved. There is need for a set of 
. ___ guidelines for farmers and local and central Government agencies invol ved, 
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that can be followed in times of emergency. Such guidelines should contain 
information regarding emergency organisation, who to contact and how, 
reporting snow (flood etc.) conditions, what to do for helicopters, plant 
and men and other relevant information. As the situation involved in each 
snowfall is likely to vary, a degree of flexibility is necessary in such 
guidelines. 
5. Action: Kurow-Hakatarame,a District 
General 
First efforts, organised by Police and County Councils were directed 
to opening road access to all homesteads to confirm the safety of the 
occupants. By the evening of Tuesday, 7 August, the roads were clear to 
Rocky Point and below, in both Waitaki and Waimate Counties. Wednesday and 
Thursday saw contact with Cattle Creek, Round Hill, Taihoa, Moorland and 
Asheridge, although additional work was required through to Sunday, 12 
August, to adequately clear all roads to homesteads in the Hakataramea 
Valley. During and after this period, Post Office and Power Board linesmen 
worked long hours under extremely difficult conditions to re-establish 
services. Reliable telephone communication was not established beyond 
Cattle Creek until after the weekend of 11-12 August. 
Although a helicopter worked privately on Hakataramea Station on 
Wednesday, 8 August, it was withdrawn for service elsewhere, the first 
generally available helicopter entering the area late Thursday afternoon. 
An additional helicopter was employed over the weekend and helicopter 
operations ceased on Tuesday, 14 August. Helicopters were used for 
feeding, spotting and transfer of snow rakers. 
Bulldozers were first used to clear roads, or in the case of those 
few owned locally, to provide early access to stock, but by Thursday, most 
were engaged in stock salvage and feeding.' Twenty four machines were 
working in the Hakataramea Valley, including seven smaller machines 
belonging to farmers in the peripheral area. . 
Not until sufficient bulldozers were available to clear tracks, 
could effective use be made of the large pool of volunteer labour, but 
from Friday, 10th, an estimated 50-100 extra men were employed for more 
than a week in the area. 
6. Commission Involvement 
Initially Commission vehicles were made available for essential 
services - doctor, ambulance, Post Office use. 
At a meeting called by Constable Eathorne on Monday, 6 August, the 
Chief Soil Conservator offered Commission staff and vehicles for whatever 
purpose they might be required. 
On Wednesday, 8th, Mr Hurst provided transport for M.A.F. staff on 
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a ground survey of the Hakataramea Valley to determine what assistance 
might be required by farmers - specifically whether a helicopter was 
justified. The Chief Soil Conservator, meanwhile, collated disaster 
information in conjunction with the local executive of Federated Farmers. 
On Thursday, 9th, ao Snow Area Relief Committee was formed from 
Commission staff, M.A.F. staff and the Federated Farmers executive, 
primarily to engage a helicopter and to establish priorities and arrange 
work schedules for it. 
At subsequent meetings held over the ensuing three days, the scope 
of the committee's functions was broadened to include an additional 
helicopter, organisation of bulldozers, labour, and emergency feed 
supplies. Constable Eathorne served as a co-opted member of the committee, 
which, at all times, met a ready response to request for plant and services 
from plant operators, mercantile firms, sporting clubs, transport firms 
and individuals, many of whose basic interests lay well outside pastoral 
farming. 
Commission staff directly involved were Messrs Hurst and Robinson 
who provided ground liaison for helicopters, some bulldozers, and labour, 
in absence of any other communications, and who later with Mr R.V. Maxwell 
assisted with snow raking and feeding. Staff time involved was 130 manhours 
spread over a period of about one week. Combined vehicle mileage was 590. 
To date the slow thaw has obviated flooding, but warmer weather, 
with or without rain could result in a rapid rise in the Hakataramea 
River. 
7. Comment 
Points of general application made by the Soil Conservator, Lake 
Tekapo are endorsed. 
However, the Hakataramea Valley and adjacent areas had escaped such 
heavy falls of snow for too long for all residents to be adequately pre-
pared, and being more intensively farmed than the Mackenzie Basin, it was 
inevitable that large numbers of stock would be located in inaccessible 
positions on the predominantly rolling topography. 
The complete disruption of access and services, combined with 
inexperience, meant that relief work at first proceeded very slowly, and 
was first confined to reassurance on human safety. 
It is probably fair to say that "business as usual" was carried to 
quite ridiculous limits in the first vital days of the disaster, as 
witness the holding of a meeting of the Waitaki Lakes Committee on 6 August. 
This drew key men involved in disaster relief away from their work unneces-
sarily. 
Excessive caution also appeared to surround the initiation of a 
helicopter service to stricken farms and it is considered that the expense 
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Destination~ a dry feeding pad. 
- T.H. DonaZdson. 
of an in tial survey by fixed-wing aircraft, which could have been carried 
out on Tuesday, would have saved one and a half days in the organisation 
of stock salvage. The onset of a plethora of metabolic disease in stock 
left without food or water for up to and beyond a fortnight clearly shows 
the importance of prompt action, even at the possible risk of temporary 
under-use of men and plant. 
The lack of what might be termed a forward command post in the 
Hakataramea Valley in the early stages of the work was a disadvantage 
leading to some duplication of effort, but this was probably an inevitable 
result of lack of effective radio or telephone communications, although 
it was later discovered that at least one Cattle Creek farmer had radio 
contact with the area outside the snow. 
Finally, it is considered that in the preparation of guidelines, no 
rigid demarcation should be set between human welfare and that of live-
stock. 
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8. Recommendations 
The following courses of action by the Commission are recommended: 
(a) The proposed Commission radio communication system be further 
promoted; 
(b) Discussions be initiated between Ministry of Works, Twizel and 
Timaru, Mackenzie County Council, Waitaki and Waimate County Councils 
and the Commission to arrange for the establishment of a joint 
emergency channel in respective radio communication systems; 
(c) Arrangements be made for the provision of a permanent aerial at 
Lake Tekapo Office which may be used by any M.O.W. Twizel packset 
radio used there for Tekapo-Twizel communications; 
(d) With the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries arrangements be 
initiated for periodic consultations with helicopter operators 
(including R.N.Z.A.F.) on the subject of provision and organisation 
of necessary helicopters, equip~ent, fuel etc. in the event of 
emergency services ,being established; 
(e) Meetings be promoted between representatives of the following 
organisations: 
(i) Mackenzie - Mackenzie County Council, Ministry of Works 
(Twizel and Timaru), Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Police, South Canterbury Electric Power Board, Electricity 
Department, South Canterbury Catchment Board, Fairlie and 
Mackenzie branch of Federated Farmers and the Post Office. 
(ii) Omarama-Kurow-Hakataramea - Waimate and Waitaki County 
Councils, Ministry of Works (Twizel and Oamaru), Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, Police, Waitaki Electric 
Power Board, N.Z. Electricity Department, Catchment Authorities, 
Duntroon, Omarama and Upper Waitaki branches of Federated 
Farmers and Post Office; 
The purpose of these meetings being to bring up to date arrangements 
to handle similar emergency services; 
(f) Assistance be offered to Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with 
the production of guidelines for action by farmers in times of snow 
emergency. 
I.G.C. Kerr 
P.A. Hurst 
A.W. Robinson 
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DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AND SURVEY 
Highland Farm Settlement, Hakataramea Valley 
Heavy snow accompanied by strong southerly winds fell in areas above 
150 m (500 ft a.s.l.) from Sunday 5th August to Tuesday morning 7th August 
1973. In the upper Hakataramea Valley snow started falling during the day 
and lay to a depth of 6 in. by evening. That evening the manager when 
taking his son back to boarding school took the Landrover part way down the 
Valley as well as the car and fortunately so because on his return the road 
was impassable to cars. His cariremained down the valley for over a week. 
When snow stopped falling on Tuesday it lay to a minimum depth of 
1 metre (3 ft) over all the downs, and probably much deeper at the back of 
Crossans' Block. 
A four-wheel drive tractor reached Cattle Creek on the Tuesday and 
the road was cle~red by the County to Highland Farm Homestead by Wednesday 
mid-day when some provisions were taken in. Roads in the upper part of the 
Valley and side roads were cleared by Saturday night, a week after the snow. 
As is usual in snow situations communications were difficult and 
power was off. However the Power Board and Post Office did a magnificent 
job in making temporary connections, and power and phone were restored to 
workable levels within a few days of access being available. 
Contact was made from Highland with bulldozer contractors on 
Wednesday via the County radiotelephone system which was operating again 
by then. The same day the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries made a 
road inspection of the area and contacted many farmers, and arrangements 
were made to obtain the services of a helicopter for limited hay feeding 
and to enable farmers and runholders to inspect their properties. 
Bulldozer operators were told by M.A.F. to contact the Highland 
Manager, Don Fraser, on arrival at Cattle Creek. This instruction, unknown 
to Fraser until the bulldozers arrived, saddled him with co-ordinating 
bulldozer activities over all the upper part of the Hakataramea Valley as 
well as coping with his own problems on Highland. It was some days before 
he was relieved of the position and by then most bulldozers were starting 
to move out of the district but during that time he was a tower of 
strength to the residents of the area in g~tting things done while at the 
same time putting up with the idiosyncrasies of people which become evident 
in times of stress. 
By Saturday 11th, with no thaw and snow still 2-3 ft deep, several 
bulldozers were clearing tracks and snow-raking paddocks for sheep and 
cattle. Late that evening all mobs of sheep had been found and all stock 
fed. It was a mammoth task achieved thanks to the magnificent efforts of 
228 
many volunteers including local farmers, transport truck drivers including 
the use of some of their trucks, rabbit board personnel and many others. 
The Manager's wife and assistants provided dozens of meals to helpers who 
came and went in a constant stream. 
Neighbours at the Caberfeidh end fed the cattle there for three 
days which was of considerable assistance. 
On Sunday 12th a bulldozer cleared the snow off the tracks at 
Caberfeidh to assist the movement of stock. There had been considerable 
thawing at that stage on the hill and the cattle were starting to move 
about. 
Monday 13th 
There was still no thaw on flats and downs and energies were directed 
to feeding all stock. Two bulldozers were still at work increasing 
feeding areas and clearing tracks and making access to water. 
Tuesday 14th 
There was again little thaw with snow still 18-24 in. deep around 
the Cattle Creek area. I accompanied the Waimate Veterinary Club veterin-
arian on an inspection of stock in the area including Moorland Settlement 
and Highland Farm Settlement. There was evidence of stock dehydration in 
places but not as noticeable as it had been in two-year-old heifers the 
previous day on Highland. Sheep were showing signs of metabolic disorders, 
of the sleepy sickness-milk fever type. Snow was starting to melt 
sufficiently to form some puddles which was starting to alleviate the 
problem of access to water. 
Friday 17th 
Snow still 12-18 in. deep in Cattle Creek area with considerable 
clearing on the Kirkliston Range but almost no clear spots on the Eastern 
side. 
Wednesday 22nd 
Snow clearing rapidly off Kirkliston Range but still 8-12 in. deep 
in Cattle Creek area with Crossans Block-Moorland area still a blanket of 
white. 
Thursday 23rd 
Snow all cleared off the Caberfeidh Downs and the ground was remark-
ably dry considering the quantity of snow. 
Movement by vehicle was now relatively easy over most of the 
settlement and stock were brightening up and were generally looking better, 
but there were still quite a few deaths from metabolic disorders. 
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Stock General 
A set of circumstances normally considered unfavourable worked to the 
block's favour. This commenced with the dry autumn which because of 
stock condition resulted in the rams being put out a fortnight later 
thereby delaying lambing until early October. This also meant there was no 
urgency for shearing, normally done early August, to be commenced until 
mid-August and fortunately the shearer was held up a few days in North 
Canterbury. 
The ewes had been brought down to paddocks nearer to the shearing 
sheds which considerably facilitated access. 
Stock were in good condition and appeared to stand up to the condi-
tions remarkably well. The hardest hit appeared to be the two-tooth ewes. 
Deaths 
Immediate deaths in the snow appeared remarkably light with about 80-
100 sheep and 1 cow but deaths started to mount up as metabolic disorders 
took their toll. The final tally of deaths based on carcasses collected 
was: 
278 mixed-age ewes 
42 hoggets 
4 wethers 
324 sheep (3.61% of flock) 
4 run cows 
6 rising 3 yr Heifers 
5 rising 2 yr Heifers 
1 rising 1 yr Heifers 
16 cattle (1.17% of herd) 
The low percentage loss, compared with common losses in the area up 
to 11 percent, and one known loss of 500 out of 1400, being 35 percent, is 
in no small measure a tribute to the ability of the manager and his staff 
who put all their effort into saving stock during the month that followed. 
Feed and Feeding 
With more sophisticated feeding methods, a snowfall can spell disaster. 
Oat feeding is good while there is somewhere to feed it and thoughts were 
given to feeding it on the tarsealed road when it w~s cleared but this was 
hazardous. 
Good quality hay fed out by Landrover and car type trailer in the 
lanes left by the bulldozer was most successful. This probably caused a 
bit of upset to sheep that had been on an oat and rough grass ration but 
because of the relatively dry conditions it was only a day or two after 
tracks were cleared that oats was again being fed. 
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It was fortunate, that with the previously very dry ground conditions 
and slow thaw, that the cleared lanes remained fairly dry. 
All feed crops, if they had grown, would have been of no use for 2-3 
weeks and after that feeding would have been precarious due to wet ground 
conditions in feed paddocks. 
Hay and oat supplies which at the start of the winter consisted of 
just under half the winter feeding requirement, the balance being from 
grazing, just held out with only 100 bales of lucerne being purchased. 
From mid-August until early October approximately 9000 bales of 
grass-seed straw was fed out to the breeding cows. Although of low feeding 
value this feed served as a most useful emergency feed ration with what 
little grass was available. 
Good quality feed continued to be short during the early spring 
period and ewes were eventually prelamb shorn with virtually no greenfeed 
being available. However weather conditions were good and ewes came out of 
the wool in satisfactory condition. 
Although feed was sufficient, it is most desirable that adequate 
reserves of hay and oats be built up to carry stock through such extremes 
of climate. 
Costs of the Snow 
The direct cash costs incurred by the snow are as follows: 
Hire of bulldozers 
Hire of helicopter 
Feed 
Vet. remedies - est. 
Loss of stock at current market value 
278 mixed-age ewes at $20 
42 hoggets at $15 
4 wethers at $15 
4 cows at $180 
6 rising 3 yr heifers at $160 
5 rising 2 yr heifers at $150 
1 rising 1 yr heifer at $120 
$1350 
70 
240 
300 
5560 
630 
60 
720 
960 
750 
120 
$1961 
$8800 
$10761 
Also there was additional mileages to vehicles and travelling 
expenses, sundry expenses, plus repairs to fences. In general fences 
did not suffer too badly but there will still be considerable time spent 
re-straining hill fences this sUmmer. 
Notes on snow precautions and needs 
1. Feed reserves in the form of dry feeds such as hay and oats should 
be 25 percent above anticipated normal requirements. 
2. Stock should be held in accessible areas after the shortest day 
when being fed or placed on blocks known to clear quickly of snow. 
(This was the case.) 
3. Access to water should be watched as snowraking proceeds. Watch 
for signs of dehydration. If cattle suddenly appear very quiet it 
is probable they are very thirsty. 
4. All stock should be accustomed to eating dry feeds such as hay and 
oats when they were young, i.e. hoggets and calves should be fed on 
these feeds early in their first winter so that they will take to eating 
it more readily whenever the need arises. 
Where possible all stock which are to be fed during the winter or 
likely to be fed during the winter should be introduced to the feed 
available, hay or oats, even if Qnly low levels as a supplement, from mid-
June. This will tend to reduce undesirable rapid changes in diet if only 
a dry diet (hay, grain) is necessary due to snow. 
5. Early diagnosis of meatbolic disorders is essential, even if only 
the type of disorder, and taking of immediate remedial measures is 
essential. The use of drugs and magnesium on hay under veterinary advice 
as soon as any sign of disorder appears is well worth while. Molasses is 
a very good cheap sugar supplement to use on hay as an early preventative 
to disorders. 
6. Use of machinery 
(a) Helicopters 
These are very good but in such a situation are in very short supply, 
are available only for a short time and are very expensive. 
Uses should be in order of priority 
(i) Check on homesteads to ascertain health, stores, and require-
ments if communications are disrupted. 
(ii) Reconnaissance of the property to check the whereabouts of 
stock so that snowraking operations with bulldozers etc. can 
be rationally planned. 
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(iii) Ferrying men in and out of blocks and properties for snowraking 
until vehicle access is restored. 
(iv) Taking out hay. Note this is a low priority and I feel that 
much time and effort is possibly wasted in this work as in many 
cases the hay was still there after the snow melted. It could 
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be of good use if vehicle access is not available to a group 
of cattle that have been snowraked into an area where water is 
available. 
(b) Bulldozers and snowploughs on crawler tractors 
The more the better. It could be well worthwhile carting a bulldozer 
100 miles for just one day's work. They are the best and fastest 
means of clearing snow from roads, tracks, around buildings and 
feeding pads or for making lanes in paddocks and snowraking trapped 
mobs of stock. 
The farmer/manager, or someone who knows the property well, should 
be with the driver so that the best use can be made of the machines. 
Bulldozers were most useful on Highland but it was almost a week 
before the first one was available. 
The making of ianes around a paddock for feeding stock and at th'e 
same time using the lanes for access to other areas creates diffi-
culties. It may be preferable to clear (or roll down the snow with 
the tracks on the bulldozer) a larger area and hold the sheep in this 
and form a separate lane for access. 
(c) Crawler Tractors 
A crawler tractor is most useful for snowraking as it will make satis-
factory tracks for sheep to move out on and is fairly mobile in snow 
up to 2 ft 6 in. deep. A good feeding pad can also be developed 
with a crawler tractor merely by compacting the snow and feeding out 
on it. This can be expanded each time s.tock are fed. 
(d) Four-wheel-drive tractors 
A four-wheel tractor demonstrated its outstanding ability to negotiate 
the deep snow when it was driven by a local farmer from the bottom of· 
the valley to the top-most property to check on homesteads prior to 
the road being opened. 
These machines are worthy of full consideration for a settler, as 
a type of tractor for cultivation, winter feeding, and machine for 
snowraking and possibly fitting a snowplough onto. It would be 
especially suitable on Caberfeidh where autumn, winter, and spring 
conditions are often very wet and frequently subject to snow. This 
type of tractor would also be safer on the tracks than a normal two-
wheel drive. 
(e) Light Four-wheel-drive Vehicles (e.g. Landrovers) 
These vehicles were the most mobile where snow did not exceed about 
one foot in depth especially when fitted with chains on all four 
wheels. A Landrover with.heavy car trailer proved an extremely 
useful and mobile method of feeding stock along the lanes cleared by 
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the bulldozers. A flatdecked Landrover would have been preferable to 
the weel-side and covered vehicles which are on the block. 
(f) Wheel tractors 
Wheel tractors ,are fairly limited in deep snow and even when snow is 
cleared have very limited traction even on slight inclines if the 
ground is frozen. 
GENERAL 
Highland Farm Settlement came through the snow with very moderate 
losses. The response by staff and their families to the occasion was most 
commendable in the arduous conditions. 
While the staff coped with the vehicles available it is essential that 
this block be kept fully equipped with good well maintained vehicles which 
are so essential in snow conditions. 
Houses should continue to be built with solid fuel space heaters 
and dual hot water systems. It is also desirable that a pot can be heated 
on the space heater or that some alternative method of cooking be provided. 
Rock-gas cookers that will attach to gas cylinders used for lamb tailing are 
very convenient standbys. 
Communications were most difficult and no system perfect. Radiotele-
phone systems were only as good as the power supplies to the transmitters 
and all failed, some being restored within a day or two either with 
emergency generators or where possible by repairs. The Waimate Veterinary 
Club which provided an excellent veterinary service during the snow also 
loaned a base radio set to Highland Farm Settlement although by that time 
telephones were working again and it was not required. 
One interesting point was how the snow cleared much quicker off the 
lower part of the Kirkliston Range and the downs of Caberfeidh than from 
other areas in the Valley. This has apparently also been the situation in 
other heavy snows dating back to the late 1880s according to an old and' 
well-informed resident of the Valley. 
SUMMARY 
While losses in the snow have been moderate, the cost is still fairly 
substantial at nearly $11,000 with other longer term costs such as lambing 
percentage reduced by as much as 10 percent (1972 - 91%; 1973 - 80%), 
anticipated !educed calving, repairs to fences, and additional wear and 
tear on vehicles. With these additional costs the total could exceed 
$20,000 or $1.25 per stock unit carried. 
R.A. Ward-Smith 
Field Officer 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
Climatic Emergency Relief - 14 November 1973 
Cabinet has approved an additional relief measure in the form of a 
Suspensory Loan to be available to farmers suffering severe financial 
hardship as the result of adverse climatic events. 
It will be necessary for Relief Committees to be satisfied that 
conditions are such that individual farmers are facing hardship, and to 
recommend to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries that he seek 
Ministerial approval of the provision of suspensory loans within the 
Committee's area. If and when approval is received, the Committee's task 
will then be to ensure that farmers are aware of the availability of this 
form of assistance. Investigations into the circumstances of individual 
applicants, and decisions as to the actions to be taken in each case will 
be the responsibility of State Advances Corporation. 
Cabinet has also agreed to the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture 
and Fisheries approving certain relief measures without reference to 
Cabinet. These measures are: 
(1) Subsidy on stock cartage 
(2) Subsidy on hay cartage 
(3) Regrassing subsidy, in case of floods. 
In the event of serious climatic adversity, Relief Committees can 
expect early decisions on requests for these 'standard' forms of assis-
tance. 
It should be noted that provlslon of Government-guaranteed bank 
overdrafts is no longer on the list of 'standard' relief measures. It is 
felt that the existing forms of financial assistance available through the 
State Advances Corporation should be sufficient to deal with most situations, 
and where cases of severe hardship exist, Relief Committees can ask for 
approval for the suspensory loan provisions mentioned earlier in this 
circular. However, if neither of these means of financial help is considered 
sufficient, and the Committee feels that Government-guaranteed bank over-
drafts would fill a real need, Government is prepared to consider such 
requests. 
In view of the major involvement of the State Advances Corporation in 
providing financial assistance to farmers suffering from the effects of 
adverse climatic events, an officer of the Corporation is to be invited to 
be a member of all Relief Committees. 
J.M. Hercus 
for Director 
Advisory Services Division 
STATE ADVANCES CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND 
CLIMATIC RELIEF ASSISTANCE 
(Circular Memorandum 107/1973 of 16 November 1973) 
1. POLICY 
The Corporation as part of its normal rural lending activities, pro-
vides special financial assistance to farmers (including 50/50 share-
milkers, etc.) in defined climatic relief areas. (Previously referred to 
as Disaster or Drought Relief.) Applications are treated sympathetically 
where the difficulties arise because of exceptional climatic conditions. 
A flexible approach is taken to security margins, mortgage ranking, etc. 
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Arising from the severe drought conditions during 1972/73 in the 
Wairau Valley and the 1973 snowstorms in North Otago and Canterbury, 
Government has decided that a suspensory loan factor is to be included in 
future relief measures. This will apply only to farmers who are suffering 
severe hardship because of exceptional climatic conditions such as drought, 
floods, storms, etc. (Approval has already been given to granting 
suspensory loans in appropriate cases to Wairau Valley farmers and those 
in North Otago and Canterbury affected by snow losses.) 
Where severe climatic conditions have occurred and local "Climatic 
Relief Committees" consider suspensory loan provisions could be warranted 
they will make a recommendation to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for suspensory loans to be considered. The committees will not 
be involved in the actual investigation of individual farmer's circum-
stances. The following criteria will be used by the committees in deciding 
whether suspensory loans should apply: . 
"That conditions within the defined area are such that individual 
farmers are facing hardship because of any of the following factors: 
(a) significant stock losses or reduction in capital stock; 
(b) significant loss or anticipated loss of crops, fruit or 
other production." 
2. RELIEF MEASURES 
Interest rate to be 5~% (non-reviewable) irrespective of the ranking 
of the security available. 
(i) Standard: Payment of interest only for the first two years and 
then review to fix permanent repayment terms; or 
Interest may be deferred for the first two years and 
at the end of the deferment period added to the loan and the total 
amount placed on a repayment term of up to 25 years. 
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(ii) Special Measures: Interest which would normally accrue on relief 
loans in the first two years up to a limit of $500, can be placed 
on a suspensory loan basis for five years. The amount suspended 
would be interest free and written off after five years unless the 
farm is sold during· this period in which event the suspensory 
amount would be repayable. 
3. PURPOSE OF CLIMATIC RELIEF LOANS 
These loans can be used to meet all forms of farm expenditure 
includin~ normal maintenance, purchase of hay or other stock foods, cartage, 
sprays, living expenses, etc. Refinance will also be considered to repay 
hardcore debts or other outstanding debts if essential to assist in the 
farmer's rehabilitation. 
4. ELIGIBILITY FOR SUSPENSORY LOANS 
It is not possible'to lay down precise criteria for Corporation 
officers to deal wit~ individual cases but with present buoyant prices it 
is expected that there will be few instances where suspensory loans will 
be required. As a general rule applicants will be eligible for suspensory 
loans where it is essential to defer interest on climatic relief loans and 
where the equity in the total farming enterprise does not exceed $50,000. 
Even though an applicant does not qualify for a suspensory loan his cir-
cumstances may be such that a deferment of interest is warranted and it 
is Head Office intention that this concession should continue to be 
freely available. 
All applications involving the granting of suspensory loans are to 
be referred to the M.L.C. for consideration. 
5. DELEGATION 
Local Loans Committees are authorised to grant loans on the 
following basis: 
(a) Up to $1,000 on security of a simple form of acknowledgement -
document to be prepared by Corporation; 
(b) Up to $10,000 secured by formal documents provided the loan is 
within normal two-thirds lending margin. 
All other cases, including declines, those of doubtful merit and 
those where suspensory loans may be warranted, are to be referred to the 
M.L.C. 
6. FEES AND RESERVE FUND CONTRIBUTION 
No application fees are payable but General Reserve Fund contribu-
tion is to be paid on all advances (except in the case of a stock loan 
borrower). 
7. PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
Although the Special Relief measures refer to a suspensory loan 
factor, in practice interest will be recovered from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries Emergency Expenditure. 
For accounting purposes the action taken for deferment of interest 
(para. 2(i)) will also apply to the suspensory loans approved under para 
2(ii). In the former case the interest will be capitalised at the end of 
the two-year period; in the latter case (suspensory loan) the Corporation 
will claim the two years' interest from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
When a climatic relief loan includes a suspensory loan, the borrower 
will be advised in the offer that interest (up to $500) due for the first 
two years is being suspended and will be written off after five years, but 
if he sells the property within the five year period the suspended amount 
will be repayable. Detailed accounting instructions will be issued later 
and will cover the issue of instalment notices. 
8. REPORTS 
The type of report to be completed will depend on the circumstances 
but as a general rule a B 2/6 report and summary sheet with budget will be 
required for existing Corporation borrowers and a full valuation and 
report for new applicants. 
9. FUNDS 
While for classification purposes climatic relief loans will be 
shown under "refinance", Branches can exclude these loans from their 
refinance authorisation allocation. However, a record of climatic relief 
loans is to be kept in each Branch so that statistical information can be 
readily obtained when required. 
10. GENERAL 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries will be sending separate 
instructions to local Climatic Relief Committees and through them will 
arrange the necessary publicity. The Ministry will also instruct Local 
Committees to refer any individual enquiries to the Corporation. District 
Appraisers will in future be members of all Climatic Relief Committees. 
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RNZAF iroquois with hay in the sling and troop bay. 
- T.R. Donaldson. 
Copies of this circular are being forwarded to Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries to be distributed to Advisory Officers and a number of copies 
of the Ministry's circular are available for distribution to Rural Field 
staff and Farm Administration. 
11. A new form of acknowledgement (D15/3) has been prepared for loans of 
up to $1,000, approved in terms of paragraph 5(a) and a supply of 
these forms is being forwarded under separate cover. 
Where a suspensory loan has been approved the following clause will 
be inserted in the security document: 
"Notwithstanding anything elsewhere in these presents contained 
any interest as aforesaid (but not exceeding in all the sume of 
$500.00) which may accrue hereunder during the first two years 
of the subsistence of this loan shall not be payable by the 
mortgagor(s)/guarantor(s) unless all or any of the aforesaid/under-
mentioned land shall within the first five years of such subsistence 
be sold or leased or otherwise alienated: and unless and until the 
same shall become payable during the said first five years such 
interest shall itself not bear interest hereunder." 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
NEW ZEALAND ARMY 
"1. This report covers the period in early August in which blizzard 
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conditions prevailed over most of the central South Island, and HQ 3 
Infantry Brigade Group was dire,cted to co-ordinate Service assistance to 
isolated farms, communities, and authorities concerned with the distribu-
tion of power. 
(a) Co-ordination between the Services, Police and Civil Agencies: A 
senior officer from R.N.Z.A.F. was seconded to HQ 3 Infantry Brigade 
Group throughout the emergency. His assistance and the personal 
assistance of the Air Officer Commanding, HQ Support Group Wigram, 
assisted greatly in providing the requirements placed on the 
services to meet emergencies. Police liaison was arranged with 
the Co-ordinator of Police SAR and no problems occurred with this 
arrangement. Civil agencies in the main requested assistance 
through the "Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, local Power Boards 
and the Post Office and at all stages during the emergency this 
liaison worked well. 
(b) The performance of Ml13-type vehicles was particularly successful. 
The M548 Load Carrier vehicle was responsible for opening Porters 
Pass and rescuing a number of stranded motorists. 
(c) This type of operation required trained drivers using vehicle fully 
fitted with wheel chains. 
2. Manpower and vehicles, employed directly in support, is summarised 
at Annex A, but does not include command post or communications 
staff. Details of Annex A are given below:" 
Annex A 
1. Man hours used in support of: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Ashburton Electric Power Board 
Search and Rescue air crash 
Central Canterbury Electric Power Board 
New Zealand Post Office 
New Zealand Police 
Total man hours expended 
(Army manpower employed totalled 130 approximately) 
5950 
235 
34 
160 
20 
10 
6409 
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2. Vehicles Used and Mileage 
Type 
M113 APC 
M548 TLC 
Landrovers and 
Trucks 3.0 ton 
Totals 
Introduction 
Qty 
4 
1 
73 
78 
R.J. Andrews 
Lt Col. 
Chief of Staff 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
ROYAL NEW ZEALAND AIR FORCE 
Operation Snowline 
Miles Run 
1339 
605 
31624 
33568 
1. Following very heavy snowfalls in the Canterbury Plain area in early 
August 1973, the RNZAF was tasked by the Government to provide air 
support for search, rescue and relief operations. NZDEF Air Op Inst 7/73 
provided the directive for OPHQ involvement in these operations. 
Aim 
2. The aim of this paper is to briefly outline Operations Group's part 
in this relief operation, nicknamed SNOWLINE, and to offer recom-
mendations. 
Discussion 
Operations Group Involvement 
3. Operations Group provided four Iroquois aircraft plus aircrews and 
support personnel, in direct support of SNOWLINE. The aircraft and 
crews were drawn from No 3 Squadron, RNZAF Auckland and No 3 Squadron 
Detachment, RNZAF Wigram. The detachment was commanded by the Acting 
Officer Commanding Utility Flight, No 3 Squadron, Squadron Leader K. 
Claydon, and was in situ from 9-13 August 1973. 
Command and Control 
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4. Command and control of OPGP aircraft and personnel was exercised by 
the AOC OPGP through the detachment commander. 
Co-ordination 
5. All tasking in the relief area was co-ordinated by an officer 
appointed by AOC Support Group, and individual flights were tasked 
by a jointly manned ATOC, through MAOT's at Fairlie, Darfield, Methven and 
other in country landing sites. Minor communications problems, and lack 
of an RNZAF representative at the local civil Area HQ's resulted in so~e 
overtasking by Ministry of Agriculture representatives. 
Effort 
6. The detachment flew 424 sorties, amounting to 149.2 hours during 
period 8-13 August 1973 (see Annex A). 
7. Total payload carried amounted to 872 passengers and 103 tons of 
freight, and included the casevac of the captain of a crashed 
RNZAF Harvard, and a pregnant woman. 
8. The manpower directly involved in the operations worked, on average, 
one 15~ hour day for 7 days, from reveille at 0530 hours until last 
,meal at 2100 hours. 
Support 
9. The support given by RNZAF Wigram personnel was greatly appreciated. 
They cheerfully and happily worked long hours to help the detachment. 
10. Cold weather clothing was issued on arrival at RNZAF Wigram: In 
future this will be drawn from the pool at RNZAF Auckland, and 
should include sunglasses, particularly for MAOT's and MAMS working in 
country. 
11. The landing sites used were not ideal. The availability of flat 
hard standings with road access at strategic locations in the area 
would have speeded up the in-country delivery of supplies. 
Conclusion 
12. The RNZAF Operations Group made an extremely practical and useful 
contribution to the relief operations in support of the civil 
admirri-syration. In a sustained operation it is necessary to have sound 
communications, and a flexible command and control organization. 
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AeriaZ spotting on CoZeridge Station. 
13. The need for closer liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries representatives in country was apparent, particularly if 
the full potential of RNZAF participation is to be realized. 
14. The provision of flat hard area suitable for helicopter LS's would 
speed up the relief resupply. 
Recommendations 
15. It is recommended that·: 
(a) An annual seminar be held each autumn between RNZAF and appropriate 
civil departments to discuss past relief operations,aand formulate 
outline plans for future operations. 
(b) That the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries consider means of 
providing suitable helicopter landing pads at strategically placed 
localities in country. This could be discussed fully at the 
proposed seminar. 
D.B. Flintoff 
Group Captain 
for Air Officer Commanding 
I 
Aircraft Hours Sorties 
------ ------ ------
Date Avail Serv Daily Total Daily Total 
8 Aug 2 2 7.4 5 
9 Aug 4 4 23.4 30.8 20 25 
10 Aug 4 4 32.3 63.1 130 155 
11 Aug 4 4 30.1 93.2 122 277 
12 Aug 4 3 20.5 113.7 60 337 
13 Aug 4 3 35.5 149.2 87 424 
OPERATION SNOWLINE 
IROQUOIS TASK SUMMARY 
Passengers Freight (tons) 
------ ------
Daily Total Daily Total 
8 Nil 
24 32 19 19 
161 193 14~ 33~ 
237 430 37!z 70t 
144 574 17!z 88~ 
298 872 15 I 103~ 
Medical 
------
Daily Total 
Nil 
1 1 
5 6 
1 7 
Nil 7 
Nil 7 
ANNEX A 
Remarks 
Nil 
10.2 hrs transit 2 A/C 
H~-WG 
Casevac from Harvard 
crash 
Casevac from Civil 
Helicopter crash 
2.0 hrs Harvard crash 
support 
1.6 hrs Harvard salvage. 
Includes 10.8 hrs 
transit. 
~ 
~ 
w 
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An Army M548 tracked vehicle with emergency stockfeed. 
High Peak Station. 
- N. Z. Army. 
M548 returns to Springfield with motorists who were 
trapped on Porters Pass. 
- N. Z. Army 
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, WELLINGTON 
Agriculture - Use of Helicopters in Snowstorm; 5-7 August 
1. Cabinet (CM 72/39/34) approved delegation to the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries powers to approve an air assistance exer-
cise to assist farmers to save livestock in emergencies caused by 
abnormal climatic conditions. 
2. Farmers were to contribute to the exercise: 
* 
* 
* 
Not less than SO percent of the cost of operations on each 
property 
Not less than SO percent of transit costs o~ aircraft (when' 
Air Force aircraft are called in from other areas) between the 
base and ~he emergency headquarters 
Government meets the full costs of "ferry time", defined as 
the time taken to travel from emergency headquarters to the 
individual property and from one property to another. Ferry-
time also includes spotting, investigation and similar air 
time not directly attributable to the property of a runholder. 
3. Cabinet approved as part of the procedure for air and surface assis-
tance that farmers agree beforehand to meet not less than SO percent 
of the costs as set out in paragraph 2. 
4. Payment for air and surface assistance is to be made on approval of 
the invoice by the appropriate Relief Committee. 
Recoveries 
5. Recoveries are to be made from farmers, on the basis prescribed in 
paragraph 2, by normal debit note action. 
6. Invoices submitted by helicopter and other operators of equipment 
used may not differentiate between ferry time and "on farm" time. 
If not, Advisory Officers and Relief Committees should be approached 
and asked to give an estimate of productive air time spent on 
individual properties. Similar action will be necessary in regard 
to Ministry of Defence aircraft. Adequate records should have been 
kept to enable such an estimate to be arrived at. 
7. For each invoice received, a breakdown should be prepared listing: 
(i) properties upon which emergency equipment was employed; 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(i v) 
the hours or parts of hours of productive air time spent on 
individual properties; 
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the hours of ferry time from emergency headquarters to indivi-
dual prqperties and between properties; 
and the hours of ferry time spent on reconnaissance, spotting 
and similar air time not attributable to specific properties. 
8. Recoveries are to be made from individual farmers who received aid, 
the amount being 50 percent of the productive air time multiplied 
by the cost per hour charged by the operator. The Ministry will 
meet costs incurred in "ferry time". 
9. Transit costs should only have been incurred in the transfer of Air 
Force Iroquois helicopters from Auckland to Christchurch. Fifty 
percent of this cost should be recovered from farmers on a 
percentage basis of productive air time spent by Iroquois heli-
copters on individual properties. A summary of the information 
received from the Ministry of Defence is outlined in the attached 
appendix. It is understood that Defence airc~aft serviced committees 
in the Christchurch region only. 
APPENDIX 
USE OF DEFENCE AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST SOUTI-I ISLAND FARMERS 
The following Ministry of Defence aircraft were used on relief work 
resulting from the snowstorm of 5-7 August. Daily hours flown are also 
outlined: 
Date 
8.8.73 
9.8.73 
10.8.73 
11.8.73 
12.8.73 
13.8.73 
Total operating (includes farmer 
operations and ferry time) 
Transit time 
Total flying hours 
Iroquois 
3.0 
10.9 
27.7 
26.7 
18.5 
20.6 
107.4 
18.5 
125.9 
Sioux 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
Devon 
2.4* not 
recoverable 
2.4 
2.4 
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The costs and charge out rate related to the above aircraft are as 
follows: 
Aircraft 
Type 
Iroquois 
Sioux 
Devon 
Note: 
Aircraft Direct 
Operating Cost 
$ 
15,108 
260 
125 
15,493 
(Chargeout 
rate/hour) 
($120/hour) 
($40/hour) 
($52/hour) 
Aircrew (Charge out 
Costs rate/hour 
$ 
1,511 ($12/hour) 
26 ($4/hour) 
31 ($13/hour) 
1,568 
1. The cost for the Iroquois includes transit time. 
Total 
$ 
16,619 
286 
156 
17,061 
2. The Devon aircraft was used for a Government recce by Mr Barclay, 
MP, and Mr Jolly, MAF, and is not recoverable from farmers. 
The following example outlines the costs to be recovered from 
farmers. The amounts shown are for purposes of this example only and 
the actual amounts would have to be calculated. 
Total cost - Ministry of Defence aircraft $17,061 
Less cost of Devon (non-recoverable) 156 
$16,905 
Less cost of ferry time (non-recoverable) 6,905 
$10,000 
50 percent recoverable from farmers $ 5,000 
This includes cost of transit time for Iroquois to be apportioned 
as outlined in paragraph 9 of covering instruction. 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, WELLINGTON 
(Advisory Services Division Circular Memorandum 1972/19) 
Use of Air Services in Abnormal Climatic Emergencies 
1. Government has approved an extension of emergency relief measures 
to assist farmers in widespread abnormal climatic emergencies, such 
as snowstorms or floods, which are unseasonally severe and have an 
extraordinary effect on a large number of stock. Helicopters and aircraft 
may now be used in certain situations for inspection and relief work. It 
is intended that resources of commercial organisations be used wherever 
practicable and the Ministry of Agriculture may approve Area Relief 
Committees' recommendations. However if no suitable aircraft or heli-
copters are available from the private sector, Defence Department resources 
may be used subj e.ct to the approval of the Minister of Defence. 
Set out below are procedures and conditions to implement this 
additional assistance. 
2. Use of aircraft for inspection and spotting purposes 
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(a) Regional controlling officers, after they have satisfied themselves 
that it is essential, may authorise the use of aircraft for inspection 
and spotting purposes in respect of any snowstorm or other emergency 
arising from abnormal climatic occurrences such as floods and storms. 
A departmental Advisory Officer is to be included in any inspection 
party. Where the emergency affects more than one advisory district 
it is desirable that departmental representatives (preferably Farm 
Advisory Officers) from all affected areas are involved in these 
appraisal missions. 
(b) Expenditure is to be charged to the item Emergency Expenditure to 
Assist Farmers. 
3. Use of helicopters and aircraft to assist farmers 
A cast setting out full details, including the following provisions, 
may be put to the Director-General by an Area Relief Committee for the 
hire of helicopters and aircraft following widespread abnormal climatic 
occurrences provided: 
(a) The Area Relief Committee is first to consider the effect of the 
emergency, the need for and value of an air or other excise to 
assist farmers and, only when considered justified, to recommend 
assistance. 
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(i) The Chairman of the Committee may contact the following Airforce 
personnel to obtain advice on the feasibility and estimated 
cost of using aircraft or helicopters to assist the Committee 
make a decision. 
Station 
Wigram 
Whenuapai 
N.Z. Defence 
Headquarters 
Location 
Christchurch 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Contact Officer 
Orderly Officer 
Orderly Officer 
Deputy Air Staff Officer 
(ii) Justification for assistance must be clearly established. As 
a general guideline the following points are to be considered: 
The survival of a large number of domestic stock, say 10,000, 
is in serious jeopardy. 
It is in the national interest to save these animals. 
The situation arose for reasons beyond the control of the 
farmer/runholder. 
Rescue measures have a reasonable chance of success. 
The cost.is justified. 
(b) Farmers are to agree beforehand to meet half the transit cost of 
aircraft, or equipment and personnel to the headquarters established 
for the emergency operation. Also half the cost of operations on 
their separate properties. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
The basis of determining share/cost is as follows: Government 
will meet the full cost of "ferry time", i.e. the time taken 
by air or ground equipment to travel from the emergency head-
quarters to the individual property and from one property to the 
next. Also spotting, investigation and other similar air time 
not directly attributed to the property of a farmer. 
Charges for air services are to be based on the productive air 
time flown multiplied by the cost per hour. Note the current 
cost of operating an Airforce Iroquois helicopter is $120 
per flying hour. 
The Area Relief Committee is to arrange for the completion of 
agreements in writing with farmers, except where the nature of 
the emergency and time do not permit such action before relief 
is required, in which case verbal agreements are sufficient 
provided they are confirmed in writing as soon as practicable. 
(c) The Area Relief Committee is satisfied that the farmers involved are 
aware of the cost-sharing basis and are prepared to meet their share. 
(d) Endorsement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of the need 
for air assistance. A copy of the case is to be referred through the 
regional controlling officer to the Director, Advisory Services 
Division, with his supporting comments and a firm recommendation. 
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4. Availability of assistance 
Area Relief Committees are to use local resources for air, surface 
or other assistance but if none are available, or those available are 
inadequate, assistance may be sought from Defence Department. 
Procedures are as follows: 
(a) If, after completing the procedures detailed in paragraph 3, the 
Area Relief Committee considers Defence Department's assistance is 
required because there is no suitable alternative, the Chairman is 
to contact his regional controlling officer to advise him of the 
request with full details setting out action taken to date and 
reasons supporting the case. 
(b) The regional controlling officer is to forward the request, 
together with full details and his recommendation, to the Director, 
Advisory Services Division who will initiate action to obtain the 
necessary approval. NOTE: Ministry of Defence approval required. 
s. Accounting procedures 
(a) Where private contractors are employed: Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries is to pay contractors' accounts and recover farmer 
costs. Local accounting offices are to arrange this provided the 
expenditure has been correctly approved beforehand. 
(b) Where Defence equipment or personnel are utilised: 
(i) Defence Department is to meet all expenditure involved and 
keep adequate records to support recovery of the full costs 
incurred, including air/time and the times of Defence staff 
involved. A transfer voucher with statements or copies of 
records supporting recovery of expenditure from Agriculture 
is to be forwarded to Head Office. Head Office will forward 
the claim to the appropriate region for verification before 
completing the departmental coding and transmitting to 
Treasury. 
(ii) Agriculture accounting offices are to arrange for local 
Defence staff to supply details of costs incurred on indivi-
dual farmers' properties and raise debit notes to recover the 
farmers' share. 
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Section 7: Suggestions for the Future 
The efficiency of relief,measures is discussed by members 
of several organisations which took part in the emergency and 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries takes a critical look 
at all facets of relief work. The findings are summarised ln 
the final sub-section, Suggestions for the Future. 
Findings of a Representative Meeting of Organisations. 
Findings of Ashburton Staff of Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
Findings of Farm Advisory Officers. 
Role of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ln Future 
Emergencies~ 
Suggestions for the Future. 
FINDINGS OF A REPRESENTATIVE MEETING 
OF ORGANISATIONS 
(Timaru, 24 August 1973) 
Present: Representatives of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Advisory 
Services Division, State Advances Corporation, Department of Lands and Survey, 
South Canterbury Catchment Board and farm consultants. 
Findings: 
(1) The contact with Federated Farmers should be the Chairman, his 
nominee or Secretary. He will then nominate farmers to be active in 
the area. There could be farmers from outside who have the time 
because they are not personally involved in the disaster. 
(2) Key people are required to phone up when they get, say, 3 inches of 
snow. An early warning system is most important in view of future 
lack of communication. 
(3) Radiotelephone links - unless these are in regular use they will not 
work. Catchment Board experience has proven this. It is not a real 
solution to areas in isolation. It is better to drop units in by 
helicopter. Ministry of Works and local Power Board should be all on 
the emergency frequency. 
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(4) Contact and meet with Catchment Board, State Advances Corporation and 
Department of Lands and Survey to work out a list of people, vehicles 
and radiotelephones and to allocate these resources to various 
centres to best advantage. People to have knowledge of the particular 
area. 
(5) An inventory is required of machines: 
(a) Helicopters and their capability. 
(b) Bulldozers and their capability. 
(c) Transporters. 
(6) The matter of insurance and liability in terms of helicopters and 
avalanche etc. needs to be well sorted out. 
(7) Civil Defence should not be brought in unless life is at risk. 
(8) Our position needs to be sorted out in relation to 
(a) Search and Rescue 
(b) Individual safety of the farmer - e.g. health, pregnant woman 
etc. 
(9) Some means needs to be devised so that the farmer can let us know 
if he requires assistance or not. This applied particularly to air 
reconnaissance. This could involve making a coloured mark in the 
snow or flying a flag. It was suggested there should be two-way 
communication as someone in real trouble may be able to do nothing. 
(10) Opening of roads - this is the responsibility of the County but we 
need to sort this out to see where we stand where this must be done. 
All agreed that access is of prime importance both to and on the 
farm and that little progress can be made until this has been achieved. 
(11) A fixed-wing plane is an advantage for the first quick look over the 
total area. 
(12) The real problem is to get the first helicopter. This should be 
used for general reconnaissance by people who know the area, then to 
calIon the farmer in isolation to find out what he wants. Only then 
is it to be used for spotting and feeding out. 
(13) The Army should be called in very early. The main problem is 
communication and the Army signallers can overcome a lot of this. 
They are also independent in terms of looking after themselves. The 
Army have radiotelephone sets that can be used in a helicopter. 
(14) The Catchment Board and the Counties can be a good radiotelephone 
link. Similar links between these organisations, modelled on the 
Geraldine County, need further investigation. This is very 
important in the initial stages. Heavier power and phone lines 
need investigation. 
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(15) For snowraking, only experienced men should be sent into the high 
country where there is danger. On easier country an experienced man 
is required with each team. In many cases the farmer does not know 
what is required. 
(16) An investigation needs to be made of land machines. These include, 
snow mobile, snow cat, ski whizz etc. We need to know who has them 
and how do we get them. 
(17) Meet every two years to up-date thinking. 
(18) Better use of the local radio station 
information about district problems. 
for helicopters and other assistance. 
made at specific times. 
would provide more specific 
Priorities should be established 
Situation broadcasts should be 
(19) Damage to buildings - refer to comments, item 19. 
(20) Reliance on electricity - refer to comments, item 20. 
(21) Farmers should have'equipment to handle snow. 
Some comments by the South Canterbury Disaster Relief Committee on the 
the points raised were: 
(5) Inventory of machinery available: 
Civil Defence should already have a list. 
Police lists would not be complete. 
There was a need to detail capacity of machinery shown in such 
lists. 
(6) Insurance: 
It appeared Public Service personnel would be adequately covered as 
would anyone working on a payroll but the position of private and 
volunteer workers was not clear. It was suggested that the position 
would be rectified with the introduction of the Compensation Act in 
April 1974. 
(7) A Civil Defence emergency could not be proclaimed unless human life 
was at risk. 
(8) While welfare of stock was the primary responsibility of the 
Emergency Committee, the terms of reference obviously included the 
health and safety of the farming population. 
Mr Simpson (Mackenzie branch, Federated Farmers) commented that 
immediately the seriousness of the position became obvious the 
Chairman of the Mackenzie County Council had contacted the Police 
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and medical services and ascertained what assistance was necessary 
for households under stiess. 
(9) Some system must be devised for a farmer in isolation to be able 
to advise a reconnaissance party whether or not he needed assistance. 
(10) Opening of roads: 
Access to properties is of primary importance. 
Mr Midgely (Waimate County Council) stated that the Waimate County 
Council accepted that communication was its primary concern and 
it had endeavoured to assure access to every occupied property as its 
first priority and the opening of roads for the rescue of stock as 
its second priority. 
(11) Fixed-wing planes could obviously be ~sed for initial reconnaissance 
as these could be brought into the area quite speedily and there was 
normally a fairly large pool of such planes available . 
... 
(13) Earliest possible use should be made of Army personnel. 
(14) Catchment Boards and Counties would be looking closely at the 
question of communication. Suggested that radiotelephone sets should 
be converted for dual use either battery-operated or power-operated 
and that every effort should be made to establish an inter-link 
between Counties, Catchment Board and relief headquarters. 
(IS) It was stressed that snowrakers being dropped into the high country 
should be experienced men and that in every party of snowrakers an 
experienced person should be in charge. 
(16) It was considered most desirable that an investigation be made 
to the location and availability of equipment such as snowmobiles, 
snow cats and snowploughs. 
(17) Mr Simpson advised that a meeting of farmers in his area had 
recommended that the Emergency Committee should meet say every two 
years to up-date thinking on disaster relief and to keep Federated 
Farmers Executives and departmental staff au fait with the position. 
(18) It was also suggested that fuller use of the local radio station be 
made in times of emergency to publicise the position and to act as 
a morale booster to those most seriously affected. 
Mr Blakemore (Levels County Council) supported the idea on the 
basis that an informed public was a happy public. He stated that 
close liaison was necessary between County Councils and the relief 
organisation headquarters. This was the practice that had been 
followed previously in flood situations. 
256 
Mr Donaldson (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) suggested that 
the correct procedure would be for County chairmen to make initial 
statements, as soon as possible, about the facilities available and 
the types of relief that were being undertaken. 
The Chairman commented that the most essential thing in such state-
ments was that the information must be factual and be as up-to-date 
as possible. 
(19) Mr Faulks had asked that it be brought to notice of the meeting that 
concern was expressed in the Geraldine area at buildings which had 
been reputed to have a snow loading of two feet but which had 
collapsed with a considerably lighter load. 
Mr Slater (Geraldine County Council) commented that obviously 
buildings in the affected areas should have a higher snow loading 
factor than two feet. It was pointed out that the density of snow 
was an important question and wind conditions also. 
(20) Mr Kerr (Waitaki Catchment Commission) referred tQ the necessity for 
a general preparedness for snow conditions such as emergency cooking, 
lighting and heating facilities. It was also essential that farmers 
in areas which could be affected should be encouraged to own and 
maintain in good working order battery-operated radios, so that they 
could at least hear broadcast information. 
(21) Mr Donaldson stressed that farmers in snow areas should be encouraged 
to be self reliant so as to meet normal snow risks. 
Mr Neilson (State Advances Corporation) stated that there had been 
considerable lack of enquiries for assistance and he queried whether 
State Advances Corporation should be pushing this question or 
whether they could wait for requests to be made. It was commented 
that there would probably not be a great demand for the type of 
assistance available through State Advances Corporation and that there 
should certainly be no need for State Advances Corporation to canvass. 
FINDINGS OF THE ASHBURTON STAFF OF 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
1. Efficient management from top down is essential. All staff must be 
given clear areas of responsibility and lines of control at the start. 
Staff must all be in the position where they are given the opportunity and 
encouragement to do their best. 
2. District Description should have a special section on resources 
available in an emergency. 
e.g. Suitable headquarters 
Contractors 
Bulldozers 
Planes and helicopters 
Meal facilities 
Other Government Dep~rtment contacts 
Other Organizational contacts 
Available mobile radios. 
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3. Liaison with Police and Civil Defence, particularly, but also with 
other departments or organizations such as Ministry of Works, Power 
Board, Post Office and County need some central co-ordination. 
In any future disaster of a similar nature, main base would be the 
Operations Room in the Ashburton Police Station. Controlling Officers of 
all above would be in this room together. Sub-bases would be set up in 
main disaster area. 
4. Communications were a major problem and need improving by: 
(a) Mobile (prefe"rably 4-wheel-drive) radio communication must be 
available from start. Regular communication must be maintained with 
all assistance being rendered. 
(b) Local radio stations should have been used more. A person to be 
allotted Press and Radio Officer - not the Controller. Regular 
broadcasts are essential. 
(c) Regional Advisory Officer of the Ministry should inspect all areas 
at the start, with a quick flying visit. 
(d) All staff should have some training in the use of two-way radio. 
(e) Underground telephone wiring to be used where possible. 
5. Records should be kept as well as possible under the circumstances 
by: 
(a) Large graph sheets on pinex boards as master sheets. These enable 
scheduling to be seen at a glance. 
(b) Have sheets of memo paper date stamped. Write time down on every 
message. This means later all scraps of paper can be easily identi-
fied and used as a more reliable record." 
(c) One man, preferably departmental, should be allocated to each 
helicopter to see it has an efficient schedule, and keeps to it, 
travel with it and keep its records. 
D.D. Collie 
Farm Advisory Officer 
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FINDINGS OF FARM ADVISORY OFFICERS 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Christchurch, 
31 August 1973) 
Setting up an Organisation to Deal with an Emergency 
One of the main difficulties in dealing with an emergency is loss of 
communications (i.e. telephone and road access). This is particularly so 
with snow, and there is always a delay until weather clears, and road 
access is established. 
Line of action to be taken 
(1) Set up a Steering Committee: 
- Evaluate the situation. 
- The Farm Advisory Officer to be on the spot. 
- Steering Committee should be geographically spread. 
- Should consist of someone near but not likely to be involved or 
snowed in - one who knows the area and has some standing in 
Federated Farmers. 
- There should be two or three on call. The Steering Committee 
should consist of 20 members (?). 
(2) Equipment and Services: 
(a) Aircraft to be on standby to be called on as soon as conditions 
permit, either fixed-wing or helicopters. 
(b) Need list of contacts for helicopters which are available in the 
area (Air Force and private). 
(c) List of fixed-wing planes available. 
(d) List of ground equipment (i.e. Army, Council, Ministry of Works, 
and Post Office. In general, Council etc. will be tied up opening 
roads. 
(e) List of contractors and what equipment they have and where it is 
likely to be based. 
(f) Army - tracked vehicles 
- personnel carriers 
- radiotelephone communications 
(tracked vehicles could possibly be used for initial ground survey). 
(g) Jet boats - for reconnaissance on rivers i.e. Waimakariri and 
Rakaia. 
(3) Action Committee 
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Could consist of Ministry Officers (Advisory Services Division and 
Animal Health Division), Police, County Council, Catchment Board, 
Ministry of Works, MinistTY of Transport, Stock and Station firm 
representatives. 
(4) Communications 
- Must assume that there are no communications. 
- Arrange session with Army and Air Force on communications and 
familiarisation - inspections of country likely to be under snow 
in the event of a storm. 
- Encourage outlying farmers to have radiotelephone communications. 
- Encourage runholders to write a message in the snow. Send a card 
of instructions. 
- Discuss with Councils concerned the position Qf this committee if 
Civil Emergency is declared. 
- The Ministry's Office was considered the best centre for future 
emergency. 
- Telephone - 3 lines required in any future emergency. 
(5) Control 
The Head controller should be the local Farm Advisory Officer. It 
was considered that - control at Darfield was O.K. 
- manpower at Hororata was O.K. 
The Deputy Controller should handle publicity and be: 
Manpower controller 
Hay and stock cartage controller (including grazing) 
Communications - controller 
Ground equipment - controller 
Controller at sub-stations 
and set guidelines to type of men required (i.e. stock agents with 
knowledge of country))to man helicopters. 
Consideration should be given to: 
(6) Disposal of dead stock 
(7) Buildings - Earthquake and War damages 
(8) Fuel transportation 
(9) Transportation for bulldozers 
(10) Each office needs a good supply of maps of the area. 
NOTE: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has now instructed district 
staff to set up steering committees in conjunction with Federated Farmers 
so that a nucleus of people who would be appointed to area relief committees 
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in an emergency would have a working knowledge of procedures. Farmers 
are to be selected both as individuals and for their geographic location. 
M.A.F. district staff have also been instructed to establish and record 
at all offices the resources that are available in each area. They are 
also required to work out detailed plans which can be put into effect 
with a minimum of delay at all locations which may be involved in an 
emergency. 
ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE 
AND FISHERIES IN FUTURE EMERGENCIES 
(Report of a meeting of sub-regional representatives 
of the Ministry held at Timaru) 
PRESENT 
D.D. Collie (Chairman, Ashburton); R.L. Bennetts (Darfield); 
T.H. Donaldson (Fairlie); M. Stockdill (Waikouaiti); J.D. Currie (Oamaru); 
D. Reynolds (Christchurch). 
A. Actions Needed Now or in Near Future 
B. Actions on First Signs of an Emergency 
C. Actions During an Actual Emergency 
A. ACTION NOW 
(1) Responsibilities and lines of control need setting out clearly from 
Wellington down. 
(a) Need a specific Head Office co-ordinator for emergencies (now 
decided it will be Director, Advisory Services Division, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries). 
(b) Regional Advisory Officers must inter-communicate as well as deal 
with Head Office. As soon as the main centre of disaster emerges, 
one Regional Advisory Officer becomes South Island (or North Island) 
controller, i.e., one Regional Advisory Officer could control the 
operation in two or possibly three regions. 
(c) Officers require clearer, more specific, standing instructions on -
(i) Who can request declaration of a disaster area and how soon 
can it become effective. 
(ii) What equipment can be used under subsidy, either full or 50 
percent. (Could the Director have authority to make initial 
decisions to be later confirmed by Cabinet?) 
(iii) 
(i v) 
(v) 
What authorities a Farm Advisory Officer has. 
Our responsibilities when sending out people into possibly 
dangerous situations - such as to 
(1) Ensure people are physically fit 
(2) Ensure that recovery is arranged 
(3) Ensure they are capable 
(4) Ensure they have equipment for survival if recovery is 
delayed. 
Our liabilities in·situations above. 
(2) Sub-regional steering or standing committee should-be set up in each 
sub-region. 
(a) Should include up to six strategically spread farmers, Secretary of 
Federated Farmers, State Advances Corporation representative and with 
sub-regional controller as Chairman and Administration Officer as 
Secretary. 
(b) Should meet and discuss M.A.F. preparations (basically results of 
this meetin'g) once these have taken place. 
(c) Should form the basis of the Relief Committee in an emergency. 
(d) Have district contact men who ring you whenever trouble seems to be 
arising. 
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(e) In some areas much of the organisationaand liaison will be at district 
rather than sub-regional level, e.g. Palmerston. 
(f) Signed authority should be obtained from say 20 farmers (in areas 
likely to be affected) for sub-regional controller to order necessary 
equipment immediately. This would eliminate a major delay problem 
or responsibility. 
(3) Into the District Description held at all offices should be a special 
section on "Resources Available in an Emergency" which is reviewed 
annually. 
(a) To include such things as -
suitable headquarters 
contractors 
bulldozers 
aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter) listed and zoned 
Army and Air Force resources 
meal facilities 
list of people who can assist, e.g. soil conservators, 
private consultants 
suitable commercial people 
Rabbit Board employees. 
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This list should have clearly marked those who have assisted 
in previous disaster relief as experience is a valuable asset. 
other Government Departments and organizations with contact names 
for each, e.g. Ministry of Works 
Power Board 
Post Office 
Catchment Board 
County anq Police 
available mobile radios and amateur operators 
jet boats 
a list of equipment and stores for immediate order at first signs 
of disaster arising. 
(b) Much of this data to be available from Animal Health Division, 
M.A.F., or local County. 
(c) Twelve County maps and topographical maps should be held in each 
office. Alternatively, if access to th~se is readily available 
at local County office or Lands and Survey this is preferable. 
(4) Sub-regional controller should ensure that a full understanding of 
each other'S role is achieved now, between M.A.F., Police and Civil 
Defence. Also the roles of other organizations, e.g. Power Board 
and County. 
Of particular importance is a list of equipment held by these 
organisations. 
Also a clear guide to the prior responsibilities of Civil Defence 
and Police where people and property are involved. 
(5) Regional Advisory Officer to organize a training course durin& 1974 -
probably at Wigram. 
(a) To cover the following main topics -
Use of helicopter (safety, what it can do, how to sling loads and 
how to schedule) 
Use of radio e.g. Post Office Engineer responsible for radiotelephone 
Map reading 
Organization and administration of an emergency 
General talk on principles of rescue work in both water and snow 
(may need speakers from other regions). 
(b) Three officers from each sub-region to attend (including sub-
regional controller). 
(c) Copies of the Search and Rescue Handbook (Saric 1/1973) should be 
circulated to all Advisory staff. 
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(d) As a result of this summary and the above course, an advisory bulletin 
be prepared to replace present circulars and instructions. 
(6) Each sub-region should prepare a "Handout Card" for all farmers 
entitled, "What to do in an Emergency", to be put by phones. 
(a) It would outline - relief measures likely to be set up 
contact people in the area 
how to get communication, e.g. write on snow 
(b) Arrangements would be made with local radio stations to have set 
times for broadcasting messages during an emergency. These times 
would be on the handout. 
B. FIRST ACTIONS 
(1) Local checking on first signs of any trouble. 
(a) From contact men who ring you whenever certain events occur, e.g. 
three inches of snow, a two-foot river rise. 
(b) When definite problem seems to be arising, contact your Regional 
Advisory Officer (if not available, contact Head Office). 
(2) This should be followed by a reconnaissance flight in fixed-wing 
aircraft. 
(a) Regional Advisory Officer to delegate all inspectional requirements 
and remain at the office. 
(b) A local flight can be arranged by the Senior Farm Advisory officer 
if necessary. (Speed is essential.) This may well be before (a). 
(c) Police should accompany M.A.F. staff on this first flight. 
(Liaison with police throughout is very important.) 
(d) Follow the first reconnaissance, with an helicopter reconnaissance 
of specific situations if needed. 
(e) Have administration staff warn people of the possible need for the 
relief committee to take action. (They can be then making their own 
arrangements.) 
(3) If necessary, take the action needed to set up a Relief Committee 
and Organization. 
(a) Liaison at an early stage is important (even before headquarters is 
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set up) with - Police 
Civil Defence 
Federated Farmers, and other organizations such as -
Post Office 
Post and Telegraph 
Power Board 
Catchment Authorities 
County Council 
Stock firms (for Rt feed supplies and grazing). 
(b) Define duties, clear areas of responsibilities and lines of control 
for all involved in the organization. This would be the responsibility 
of the Sub-Regional Controller to do, with the approval of the Regional 
Advisory Officer if it is possible. 
C. ACTIONS IN THE EMERGENCY 
(1) Set up the necessary headquarters. 
(a) Main co-ordinating'headquarters at the sub-regional centre, manned 
by the Sub-Regional Controller. 
(b) Operational headquarters as close as possible to trouble. 
(c) Use a hall or large facilities if available. 
(d) Ensure ample phones installed immediately (suggest 3-4 lines). 
(e) Prepare and display plenty of signs around headquarters, i.e. 
air operations, ground operations, feed supplies. 
(f) A busy headquarters needs one person as a receptionist cum chucker-
out. 
(2) Staffing-
(a) M.A.F. in charge of all bases or headquarters. Usually Farm 
Advisory Officer who services the area. 
(b) Use all "non-involved" personnel possible, with good local knowledge, 
i.e. M.A.F. staff 
Field officers of other Departments 
Catchment Board officers 
Private farm consultants 
(c) Sound "non-involved" farmers with good local knowledge can be very 
helpful if selected carefully, also similarly, sound stock agents 
or lamb drafters. 
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(d) It is essential at the start that all staff must be given clear 
areas of responsibility (e.g. ground equipment, private helicopters 
or labour) and clear lines of control and staff to answer to. 
Officer in charge must be clear from the start. 
(e) A Press and Radio officer should be appointed. (Sole officer to 
deal with Press .and Radio.) 
(f) As mentioned before, Sub-Regional Controller must ensure good 
liaison with other organizations or departments, especially Police 
and Civil Defence. 
(g) When setting up headquarters, don't forget meal arrangements and 
sleeping if necessary. 
(3) Communications-
(a) This is one of the first essentials. 
(b) Radio network should be set up to include -
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
All helicopters 
Mobile radio within local areas to control ground equipment 
Link with any sub-bases. 
(c) Press and Radio Officer should ensure regular bulletins for 
scheduled N.Z.B.C. broadcasts. 
(d) Sub-Regional Controller to ensure Head Office is kept well 
informed by regular reports to Regional Advisory Officer. 
(4) Records-
(a) Use pinex baords with large sheets of graph paper for scheduling. 
(b) Have date stamped memo paper by each phone. Write the time on each 
as messages are received or given. 
(c) One man in charge of each helicopter (to fly with it). One man in 
charge of each group of ground equipment. With a long exercise, may 
have to change staff after two days. 
(5) Labour Organization -
(a) Assembly firstly at Sub-regional headquarters (if large numbers). 
(b) Only experienced men on dangerous country. 
(c) Even on easy country, at least one experienced man per team. One 
man in charge of each team and his name recorded. 
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(d) Ensure good meal arrangements and sleeping if necessary. 
(e) Ensure all report in each night one hour before dark, or at least 
their locality and recovery checked' one hour before dark. 
(6) Other Services -
(a) Stock movement and feed cartage -
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
Organize early and get headquarters approval. 
Detail organization left to Federated Farmers and carriers. 
Must keep close liaison with local Federated Farmers 
SeGretary. 
Co-ordinate any activity outside sub-region, e.g. hay from 
another region. 
One officer should be appointed solely to liaise with firms, 
carriers, etc. 
(b) Water Supplies -
(i) Once again organized by Federated Farmers and local authority. 
(c) Dead Stock Disposal -
(i) Responsibility of Livestock Division. 
(ii) Must keep them and headquarters informed of any likely need. 
(d) Urgent Supplies - e.g. vet supplies 
(i) The responsibility of Sub-Regional Controller to arrange. 
(ii) It could be advisable to have vet on the local committee. 
(7) Liaison with Other Bodies -
(a) Police and Civil Defence - essential from the start. 
(b) Local body authority - also essential from the start. Especially 
for access. 
(c) Power Board and Post and Telegraph. 
(d) Catchment Board. 
(8) Winding up -
(a) As soon as possible, frontline headquarters should close down. 
(b) Close sub-regional headquarters in consultation with the Farmer 
Committee. 
ADDITIONAL NOTES 
(1) Insurance liabilities need clarifying -
(i) Farm Advisory Officers 
(ii) Farmers and-others under our direction. 
(2) Our responsibilities in regard to road opening. 
(3) Priorities. These are -
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(i v) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
Survey 
People 
Spotting 
Hay to cows 
Movement of labour 
Hay to other stock 
Movement of stock 
All farmers to be at stage (iii) before any at {iv). Items (iv) 
to (vii) will vary with circumstances. 
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(4) Assistance is available through Transport Department to close roads. 
Civil Air to close airspace. 
(5) Expenses. All reasonable expenses will be paid to staff including -
(a) Morning and afternoon teas 
(b) Some coverage of loss of personal property 
(c) Reasonable additional protective clothing purchases. 
(6) Suggested procedures should be in the form of guidelines only as 
there is a danger of over-organization which limits on-the-spot 
initiative. 
(7) Degree of action now and in the near future could well vary with the 
known risk in different districts or rub-regions. 
(8) It is very useful after an emergency to do an individual farm survey 
of damage, losses and assistance received. 
SUMMARY 
Most important point is fast action. Fo~lowed very closely by some 
intelligent decisions. Use initiative. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Below are summarised recommendations for improving the effectiveness 
of rescue and relief in future heavy snowfalls. 
A. STOCK HEALTH 
1. Farmers in snow-prone areas should ensure that they have ample stocks 
of Ketol or Glysatone, penicillin, and calcium boro-gluconate before 
winter starts. They should also lay in supplies of sheep nuts. 
2. Farmers should have some snow clearing equipment of their own and 
should start using it as soon as snow settles to any depth and keep 
using it, even at intervals during the night, to keep open access to 
their stock and s~pplies of feedstuffs. 
B. STOCK RESCUE 
1. Early reconnaissance is essential. Fixed-wing aeroplanes are usually 
more quickly obtainable for this than are helicopters. 
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries staff and some key farmers 
and rural service men need regular familiarization with helicopters 
and aircraft procedures and tuition in elementary navigation. They 
also need familiarization with Army procedures and equipment. 
3. District lists of contractors and farmers with heavy equipment should 
be compiled and kept up to date by Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries offices (now authorised). 
4. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries district offices in snow-prone 
areas need radiotelephone equipment, or quick and certain access to 
it. They need training in using it. 
S. A four-wheel drive vehicle should be located at each Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries district office. 
6. Good record keeping is essential. Aids are date-stamped paper in 
pads, large sheets of graph paper on wallboard for scheduling, noting 
time of each message passed. 
7. One man, preferably a staff member of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries should be allocated to act as liaison officer with each 
helicopter working in a district, to travel with it, keep its records 
and compile its task schedule. 
8. It is probably desirable for the local Farm Advisory Officer to 
automatically assume the position of livestock rescue co-ordinator 
for Disaster Relief Committees. 
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9. Early warning systems should be set up with key farmers expected to 
telephone in to M.A.F. office when snow builds up to a pre-determined 
level. 
10. Only experienced men should be sent snowraking in steep hill country 
and in easier country a locally experienced man must lead each team. 
11. District offices of M.A.F. need detailed operations plans for use 
in an emergency (now authorised). 
C. ACCESS 
1. Early and firm measures to control sightseers must be taken. 
2. Self-contained clearing teams work well. 
3. Good radiotelephone communication between base ~nd teams is essential. 
~ 4. 
It should preferably be of dual channel type in case a repeater 
station fails. Reports should be made at fixed intervals. 
Local resources lists should be compiled and kept up to date. 
5. Single-lane access ways need frequent passing bays, and entrances 
to side roads should be widened out where possible. 
6. Much better use should be made of broadcast radio to relay messages 
at regular times to people without access or telephones, or to 
stranded motorists. The Police should be the single agency through 
which messages are relayed. 
7. Road clearing by graders and snowploughs should begin as soon as 
snow starts to lie and be kept going during daylight hours. Non-
essential clearing should cease at nightfall and plant be withdrawn 
from the snow zone. 
8. County Councils should consider giving prior permission to some 
farmers to open snowbound roads in future. 
9. All rubber-tyred machines and vehicles in snow need chains. 
D. GENERAL 
1. Organisations equipped with radiotelephone systems should consider 
arranging for the establishment of a joint emergency channel. 
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2. Radiotelephone sets for use in emergencies should be held at a base 
and dropped in by planes if necessary rather than left at remote 
sites. Regular servicing and use is essential for reliability. 
3. In each region discussion to organize relief services in emergencies 
should be held between -
New Zealand Police 
Civil Defence Organisations 
County Councils 
Power Boards 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Catchment Authorities 
Ministry of Works 
New Zealand Electricity Department 
Federated Farmers 
New Zealand Post Office. 
4. A central emergency headquarters should be established, perhaps under 
the control of the Police and in their Operations Room. This station 
would be in constant touch with the control bases of participating 
organisations and co-ordinate their activities. The central head-
quarters would'make decisions where human welfare was involved. 
5. In an emergency an early meeting of emergency controllers from each 
organisation is essential. It is probably better that this should 
happen rather than that a predetermined emergency plan should auto-
matically be set in motion. 
6. Army signal units are self-contained, and are expert at running 
communications systems in emergencies. They should be called in 
early. 
7. Civil Defence have mobile kitchens able to provide food. 
CONCLUSION 
After the 1967 snow, the Institute published an article about it in 
"Review". It concluded with a list of "Suggestions for the Future'~ based on 
the opinions of those who took part in relief work. The suggestions were 
repeated in the full report sent to all contributing organizations. 
Unfortunately few of the suggestions appear to have been put into practice 
before and during this latest disaster - especially those relating to joint 
organization of relief services. Most bodies had some sort of disaster 
plan and set it up for the occasion. But few enough of these plans were 
based on prior arrangements with other bodies. Some organizations were 
even unaware of or failed to advise others in the same district working 
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on related facets of relief. For instance, until Wednesday 8th - three 
days after snow relief began - Ashburton County emergency headquarters 
was unaware that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was organising 
reconnaissance and stotk rescue from bases at Mayfield and Methven. 
All the organisations involved in this 1973 snowstorm seem to have 
discussed wi thin' themselves ways of improving their internal efficiency 
in future disasters. Some joint meetings have even been held - for example 
in Ashburton where the Police convened a meeting attended by representatives 
of Civil Defence, Federated Farmers, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Ashburton County Council, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Transport, 
New Zealand Post Office and the Radio Emergency Corps. As a result the 
Police in Ashburton district are likely to take the initiative in 
organising relief in future disasters in the County. There are some 
other loose agreements and irregular dialogue between bodies. 
Local arrangements have usually depended on local initiators but no 
one organization or even Minister seems to have powers to co-ordinate 
others except where there is a civil emergency. In truth, some apparent 
reluctance between bodies to share in continuing formal liaison and 
regional disaster plans seems to indicate that while many are willing to 
assume authority, 'few are willing to dilute what th~y have. 
The organiz~tion of relief services (aided by more and better 
equipment) was much better in August 1973 than in November 1967. However, 
by their lack of preparation, too many seem still to hope that "she'll be 
(nearly) right" again next time. 
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- Oamaru 
- Palmerston 
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New Zealand Forest Service - Canterbury Conservancy, Christchurch 
- Forest and Range Experiment Station, Rangiora 
Department of Lands and Survey - Christchurch 
- Timaru 
New Zealand Meteorological Service, Wellington 
New Zealand Post Office - Regional Engineers Office, Christchurch 
- District Engineer, Timaru 
Ministry of Works - Christchurch Residency - Highways 
- Timaru Residency 
New Zealand Electricity Department 
North Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Central Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Ashburton Electric Power Board 
South Canterbury Electric Power Board 
Waitaki Electric Power Board 
Malvern County Council 
Ashburton County Council 
Geraldine County Council 
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